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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS, 
a Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
NOVA MUD CORPORATION, 
a Nevada Corporation. 
Defendant/Appellant. 
RESPONDENT' S BRIEF 
No. 89-0634-CA 
Category 14(b) 
* * * * * 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to the 
provisions of §78-2a-3 (2) (d), Utah Code Ann. (eff. Jan. 1, 
1988), as this is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Third 
Circuit Court, State of Utah. In the case below, after trial in 
August, 1989, the trial court entered its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and then entered judgment in favor of 
plaintiff Consolidated Freightways and against defendant Nova Mud 
on October 11, 1989. Nova Mud appeals the Court's judgment. 
1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
1. Whether the issues in this case are governed by the 
Interstate Commerce Act and cases promulgated thereunder. 
2. Whether or not Appellant is estopped or otherwise 
precluded from seeking a referral to the ICC. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
49 U. S. C. §10761 (a) provides in full: 
(a) except as provided in this subtitle, a 
carrier providing transportation or service 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission under chapter 105 of this 
title [49 USC §§10501 et. seq. ] shall provide 
that transportation or service only if the 
rate for the transportation or service is 
contained in a tariff that is in effect under 
this subchapter [49 USC §10761 et. seq. ]. 
That carrier may not charge or receive a 
different compensation for that 
transportation or service than the rate 
specified in the tariff whether by returning 
a part of that rate to a person, giving a 
person a privilege, allowing the use of a 
facility that affects the value of that 
transportation or service, or another 
device. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings 
Below frnfl Disposition, 
Consolidated Freightways, indisputably a shipper in 
interstate commerce, shipped 90,000 pounds of drilling mud in the 
spring of 1986 from Salt Lake City to Florida at the request of 
Nova Mud Corporation. Subsequently, a dispute arose over the 
amount invoiced by Consolidated Freightways. The complaint below 
was filed on July 10, 1987. Nova Mud answered on July 17, 1987, 
alleging failure to state a claim, estoppel, failure of 
2 
'•oris J derat i on, statute of frauds, and fraud. Consolidated 
Frei ghtways 1 ater amended i ts compl ai nt to i nc 1 ude addi t i onal 
amounts due and owing and to allow a credit for payments made. 
Nova Mini i answer to the amended complaint ra i sed the same 
defenses as its original answer. Consolidated Freightways filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment on October 3, 1988. The Motion was 
fully briefed and argued on December 16,, 1988, but, waw withdrawn 
before the Court' s ruling thereon Shortly before trial, the 
court denied Nova Mud' s Motion to Amend its Answer to bring a 
counterclaim for fraud against Consolidated Freightways. 
The case was heard at trial before the Honorable Judge 
Robin Reesp,,,, sitting without a jury, on August 4 1989 and again 
on August 2 8, 1989. The trial court took the mat ten undei 
advisement and entered its Findings of Fact ^nd Conclusions of 
Law on September 1 5, ; ^  - ; * i o;. Judgment was 
thereafter entered on October : .^ v . . ^b^ +-o+-*"* amount of 
$10,566. 15, representing the amount actually invoiced by 
Consolidated Freightways less amounts paid, ?lus interest and 
costs. (R. 272-73). This appeal followed. 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. Consolidated Freightway s i s a iommoi i carri er subj ect to 
the Interstate Commerce Act. 
2. In March of 1986, Charles Perry, an employee of 
Nova Mud' s representation in its brief on page five that 
the Motion for Summary Judgment was denied is not true. The 
record below, at R. 116, and the docket entry dated 12/22/88, 
reflect the fact that Consolidated Freightways withdrew its 
Motion for Summary Judgement. (Appendix B hereto). 
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Consolidated Freightways, was contacted by Nova Mud Corporation. 
(Tr. 1, pp. 23-24). 2 
3. Nova Mud indicated that it wanted to ship 90,000 pounds 
of drilling mud to Cape Canaveral, Florida, and asked what it 
would cost to ship the same. (Tr. 1, pp. 23-24). 
4. Perry quoted a rate of $2. 00 per mile per truckload, 
anticipating that two truckloads would be needed to haul the 
cargo. (Tr. 1, p. 33). 
5. Two truckloads consist of two tractors with either one 
40 to 45-foot trailer or two 27-foot long trailers. (Tr. 1, pps. 
26-27). 
6. At some later date, Nova Mud again contacted 
Consolidated Freightways requesting the shipment of an additional 
16,000 pounds of shipping mud. Perry quoted a rate of $1.00 per 
mile for the additional trailer necessary. (Tr. 1, p. 29-30, 
114). 
1. Based on the weight of the commodity shipped, the 
applicable tariffs were Consolidated Freightways' No. 400, Item 
2200 for the 90, 000 pound shipment, establishing a rate of 200 
cents per mile per vehicle used, and No. 400, Item 1100 for the 
16,000 pound shipment establishing a rate of 100 cents per mile 
per vehicle used. (Tr. 1, pps. 42-45, 62-64, plaintiff7 s Exhibit 
The transcripts of the electronic tapes filed by the 
reporter are not numbered. For ease of reference, this brief 
will refer to the transcript commencing with opening arguments as 
" Tr. lfl, and the transcript consisting of both parties closing 
arguments as " Tr. 2". The relevant pages of the transcripts are 
reproduced in Appendix A hereto. 
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4). 
- o, Item 2200 io subject to Item 162, 
which item defines "vehicle" as "consisting of nut '"ikjjv than tw< 
trailers not exceeding 29-feet each in length oi: a single 
trailer not less than 40-feel in 1 enqt h. " (Tr. 1, p. 43; 
Plaintiff's Ex. 4 at pps. 4 and 7). 
9. Tariff No. 400, Item 1100 is subject to Item 160 
which item allows the rate to apply < . .ngle railer not 
exceeding 29-feet in length." (Plaintiff's Ex. 4 at pps 4 and 
6). 
'10. Because of the weight involved in Nova Mud shipments, 
it was necessary for two vehicles with two 27-foot trailers each 
to haul the original 90,000 pound shipment, and one vehicle with 
one 27-foot trailer to haul the second. (Tr. 1, pp. 52-5 3, 85-
88). The bills of lading reflect that five trailers were in 
fact used to haul t ^ cargo. (Tr. 1 o0-5: plaintiff's 
Exhibits 9, 10 and 11). 
11. The cargo was satisfactorily shipped. (Tr. 1, pp. 53-
54). 
12. The complaint below was filed on July 10, 1987. (R. 1-
2). Nova Mud answered on July 17, 1987, alleging failure to 
state a claim, estoppel, failuie oi: consideration, statute of 
-"While Mr. Perry testified that two 40 to 45-foot trailers 
and one 27-foot trailer would have adequately carried the 
commodity, he also clarified that Nova Mud would have been billed 
the same amount, since the rate applicable to one 40 to 45 foot 
trailer was the same rate applicable to two 27-foot trailers. 
(Tr, 1, p, 88). 
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frauds, and fraud. Nova Mud did not allege an affirmative 
defense of "unreasonable practices" predicated on 49 U. S. C. 
§10701 (a) (R. 5-7). Nor did Nova Mud bring a counterclaim for 
damages resulting from any alleged violation of federal law 
under 49 0.S. C §§ 11705(b)(3) or 11706(c)(2). 
13. On July 29, 1988, pursuant to stipulation, Consolidated 
Freightways amended its complaint to include additional amounts 
due and owing, and to allow a credit for payments made. (R. 42-
46). In answer to the amended complaint, Nova Mud again alleged 
failure to state a claim, estoppel, failure of consideration, 
statute of frauds, and fraud, but did not at that time allege an 
"unreasonable practices" defense predicated on 49 U. S. C. Section 
10701(a) or a counterclaim for damages under 49 U. S.C. §§ 
11705(b)(3) or 11706)(c)(2). (R. 47-49). 
14. Consolidated Freightways filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on October 3, 1988 (R. 4-83). In response to the 
Motion, and for the first time, Nova Mud raised the issue of 
"unreasonable practices". (R. 90). The Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was argued on December 16, 1988, but was 
withdrawn before the Court's ruling thereon. (R. 116; Docket 
entry dated 12/22/88). No ruling was made on the Defendant's 
oral request at the hearing to refer the matter to the ICC. 
15. At the time of trial, Nova Mud conceded that it was 
not pleading unreasonable practices as a defense. (Tr. 2, p. 
26). 
16. While Nova Mud asked at the time of trial to amend its 
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answer to include the defense of accord and satisfaction, no 
motion was made at that time to amend its answer to plead an 
unreasonable practices defense. Nor was a motion made to refer 
the case to the ICC for an unreasonable practices determination. 
No motion was ever made during the entire course of the 
proceedings below to bring a counterclaim under 49 U.S. C. 
§11705(b)(3) or §11706(c)(2) for damages resulting from any-
alleged violation of Consolidated Freightways of the Interstate 
Commerce Act. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. Legal and Historical Background. The filed rate 
doctrine, with long standing historical roots in both 
Congressional and judicial law, governs the facts in this case. 
In order to prevent unjust discrimination between interstate 
carriers, a carrier is prohibited by federal law from charging or 
receiving a different compensation for services other than the 
rates specified in a published tariff. Neither ignorant nor 
intentional misquotation of rates can excuse the carrier from 
charging less or more than the rates filed. 
The Interstate Commerce Commission, in an attempt to temper 
the harshness of the filed rate doctrine, has recently 
undertaken the task of determining whether or not a carrier' s 
practice in any particular instance constitutes an unfair 
practice. There is controversy in the federal courts over 
whether or not the ICC can assume that authority in the face of 
the congressionally mandated filed rate doctrine. However, even 
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if the ICC s new self-assumed role is to be accepted by the 
courts, Nova Mud is precluded, in part by its own actions, from 
seeking relief from the ICC and is otherwise bound by the filed 
rate doctrine. 
B. The Issues in this Case are Governed by the Interstate 
Commerce Act and the Cases Promulgated Thereunder. Nova Mud's 
arguments on appeal are insufficient to overturn the trial 
court' s findings and conclusions that the filed rate doctrine 
applies. There is ample evidence of record to support the trial 
court' s Findings of Fact that the tariff rates to which 
Consolidated Freightways attested apply to Nova Mud' s shipment. 
The fact that there may have been no meeting of minds between 
Consolidated Freightways and Nova Mud is irrelevant where the 
filed rate doctrine is applicable. So, too, does the filed rate 
doctrine preclude Nova Mud' s assertion of accord and satisfaction 
as a defense to Consolidated Freightways' claims. 
C. Nova Mud is Estopped or Otherwise Precluded from Seeking 
a Referral to the ICC. Nova Mud' s position that it is entitled 
to seek an ICC referral is incorrect. First, the ICC s authority 
is limited to a case in which a lower rate is negotiated and then 
not published with the ICC by the carrier. That is not the 
factual situation in this case. Second, because an ICC 
"unreasonable practices" determination examines a course of 
conduct by a carrier, and there is no evidence in this case as to 
any course of conduct. Indeed, there is nothing in the evidence 
to indicate that this case is anything more than a misquotation 
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or misunderstanding between the parties to which the filed rate 
doctrine is directly applicable. 
Nova Mud waived its right for an ICC referral by not moving 
prior to the time of trial for such a referral, and by conceding 
at the time of trial that an ICC referral was inappropriate. 
Nova Mud stated at the time of trial that it was not pleading 
unreasonableness as a defense. It should now be estopped from 
asserting any other position. 
Finally, even if Nova Mud had moved the court for a 
referral, and even if the ICC had jurisdiction to hear the case, 
Nova Mud cannot raise its constitutional arguments for the first 
time on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Legal and Historical Background 
Contrary to Nova Mud' s statement of the nature of the 
proceedings below, the issues in this case arise, not out of a 
simple contract dispute, but from the application of the 
Interstate Commerce Act to the facts. The shipment of goods in 
interstate commerce is heavily regulated by Congress, and black 
letter rules of contract law, including "meeting of minds" and 
"accord and satisfaction" are inapplicable. 
An entity that holds itself out as and engages in the 
business of shipping goods in interstate commerce is a common 
carrier and is subject to the Interstate Commerce Act. 49 U. S. C. 
§10102; Brennon v. Schwerman Trucking Co. . 540 F. 2d 1200 (4th 
Cir. 1976); Climate Engineering Co. v. Merchants Fast Motor 
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Lines, Inc. , 459 S. W. 2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). In 
accordance with §10761 of the Interstate Commerce Act, a common 
carrier is bound to provide: 
.transportation or service only 
if the rate for the transportation or 
service is contained in a tariff that 
is in effect under this subchapter 
[49 USCS Sections 10761 et seq. ]. 
That carrier may not charge or 
receive a different compensation for 
that transportation or service than 
£h£ £3Lt£ $p3Qifi3fl in the tariff 
whether by returning a part of that 
rate to a person, giving a person a 
privilege, allowing the use of a 
facility that affects the value of 
that transportation or service, or 
another device. [Emphasis added. ] 
49 U. S. C. §10761. 
This congressional mandate has come to be known as the 
"filed rate doctrine". The doctrine embodies a longstanding 
policy against unjust discrimination between interstate carriers. 
When the Interstate Commerce Act was first passed late in the 
19th century, and when it was amended by the Motor Carrier Act of 
1935 to embrace motor carriers, one of the principal areas of 
Congressional and regulatory concern was unequal treatment of 
shippers by carriers. Boiled down to its essence, if carriers 
were to permit shipper "A", located in Salt Lake City, Utah, a 
cheaper rate for the movement of its goods than shipper "B", also 
located in Salt Lake City, Utah, then shipper "A" would obtain an 
unfavorable advantage over its competitor " B". The Interstate 
Commerce Act and the federal cases construing it are preeminently 
concerned with rooting out every discrimination and every device 
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to effectuate discrimination that comes into view. Under the 
Interstate Commerce Act, a carrier' s charges have the force of 
law and therefore may not be modified by private agreement. In 
re Penn Central Transportation Co. , 477 F. 2d 841, 844 (3d Cir. 
1973), af f' d. 414 U.S. 885, 94 S. Ct. 231 (1973). As is stated in 
L & N Railroad v. Central Iron Co. . 265 U.S. 59, 65, 44 S. Ct. 
441, 442 (1924): 
The amount of the freight charges legally 
payable is determined by applying this tariff 
rate to the actual weight. Thus, they were 
fixed by law. No contract of the carrier 
could reduce the amount legally payable, nor 
release from liability a shipper who had 
assumed an obligation to pay the charges. 
Ngr gQylfl ?iny »<?t Qr Qpiissipn pf the carrier 
(except for the running of the Statute of 
Limitations) estop or preclude it from 
enforcing the payment of the full amount by a 
person liable therefore. [Emphasis added.] 
The Supreme Court of the United States, again stating the 
powerful inclination of the court and Congress to stamp out 
devices for discrimination, held in Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 35 S. Ct. 494 (1915) 
(Appendix G hereto) as follows: 
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the rate 
of the carrier duly filed is the only lawful 
charge. Deviation from it is not permitted 
upon any pretext. Shippers and travelers are 
charged with notice of it, and they as well 
as the carrier must abide by it, unless it is 
found by the Commission to be unreasonable. 
Ignorance or misquotation of rates is not an 
excuse for paying or charging either less or 
more than the rate filed. This rule is 
undeniably strict and it obviously may work a 
hardship in some cases, but it embodies the 
policy which has been adopted by Congress in 
the regulation of interstate commerce in 
order to prevent unjust discrimination. 
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[Emphasis added. ] 
237 U. S. at 97. 
Under the filed rate doctrine, not even the intentional 
misquotation by the carrier of the applicable rates can prevent 
enforcement of the lawful rates. The Maxwell court continued: 
Neither the intentional nor accidental 
misstatement of the applicable published rate 
will bind the carrier or shipper. The lawful 
rate is that which the carrier must exact and 
that which the shipper must pay. The 
shipper1 s knowledge of the lawful rate is 
conclusively presumed. . . . [Citation 
omitted, emphasis added. ] 
Id. at 97. 
In 1986, in the wake of the I ML Trucking bankruptcy and 
other similar bankruptcies across the country, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission engaged in a rule making process in response 
to a petition filed by the National Industrial Transportation 
League (NITL). The proposed NITL rule would have declared a 
negotiated (but unpublished) motor common carrier rate to be the 
maximum reasonable rate "if the shipper acted with a good faith 
belief that the negotiated rate was the legally applicable 
rate." ICC Op., Ex Parte No. MC-177 (October 14, 1986) 
(Appendix D hereto). After full consideration, the ICC rejected 
the NITL proposal* Instead the ICC determined that because of 
its expertise in the area, it had authority to decide whether or 
not a carrier' s practice constituted an unfair practice. The ICC 
then assumed an advisory role to the courts on a case by case 
basis, passing on each set of particular circumstances as being a 
fair or unfair practice. 
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The ICC s self-assumed advisory role has been the subject of 
substantial controversy in the lower federal courts. While many 
courts accept the ICC s position, many others have questioned 
whether an ICC opinion that a particular practice is 
unreasonable can be binding on a court. These courts have based 
their rejection of the ICC s position on the fact that Congress 
and the U. S. Supreme Court have made adherence to the filed rate 
doctrine mandatory. See, e. a. , Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. 
Yaauinto (Matter of Caravan Refrigerated, Inc.), 864 F.2d, 388 
(5th Cir. 1989); Campbell Sixty Six Express, Inc. v. H. A. Cole 
Products Co. (In re Campbell Sixty Six Express, Inc. , 94B. R. 1019 
(Bankr. W. D. Mo. , 1988). 
In Motor Carrier Audit and Collection Company v. Unitefl 
Food Service, Inc. , 1987 W. L. 19008, (U. S. D. C. , D.Colo., May 
1987); (Appendix E hereto) the court recognized that in 1980, 
Congress passed legislation deregulating and amending certain 
portions of the Interstate Commerce Act, but did not amend the 
statute that is applicable to the present situation: 
While the ICC may have the authority 
to issue an advisory opinion 
concerning the reasonableness of 
allowing the plaintiff to collect the 
alleged undercharges, absent some 
indication that the Congress sought 
to change the law, this court cannot 
adopt such an opinion as its holding, 
if doing so would contradict clear 
precedent. Neither the decision in 
Seaboard nor the policy statement 
issued by the ICC in Ex Parte No. MC-
177 excuse this court from its 
obligation to follow clear Supreme 
Court precedents. And, as stated, 
the fact that the Motor Carrier Act 
13 
of 1980 did not amend 42 U. S. C. 
Section 10761(a) indicates that 
Congress did not intend to change the 
strict interpretation given that 
section. 
1987 W.L. 19008 at pp. 7-8. The case was before the court on the 
defendant's motion to stay proceedings and to refer the 
unreasonable practices issues to the ICC. That motion was 
denied. 
In response to the wave of courts refusing to refer cases, 
NITL again petitioned the ICC. The ICC determined that not only 
did it have primary jurisdiction to make unreasonable practices 
determinations, but that its determinations would be dispositive 
of the issues and binding on the courts. ICC Op. 1989 MCC Lexis 
333, June 14, 1989 (Appendix F hereto). 
What effect the ICC s new opinion will have on the 
judiciary' s disposition of these cases is not yet clear. The 
rejection by a significant number of courts of the ICC s mere 
advisory role suggests an even greater recoil by the courts from 
the ICC s statement that its opinions are dispositive of these 
issues. 
But even if the courts were to embrace the ICC s new 
self-assumed role, Nova Mud, the appellant herein for the reasons 
stated below, is precluded from seeking relief from the ICC and 
is otherwise bound by the filed rate doctrine. 
B. The Issues in this Case are Governed by the Interstate 
Commerce Act flnfl the Cases Pypmyilgfltefl Thereynfler. 
Consolidated Freightways and Nova Mud are both engaged in 
the business of shipping goods in interstate commerce and are 
14 
bound by the statutes and cases set forth hereinabove. 
Consolidated Freightways provided freight services to Nova Mud. 
Consolidated Freightways invoiced Nova Mud the applicable tariff 
rates as published with the ICC. Consolidated Freightways and 
Nova Mud are both bound by law and the filed rate doctrine to the 
tariff rate. In an effort to avoid application of the tariffs 
and the filed rate doctrine, Nova Mud has argued that the trial 
court erred in making the following factual findings and legal 
conclusions: 
1. The tariff rates to which Consolidated Freightways 
attested applied to Nova Mud7 s shipment (Appellant7 s Brief, Point 
2A); 
2. Five trailers were necessary to haul Nova Mud' s 
shipment (Appellant's Brief, Points 2B and 3); 
3. There was an enforceable contract (Appellant' s 
Brief, Point 1); and 
4. The defense of accord and satisfaction was not 
available to Nova Mud (Appellant's Brief, Point 3). 
A review of the record and applicable law, however, reveals 
that the trial court correctly decided these issues. 
(1) The evidence of record is sufficient to support the 
trial court' s findings. In order to successfully attack a trial 
court' s factual findings: 
An appellant must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the trial 
court' s findings and then demonstrate 
that, even viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the 
findings, the evidence is 
15 
insufficient to support the findings, 
or that its findings are otherwise 
clearly erroneous. [citations 
omitted]. 
Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P. 2d, 84, 88 (Utah App. 1989). 
Nova Mud has not complied with the marshalling requirement. 
Instead, Nova Mud has pointed to some confusion at the time of 
trial in Consolidated Freightways' employee Charles Perry' s 
testimony over the definition of the word "vehicle11. Because of 
that confusion, Nova Mud contends there is insufficient evidence 
to show that the tarrifs to which Consolidated Freightways 
testified were applicable to Nova Mud' s shipment. 
The evidence in support of the trial court' s findings that 
the tariffs applied to the shipment was simply ignored by Nova 
Mud. For example, in explaining how the tariffs applied to Nova 
Mud' s shipment, Consolidated Freightways' employee Charles Perry 
testified as follows: 
Q. (By Ms. Van Frank) . . . Can you 
explain to us how the tariffs as set 
forth in Exhibit No. 4 [Tariff CFWY 
400] apply to the shipment as 
reflected in Exhibit No. 6 [an 
invoice for 20,000 lbs. of the Nova 
Mud shipment]? 
A. (By Mr. Perry) In the center 
section of that copy o f [ t h e 
invoice], it shows a rate per CFWY 
Tariff 400, Item No. 1100. Exhibit 
No. 4 is the copy of the CF 400 
Tariff, Item No. 1100. States a rate 
of 100 cents per mile per vehicle 
used. 
Q. How many vehicles were used in 
Exhibit No. 6? 
A. One trailer. 
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Q. What is the rate as set forth in 
the tariff? 
A. 100 cents per mile. 
Q. How many miles is it from Salt 
Lake City to Florida as set forth [in 
Consolidated Freightways' Mileage 
Matrix]? 
A. 2,329. 
Q. For a total charge of what? 
A. $2,329. 
Q. Is that in accord with the 
tariffs as set forth in Exhibit No. 
4? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. The same thing with Exhibit No. 7 
[an invoice for 46, 655 lbs. of Nova 
Mud's shipment]. Would you explain 
to us how the tariffs in Exhibit No. 
4 apply to the shipments as set forth 
in Exhibit No. 7? 
A. Rated on the same Tariff 400, 
Item No. 2200, which states a rate of 
200 cents per mile per vehicle used. 
Q. And how many vehicles were used 
in Exhibit 7? 
A. Two. 
Q. And how many miles from Salt Lake 
City to Florida are set forth in that 
Exhibit? 
A. 2,329. 
Q. For a total charge of how much? 
A. $4658. 
Q. And are the charges as set forth 
in Exhibit No. 7 in accord with the 
tariffs as set forth in Exhibit No. 
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4? 
A. Yes, they are. 
Tr. 1, pp. 62-64. A similar interchange took place regarding 
application of the tariffs to the final invoice. See Tr. 1, pp. 
64-65. 
In explaining the tariffs, Mr. Perry noted that the items 
setting forth the rates within the tariffs were subject to the 
items setting forth the rules and regulations within the tariff: 
BY MR. PERRY: [Tariff 400, Item No. 
2200] is subject to Item No. 162, 
which is on page 4 of CFWY Tariff 
400]. . . 
Tr. 1, p. 43. Item 162 reads in full as follows: 
When reference is made to this item, 
the rate will apply on a per mile per 
vehicle basis using mileage computed 
by the instructions contained in Item 
155 in this tariff and will apply 
only when the freight is loaded in a 
vehicle consisting of not more than 
twp frrfrilqrg not exceeding 2? fsscfc 
each in length or a single trailer 
not less than 40 feet in length, 
[emphasis added]. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, page 4. (Appendix C hereto). Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 4 also indicates that Tariff No. 400, Item 1100 was 
subject to Item No. 160, which item reads: 
When reference is made to this item, 
the rate yill apply <?n » per mile per 
trailer basis using mileage computed 
by the instructions contained in Item 
155 in this tariff and will apply 
only when the freight is loaded in a 
Single trailer not exceeding 29 feet 
in length. [emphasis added]. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, page 4. (Appendix C hereto). 
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The Court, having understood Mr. Perry' s testimony, actually 
explained it to Nova Mud' s counsel during the cross-examination 
of Mr. Perry: 
Q. (By Mr. Guyon) But now you' re 
s a y i n g , as I understand i t , t h a t i t 
was an i n c o r r e c t f i g u r e a t an 
i n c o r r e c t r a t e , and i t shou ld have 
b e e n two d o l l a r s p e r t r a i l e r p e r 
mi le? 
A. (By Mr. Perry) Two d o l l a r s per 
v e h i c l e . Now, v e h i c l e f o r your 
unders tanding i s two t r a i l e r s . 
THE COURT: We' r e r e a l l y g e t t i n g 
c o n f u s e d . I t h i n k [Mr. P e r r y ' s ] 
t e s t i m o n y was t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l quote 
was two d o l l a r s per mi l e per t r u c k 
l o a d , which was two t r a i l e r s . 
THE WITNESS: Correct . 
THE COURT: Does t h a t make s e n s e t o 
you , c o u n s e l ? I d o n ' t want t o 
t e s t i f y for him, but I t h i n k we' re 
g e t t i n g s t a l l e d here a l i t t l e b i t . 
MR. GUYON: Right. 
Tr. 1, pp. 81-82 . 
Any confusion in Mr. Perry' s testimony would appear to go to 
the weight of that testimony. The trial court having understood 
Mr. Perry' s testimony on the applicability of the rates 
apparently placed more weight on that testimony and on the 
documentary evidence in plaintiff s Exhibit 4. This is the 
prerogative of the trial court as the fact finder, and his 
decision should not be overturned. Allen v. Greyhound Lines, 
Inc. . 583 P. 2d 613 (Utah 1978). 
Nova Mud has also suggested on appeal that the applicable 
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tariff rates applied only because Consolidated Freightways 
unjustifiably used five trailers instead of three to haul Nova 
Mud' s commodity. Thus, Nova Mud argues, the tariffs do not apply 
because of Consolidated Freightway' s own fault in not having 
available the 40 to 45-foot trailers that would have made it 
possible for three trailers to carry the shipment. This 
argument, however, ignores the clear evidence given at the time 
of trial that the same tariff rate applicable to two 27-foot 
trailers was applicable to one 45-foot trailer. 
Q. (By Ms. Van Frank) ... [I]s it 
your testimony that the same two 
dollar rate that applied to two 
twenty-seven foot trailers would have 
been applied to one forty-five foot 
trailer? 
A. (By Mr. Perry) That is correct. 
Tr. 1, p. 94. Therefore, it made no difference that the 45 foot 
trailers were unavailable. If they had been available, and used, 
Nova Mud would have been invoiced the same $2 rate. 
Mr. Perry' s uncontradicted testimony also established that 
the number of trailers used was necessary because of the 
applicable weight limitations: 
Q. (By Ms. Van Frank) . . . [C]ould you 
tell us why it was necessary for five 
trailers to go from Salt Lake City 
to Florida on the Nova Mud shipment? 
A. (By Mr. Perry) With the weight 
limitations between Salt Lake City, 
Utah and Florida, there is only so 
much weight that can physically be 
loaded on a trailer and make it 
across trucking scales and whatever 
legally. 
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Q. So 106, 880 lbs. , is there any way 
that you could have brought that 
much weight from Salt Lake City to 
Florida on fewer number of trucks? 
A. No. 
Tr. 1, p. 52-53. That testimony combined with Nova Mud' s 
testimony that approximately 106,000 lbs. was shipped, (Tr. 1, p. 
1-19) is ample support for the trial court' s factual findings 
that five trailers were necessary to haul Nova Mud' s commodity. 
The evidence marshalled in support of and viewed most 
favorably to the trial court' s findings, is more than sufficient 
to support those findings. Nova Mud has not met its burden on 
appeal, and the trial court's findings should not now be 
disturbed. 
(2) The filed rate doctrine applies regardless of whether 
or not the parties had a validly existing contract. As can be 
seen from the legal and historical background set forth at length 
hereinabove, the filed rate doctrine applies to the shipment of 
goods in interstate commerce regardless of whether or not the 
parties had a validly existing contract. In the granddaddy case 
of Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Maxwell, supra, 
(Appendix G hereto) the issue was whether or not a traveler who 
had been misquoted a rate, and then in reliance upon the rate 
traveled from Nashville, Tennessee to Salt Lake City was bound 
by law at the end of his voyage to pay the rate set forth in the 
tariff. Despite what would likely have been an enforceable 
contract in another setting, the higher published tariff was 
mandatory. The United States Supreme Court, while recognizing 
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the strictness of the filed rate doctrine, upheld it, and the 
traveler was required to pay the higher tariff rate. The 
apparent meeting of minds on the lower rate, evidenced by the 
finding that the carrier made an error in quoting the rate, could 
not overcome the result mandated by the filed rate doctrine. 
In the instant case, contrary to Nova Mud' s argument on 
appeal, the trial court' s judgment in favor of Consolidated 
Freightways does not necessarily presuppose there was a contract 
between the parties. The only facts necessary to the trial 
court's conclusion that Nova Mud owed the tariff rate were (1) 
that the shipment was made, and (2) that the applicable tariffs 
required that the amounts invoiced be charged. This the trial 
court found and granted judgment as mandated by the federal 
statute. A meeting of the minds between the parties was 
irrelevant to the court' s findings. The fact that there may have 
been no meeting of minds between Consolidated Freightways and 
Nova Mud cannot serve to overturn federal law and the trial 
court's judgment. 
(3) The filed rate doctrine precludes Nova Mud' s defense of 
accord and satisfaction. The trial court found that the defense 
of accord and satisfaction which might otherwise apply is not 
available in this case. The court relied on the case of 
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Standard Milling, 508 F.Supp. 277 
(W. D. N. Y. 1981). (Appendix G hereto). In that case, the federal 
district court found that to permit a shipper to invoke the 
defense of accord and satisfaction "would allow carriers to treat 
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different shippers in a preferential manner by compromising 
' disputes' over the amount of demurrage charges due. " I&. at 
280. 
Nova Mud has attempted to distinguish the Consolidated Rail 
case on the basis that it construes the application of the filed 
rate doctrine to a dispute over demurrage charges. But, in 
fact, the statute construed in Consolidated Rail is the same one 
at issue in this case. 49 U.S. C. §10761 governs charges for 
"transportation or services rendered". 
[A] carrier providing transportation 
or service subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission . . . shall 
provide that transportation or 
service only if the rate for the 
transportation or service i s 
contained in a tariff that is in 
effect under this subchapter. 
That carrier may not charge or 
receive a different compensation for 
that transportation or service than 
the rate specified in the tariff. . . 
[emphasis added]. 
49 U.S.C. §10761. The statute makes no distinction whether those 
charges are for demurrage or for freight. The filed rate 
doctrine applies equally in both situations. In accordance with 
Consolidated Rail, the defense of accord and satisfaction is not 
available to Nova Mud. 
Demurrage charges are those incurred by a railway 
shipper for each day he retains the railroad cars beyond the 
specified time in his agreement. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. 
Standard Milling, 508 F. Supp. at 278. Essentially, a demurrage 
charge is simply additional rent for the carrier' s vehicles. 
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C. Nova Mud is Estopped or Otherwise Precluded 
fypm Seeking 3 Referral to th<? ICCt 
Nova Mud's argument that the trial court erred in 
failing to refer the matter to the ICC presupposes that the trial 
court was asked to do so. In fact, the record reflects that Nova 
Mud did not move for a referral, but instead waived any such 
right at the time of trial. Furthermore, the argument 
erroneously presumes that the matter is one over which the ICC 
would exercise its "unreasonable practices jurisdiction". 
1) The ICC' s authority is limited. Even assuming the 
ICC has properly undertaken the role of passing on the 
reasonableness of a practice, its jurisdiction is limited to 
those cases in which a rate is quoted to a shipper and then not 
published by the carrier. The syllabus to the ICC s 1986 
opinion states in part: 
Where an undercharge claim is filed 
by a carrier in court based on a 
tariff rate and the shipper claims 
that a lower, negotifrtefl &1LL 
unpublished rate was understood, if 
the court refers the case to the 
Commission for determination of the 
availability of the equitable relief, 
the Commission will decide whether, 
u n d e r all the r e l e v a n t 
circumstances, collection of the 
undercharges would be an unreasonable 
practice. [emphasis added]. 
Ex Parte No. MC-177 (October 14, 1986) (Appendix D hereto). The 
ICC s subsequent 1989 opinion was issued in response to NITL's 
request for a general declaratory order that it is an 
See discussion at pages 12 through 14, supra, indicating 
that the ICC has overreached in assuming this role. 
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unreasonable practice for a carrier to conduct business on the 
basis of a negotiated rate while failing to publish the rate in 
an effective tariff on file at the Commission. 1989 MCC Lexis 
333, *1 (June 14, 1989) (Appendix F hereto). Thus, before the 
ICC will exercise its authority, it must appear that (i) a rate 
has been negotiated and (ii) the carrier has failed to publish 
the rate. 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Consolidated 
Freightways published the rate. The dispute, according to Nova 
Mud, is that those rates were applied to an unneessary number of 
vehicles. (Appellant's Brief, pg. 23). The ICC s new found 
authority does not extend to application of the rates to a 
particular shipment. 
In Inman Freight Systems, Inc. v. Olin Corp. , 807 F. 2d 
117 (8th Cir. 1986), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found: 
The ICC statement specifically 
applies to cases in which the parties 
negotiate a rate, but such rate is 
not published. The parties do not 
flrgw? here th»t 3 negQt;i»t5fl r<=it;Q ^ ?g 
unpublished but instead question the 
application of the lower published 
raiss £2 the Shipment in question. 
Accordingly, we do not refer this 
case to the ICC for possible 
application of its new policy, 
[emphasis added]. 
Inman Freight Systems, Inc. v. Olin Corp. . 807 F. 2d at 119-20. 
(Appendix I hereto). Nova Mud, by not arguing that the rates 
were unpublished, cannot now attempt to invoke the special 
expertise of the ICC for an unreasonable practices determination. 
Furthermore, there is no "course of conduct" by 
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Consolidated Freightways to which an ICC "unreasonable practices" 
determination could apply. The ICC has offered some guidance as 
to what constitutes an "unreasonable practice": 
[W]hat the Commission is finding to 
be an unreasonable practice is & 
course of conduct consisting of: (1) 
negotiating a rate; (2) agreeing to a 
rate that the shipper reasonably 
relies upon as being lawfully filed; 
(3) failing, either wilfully or 
otherwise, to publish the rate; (4) 
billing and accepting payment at the 
negotiated rate for (sometimes) 
numerous shipments; and (5) then 
demanding additional payment at 
higher rates. [emphasis added]. 
1989 MCC Lexis 333, *12. (Appendix F hereto). 
There was no evidence at the time of trial, nor did 
Nova Mud attempt to present any evidence that Consolidated 
Freightways had engaged in any course of conduct that should be 
determined to be unreasonable. Consolidated Freightways 
published the rate which it quoted to Nova Mud, and subsequently 
billed at the tariff rate. There is nothing in the facts that 
would require a special expertise of the ICC. There is nothing 
in the evidence to indicate that this case is anything more than 
a misunderstanding between the parties, to which misunderstanding 
the filed rate doctrine is directly applicable. 
2) Nova Mud waived its right for an ICC referral. 
Contrary to Nova Mud' s statements at pages 7 through 8 of its 
Brief, Nova Mud did not move to send this matter to the ICC for 
an unreasonable practices determination. While at the time of 
Consolidated Freightways' Motion for Summary Judgment, Nova Mud 
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argued that the case should be referred, no renewal of the 
argument was made after Consolidated Freightways withdrew its 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 6 In fact, Consolidated Freightways 
conceded at the time of trial that an ICC referral was 
inappropriate. A review of the complete trial transcript, 
including closing arguments, does not reveal a motion by Nova 
Mud for a referral. Rather, knowing full well that the only 
matter that could be referred to the ICC was the issue of 
unreasonable practices, Nova Mud took the position at trial that 
it was not pleading unreasonableness as a defense. 
(Mr. Guyon): ... [T]he cases that 
counsel has cited, Judge, I don' t 
believe apply to this case. 
Now, in the first place, the Caravan 
Refrigerator v. Supreme Beef 
Processor' s case is a federal case 
from the Fifth Circuit, but on page 
392, it says that our decision here 
is an application of the same rule, 
"A s h i p p e r t h a t p l e a d s 
unreasonable[ness] does not serve as 
a defense. " 
Well, that' s not what -- this can' t 
apply to the facts of this case, 
because we' re not pleading 
vnrefrgpnfrfrLeness 35? 3 flef<=m?e. We' re 
not saying that they' re trying to 
charge us an unreasonable fee, 
Nova Mud's referral to the Record (R. 123) (Appendix B 
hereto) is apparently to the trial court' s notes taken during 
argument on Consolidated Freightways' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The court' s trial notes appear at R. 215-236. 
After Nova Mud' s reliance on its counsel' s memory as to 
such a motion being made in closing arguments at trial, 
Consolidated Freightways ordered a transcript of those arguments. 
Now a part of the record, the transcript reveals that no such 
motion was made in closing arguments. 
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necessarily. (emphasis added). 
(Tr. 2, p. 26). 8 
If, indeed, anything in the closing arguments could be 
construed as a motion for a referral, a motion made at that late 
stage of trial would be untimely. The ICC lacks the authority to 
waive the undercharges, but can only make a factual determination 
as to the reasonableness of a carrier' s practice. ICC Op. , 1989 
No doubt, Nova Mud' s argument on rebuttal will refer to 
a point in closing arguments where counsel either misspoke 
himself, or the transcript is in error: 
(Ms. Van Frank]: [A]s I recall here at the Motion for 
Summary Judgment at one point, [Nova Mud was] pleading 
the fact that this was unreasonable. [Nova Mud] wanted 
a referral to the ICC. If we' re not going to be 
arguing all of those issues here at this time, and if 
counsel is willing to stipulate that the law applies, 
then I am happy to go along with that. 
The only way that [Nova Mud] can get this court to rule 
that these equitable defenses can apply, is by 
referring it to the ICC for an unreasonable [practices] 
de termi nati on. 
MR. GUYON: Could I verify that? We're [*] saying that 
the practice is unreasonable. We' re talking about the 
figures. 
THE COURT: Ok. 
MS. VAN FRANK: Well, I suppose that my response to 
that would be that yes, then at the point counsel must 
concede that the ICC has no jurisdiction to hear this 
case. . . 
Tr. 2, pgs. 35-36. 
It is apparent from the context of Mr. Guyon' s statement, 
including his previous concession at Tr. 2, p. 26 and the absence 
of any objection to Ms. Van Frank's subsequent statement, that 
either Mr. Guyon misspoke himself or that the transcript is 
missing a word. Mr. Guyon's statement at [*] should read "We're 
not saying that the practice is unreasonable. " 
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MCC Lexis 333 at *5 (June 14, 1989) (Appendix F hereto). The 
ICC s recommendation must be adopted as a factual finding by a 
trial court before an undercharge can be ordered waived. A 
motion for a referral would thus appear to be a pre-trial matter. 
A motion made after the close of evidence in counsel' s closing 
arguments would thus be ineffectual and untimely. 
Not having made such a motion, but in fact, having 
conceded that it had not raised an unreasonable practices 
defense, Nova Mud also conceded that the ICC had no jurisdiction 
to hear the case. Nova Mud is estopped from asserting otherwise 
on appeal. 
3. Nova Mud cannot raise constitutional arguments for 
the first time on appeal. It is a basic rule of appellate 
practice that matters not raised in the trial court will not be 
considered on appeal. See, e. a. , Chumney v. Stott, 14 Utah 2d 
202, 381 P. 2d 84 (1963) (and cases cited therein). Nova Mud's 
arguments of "due process and/or equal protection" were not 
raised in the trial court, and are accordingly precluded from 
being addressed at this time. 
Even if Nova Mud' s constitutional arguments were 
applicable, Nova Mud has had its day in court. With full 
opportunity to raise the issue of a referral to the ICC, Nova Mud 
chose at the time of trial to focus on the defenses of 1) accord 
and satisfaction and 2) the enforceability of the contract. 
Contrary to Nova Mud' s argument on appeal, the trial court did 
not deprive Nova Mud of any defense. Nova Mud itself chose to 
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not pursue the unreasonableness practices defense. It was not 
raised in Nova Mud' s original Answer, nor in its Amended Answer. 
Though Nova Mud sought to amend its Answer to plead a 
counterclaim against Consolidated Freightways for fraud, it made 
no effort to raise any defense pursuant to 49 U. S. C. 
§§11705(b)(3) or 11706(c)(2). Under those statutes, Nova Mud 
could have brought a counterclaim for damages resulting from any 
alleged violation by Consolidated Freightways of the Interstate 
Commerce Act. Having had at least three opportunities to raise 
the issue, Nova Mud cannot on appeal argue that its 
constitutional rights have been violated. 
CONCLUSION 
The federal law applicable to this case mandates the result 
entered by the trial court. The filed rate doctrine, while 
seemingly harsh in its application, is designed to prevent one 
carrier from gaining an advantage in interstate transportation at 
the expense of other carriers, and one shipper from obtaining an 
unfair advantage over another shipper. 
The issues in this case are governed by the filed rate 
doctrine. The evidence of record is sufficient to support the 
trial court' s findings that the tariffs to which Nova Mud 
attested applied to Nova Mud' s shipment. The filed rate doctrine 
applies regardless of whether or not there was a contract between 
the parties, and regardless of whether or not there was a valid 
accord and satisfaction. These defenses, as the trial court 
found, were unavailable to Nova Mud. 
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Furthermore, Nova Mud is precluded from seeking an ICC 
referral at this time. Not only would the ICC not exercise its 
jurisdiction over the issues presented herein, but at the time of 
trial Nova Mud waived its right to such a referral. The 
constitutional issues raised by Nova Mud, for the first time on 
appeal, cannot serve as the basis for setting aside the trial 
court' s judgment. 
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment should remain 
intact, the appeal dismissed and Consolidated Freightways 
awarded its costs on appeal. 
DATED this | L day of March, 1990. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
Leslie Van Frank 
Attorney for Respondent 
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1 mile per trailer? 
2 A No . 
3 Q Anybody been able to ship at that rate? 
4 MR. GUYON: Objection, no foundation. 
5 THE COURT: I'll sustain the second, that 
6 second objection. 
7 Q (BY MS. VAN FRANK) Did you make any 
8 shipments from Salt Lake City to Cape Canaveral, 
9 Florida in March of 1986 at the rate of 20 cents per 
10 mile per trailer? 
11 A No. 
12 Q Mr. Perry, are you familiar with the 
13 defendant Nova Mud Corporation? 
14 A I know the account, yes ma'am. 
15 Q How is it that you became familiar with that 
16 account, sir? 
17 A At the time that we hauled the loads in 
18 question a gentleman called me requesting what we could 
19 haul approximately 90,000 pounds of freight to Cape 
20 Canaveral for. 
21 Q Did you receive a phone call? 
22 A Yes, I did. 
23 Q Did the gentleman identify himself? 
24 A The gentleman identified himself as 
25 M. A. Newman. 
MARSHA PRILLER - CAPITOL REPORTERS 
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1 Q Initials "M. A. Newman"; is that correct? 
2 A Correct. 
3 Q Where were you when you received that phone 
4 call? 
5 A In my office at the terminal. 
6 Q Was anyone else present? 
7 A One of my clerks probably took the call at 
8 first and then referred it to me. 
9 Q Was anybody else listening to that telephone 
10 call from your office to your knowledge? 
11 A No. 
12 Q Would you describe for me what was said 
13 during that telephone conversation? 
14 A Mr . Newman told me that they were working on 
15 a government bid to move approximately 90,000 pounds of 
16 freight to Cape Canaveral, Florida. I then asked him 
17 what the zip codes were to Cape Canaveral, what his zip 
18 code was and how many trailers he felt that freight 
19 could be loaded on and told him I would have to call 
20 him back with a rate. 
21 Q Mr . Perry, did you take notes of your 
22 telephone conversation? 
23 A Yes, I did. 
24 Q Mr . Perry, let me hand you what has been 
25 marked -- I!m going to hand you what's been marked 
MARSHA PRILLER - CAPITOL REPORTERS 
1 A That's the NMFC item number for a commodity 
2 called drilling mud. 
3 Q And we're looking for commodity for class 
4 rates at that point, not mileage rates? 
5 A Correct. 
6 Q What is the "84084"? 
7 A That is the zip code for West Jordan. 
8 Q And the 90,000 number sign MUD? 
9 A That was the original request for a rate to 
10 move 90,000 pounds of drilling mud. 
11 Q What does the word "drilling fluid" 
12 underneath that mean? 
13 A Originally he said drilling fluid in his 
14 original request for rate and then he said it's 
15 drilling mud. 
16 Q What does "DOS 50M mean? 
17 A That is the National Motor Freight class 
18 rate, classification. It's a class 50 merchandise, 
19 which refers to the item number above. 
20 Q Is that the commodity? The drilling fluid 
21 would have been a class 50 commodity; is that right? 
22 A Correct. 
23 Q And what do the words "two trucksloads" bel 
24 that mean? 
25 A Two truckloads means that this merchandise 
MARSHA PRILLER - CAPITOL REPORTERS 
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1 would have taken four doubles trailers to move 90,000 
2 pounds of freight. 
3 Q Why didn't you write down two truckloads? 
4 A In our verbal communications in the trucking 
5 industry a truckload is either a 40 or 45 foot trailer 
6 or a set of doubles which are each 27 foot long. 
7 Q What are you referring to in this one? 
8 A Four doubles trailers. Consolidated 
9 Freightways is 99 percent doubles operation. 
10 Q Do you ever do single trailers? What would 
11 cause you to do a single trailer? 
12 A We do have single truckloads available that 
13 our trailers are 45 feet in length and we do have a few 
14 of those available for long freight that customers do 
15 need to ship. 
16 Q Going down to the next set of numbers we have 
17 "94264452 and M. A. Newman, Nova Mud." 
18 A That is the contact and his telephone number 
19 that originally requested the rate activity. 
20 Q Would it be 2,329 miles per mile maker be? 
21 A Mile maker is a computer program in our on-
22 line system tnat we can type in West Jordan, Utah and 
23 the destination of Cape Canaveral, Florida and it will 
24 come up witn a mileage of 2,329 miles from West Jordan 
25 to Caoe Canaveral. 
MARSHA PRILLER - CAPITOL REPORTERS 
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1 Q And how is it that you know that? 
2 A The fourth page of Exhibit 2 is a handwritten 
3 message that is blank and we fill in the lines for the 
4 customer that is requesting the rate and it's computer 
5 generated and Page 2 shows the computer generated 
6 response to that handwritten note and the time and the 
7 date at the top and the bottom of the request. 
8 Q Did you have a subsequent conversation with a 
9 representative of Nova LMud concerning additional 
10 materials that required moving? 
11 A At the original rate request it was to haul 
12 90,000 pounds on four trailer loads — four trailers* 
13 They came up with an additional amount of freight going 
14 to Cape Canaveral, which took an additional fifth 
15 trailer and I had to submit a separate rate request for 
16 that additional trailer. 
17 Q I'd like you to take a look at Exhibit 
18 Number 3 and I'd like you to identify that for me. 
19 A Yes. This is the rate request to cover that 
20 fifth, an additional trailer. It requests a separate 
21 rate for one trailer at $1 per mile. 
22 Q So this would have been one of the 
23 circumstances in which you sent one truck; is that 
24 correct? One trailer? 
25 A We do not run one truck across the country. 
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1 We always run them in sets of doubles, 
2 Q How is it that this particular -- did this 
3 particular truck go out with a single trailer attached 
4 to it? 
5 A The truck went with that trailer plus another 
6 trailer destined more than likely to a city somewhere 
7 between Salt Lake City and Cape Canaveral, Florida. 
8 Q And can you tell me what the requested rate 
9 for that shipment would have been? 
10 A For the single trailer? It was $1 per mile. 
11 Q How many trailers do you have going to 
12 Florida? 
13 A Five. 
14 Q At what rate? 
15 A Four trailers at a rate of $2 per mile, and 
16 one trailer at $1 per mile. 
17 Q So to simplify things then in trucking terms 
18 we had $1 per mile per trailer from Salt Lake to 
19 Florida for a total of $5 per mile to get Consolidated 
20 Freightways* goods from Salt Lake City to Florida; is 
21 that correct? 
22 A Correct. 
23 THE COURT: Let me stop you because with that 
24 last question I thought maybe the answer may have been 
25 different from the first part. I thought I understood 
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1 Q And did you receive a phone call regarding 
2 Nova Mud's rates? 
3 A Yes, I did, 
4 Q Is it the regular practice of your business 
5 to take the quoted rates from the division manager and 
6 then recite them back to the shipper? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q In this particular instance did you take the 
9 rate that was quoted to you by your division manager 
10 and quote it back to Nova Mud? 
11 A Yes, I did. 
12 Q What was the rate you quoted back to Nova 
13 Mud? 
14 A $2 per mile. 
15 Q $2 per mile? 
16 A For 2,329 miles. 
17 Q For how many trucks? 
18 A For two truckloads, four trailers. 
19 Q So each one of those trucks had two trailers 
20 attached to it and each one of those trucks was going 
21 down there at $2 per mile; is that correct? 
22 A Correct. 
23 Q And you told this to Nova Mud; is that 
24 correct? 
25 A Yes, I did. 
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1 MS. VAN FRANK: Thank you. 
2 (Whereupon, Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 
3 7 and 8 received into evidence.) 
4 Q (BY MS. VAN FRANK) Mr. Perry, it's my 
5 understanding that when a shipper is quoted a rate he 
6 is issued a file number from which the (inaudible) is 
7 subsequently identified. Is that correct? 
8 A That's correct. 
9 Q Could you explain this process a little bit 
10 to us? 
11 A In going back to Exhibit 2, my original 
12 request to my supervisor for the rate action requests a 
13 certain amount of $2 per mile. A file number is then 
14 generated which is the number one page of Exhibit 2, 
15 which shows a file number of 86027516, according to 
16 CF Tariff 400, Item Number 2200. And that file number 
17 is generated on any rate activity. 
18 Q It's my understanding that particular file is 
19 maintained in relation to the tariffs; is that correct? 
20 A Correct. 
21 Q Would you take a look at Exhibit 
22 Number 7 — 
23 MR. GUYON: That's 4. 
24 MS. VAN FRANK: Thank you. 
25 Q (BY MS. VAN FRANK) — 4, for us, please, and 
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1 tell us what tariff applied to the Nova Mud shipping. 
2 A Okay. This is the CF. This is a copy of the 
3 Tariff CF 400f which was in effect on July 5, 1985, and 
4 Tariff 400, Item Number 2200, which is — you go 
5 through it and go to Page 1 — Page 7 of Exhibit 4. On 
6 the right-hand side there's an item and then listed 
7 below there are item numbers. There's Item 2200 on the 
8 bottom which states: From all points served direct by 
9 CF to all points served direct by CF, commodity is 
10 freight, all kinds. And the rate of 200 cents per mile 
11 per vehicle used. And it does say it's subject to a 
12 couple of other item numbers. 
13 Q As I understand it -- what is the subject? 
14 A Subject to Item Number 162, which is on 
15 Page 4 of the exhibit: Application of rates to 
16 trailers not exceeding 29 feet each in length or a 
17 single trailer not less than 49 feet in length. 
18 Do you want me to read the whole item? 
19 Q No, I think everybody has a copy of and can 
20 read it. 
21 A And the other item is Item 170, which is on 
22 the following page: The participation of rates, 
23 methods of joining. The first one says: A shipper or 
24 consignee desiring to participate in the rate 
25 contained in this tariff must request participation. 
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1 An authorized representative of Consolidated 
2 Freightways must approve such participation and will 
3 acknowledge participation by giving the shipper or 
4 consignee a unique file number. Participant will also 
5 receive a letter of acknowledgement. The file number 
6 must be shown on the bill of lading at the time the 
7 shipment for the agreed upon rate to be valid and a 
8 record of participation will be maintained by the 
9 carrier under this file number, participation will be 
10 limited to specific origins and specific destination 
11 states agreed upon by the shipper or consignee and 
12 authorized by a CFWY representative, 
13 Q Mr . Perry, these tariffs were published and 
14 in effect in July of 1985; is that correct? 
15 A Correct, 
16 Q So when Nova Mud called Consolidated 
17 Freightways and asked for a rate you were able to say: 
18 We can give you a negotiated rate or a non-negotiated 
19 rate. I mean, you did not -- not that you actually 
20 said that to them, but that was a possibility. Is that 
21 correct? 
22 MR. GUYON: Well, I object. It's leading and 
23 suggestive. 
24 THE COURT: It is leading. I'll sustain it. 
25 Q (BY MS. VAN FRANK) Where is it published 
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1 that Nova Mud has participated in these tariffs? 
2 A By the file number that was assigned on 
3 Exhibits 2 and 3/ which made them parties to 
4 Tariff 400. Two different item numbers: 1100 and 
5 2200. 
6 Q So perhaps depending on what kind of — well, 
7 on what kind of — excuse me. Withdraw that. 
8 MS. VAN FRANK: Your Honor, at this point I 
9 would move to submit Exhibit 4 into evidence. 
10 MR. GUYON: I object. There's no foundation 
11 laid for it. He simply stated that he relied on that 
12 and if it's limited to the scope of his testimony 
13 that's fine, but I don't think there's been any 
14 testimony that it was submitted to say that its 
15 admission on any other basis than that. 
16 THE COURT: The basis of your objection if I 
17 understand, Counsel, then is the relevance or it has no 
18 foundation? 
19 MR. GUYON: Foundation and relevance. 
20 THE COURT: I think if I understand your 
21 objection correctly it goes more to the weight of this 
22 exhibit as opposed to its admissibility. 
23 I'll overrule the objection and receive 
24 plaintiff's Exhibit 4. 
25 MS. VAN FRANK: Thank you. 
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1 admit Exhibit Number 11 into evidence. 
2 THE COURT: Objection, Mr, Guyon? 
3 MR. GUYON: No objections. 
4 THE COURT: It will be received. 
5 MS. VAN FRANK: Thank you. 
6 (Whereupon, plaintifffs Exhibit 11 
7 was received into evidence.) 
8 Q (BY MS. VAN FRANK) Could you describe the 
9 information for us on Exhibit Number 11? 
10 A On this bill of lading they shipped 
11 17 pallets of drilling mud, Item 138640 for 40,225 
12 pounds. 
13 Q Mr. perry, I note that there are trailer 
14 numbers on each one of these bills of lading. For 
15 instance, on Exhibit Number 9, there is a trailer 
16 number 11268, and on Exhibit 10 there is a trailer 
17 number 114370 and another trailer number 15317/ and 
18 there are similar numbers on Exhibit Number 11. Could 
19 you explain to us what those numbers are? 
20 A Those are the trailer numbers that we loaded 
21 this commodity on. The 12 pallets fit on one trailer 
22 by itself for 20,000 pounds, one 27 foot trailer. 
23 Q So as I understand it each trailer has a 
24 unique number? 
25 A Correct. 
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1 Q And combining all of tne trailers on 
2 Exhibits 9, 10 and 11, how many trailers do you have? 
3 A Five. 
4 Q Can you tell from these bills of lading what 
5 the weight of those trailers would have been? 
6 A Yes, I can. 
7 Q Can you give him a minute to calculate that. 
8 That would be approximately — 
9 A The total weight of tne trailers? 
10 Q Yes, what is the total weight of the 
11 trailers. 
12 A Approximately 106,800-and-some pounds. 
13 Q How is it that you know that? 
14 A In adding the total weights of the bill of 
15 ladings, the 46/665, 40,225 and 20,000 pounds. 
16 MS. VAN FRANK: I want to represent to the 
17 Court that we went through this before we got to court 
18 today so Mr. Perry is correct on that. 
19 THE COURT: Let me ask you, Mr. Perry, are 
20 you willing to stipulate tnat tne total amount should 
21 be 106,800? 
22 THE WITNESS: 106,880, I tnink. 
23 MR. GUYON: Well, I'm willing to stipulate 
24 that that's what each of tnese documents says and they 
25 add them all together and they come up with 106,000-
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1 and-some pounds. 
2 THE COURT: So stipulated that that is the 
3 amount reflected in the bills of lading. I guess not 
4 necessarily the amounts actually shipped. 
5 MR. GUYON: But it may not be. 
6 THE COURT: That may not be material. 
7 MS. VAN FRANK: I think the Court can divide 
8 by 2 and subtract and that's approximately 15 tons of 
9 material . 
10 THE COURT: Are you willing to stipulate to 
11 that, Mr. Guyon? 
12 MR. GUYON: If you'll tell me why you need to 
13 have that stipulated since they're all in amounts here. 
14 MS. VAN FRANK: I'll withdraw that. 
15 Q (BY MS. VAN FRANK) Mr. Perry, can you tell 
16 from those bills of lading -- could you tell us why it 
17 was necessary for five trailers to go from Salt Lake 
18 City to Florida on the Nova Mud shipment? 
19 A With the weight limitations between Salt Lake 
20 City, Utah and Florida, there is only so much freight 
21 that can physically be loaded on a trailer and make it 
22 across trucking scales and whatever legally. 
23 Q So 106,880 pounds, is there any way you could 
24 have brought that much weight from Salt Lake City to 
25 Florida on a fewer number of trucks? 
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1 A No . 
2 Q Mr. perry, were you personally involved in 
3 the loading of those trucks? 
4 A I did go over to the customer's facility and 
5 inspect what the commodity was and gave some 
6 information as to the proper loading of these trailers, 
7 Q Who did you speak with over at Nova Mud? 
8 A Mr, M. A, Newman. 
9 Q Do you know who Mr. M. A. Newman is? 
10 A It's been a long time. I do know what the 
11 "M" stands for, no. 
12 Q Is he the same individual that you spoke to 
13 on the telephone? 
14 A As far as I know, yes. 
15 Q Did the individual you spoke to on the 
16 telephone identify himself as M. A. Newman? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q Did you ever have any dealings with any other 
19 representative of Nova Mud? 
2 0 A No. 
21 Q After the goods were shipped to Florida, how 
22 were they shipped — well, I can't say that. 
23 After the goods were shipped to Florida what 
24 happened? 
25 MS. VAN FRANK: Can we have a stipulation 
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1 that tney were shipped to Florida and reached tnere? 
2 MR, GUYON: You bet. 
3 THE COURT: Counsel will stipulate then the 
4 five trailers were taken to Florida, to Orlando, 
5 Florida or Cape Canaveral, Florida? 
6 MR. GUYON: Well, I don't think we can 
7 stipulate. We can stipulate that the 106,000 or 
8 whatever, the amount of merchandise that given for 
9 shipment did actually arrive there and there was no 
10 problem with it. I think we can go that far but that's 
11 all we know for certain. 
12 MS. VAN FRANK: Okay. 
13 THE COURT: I'll receive the stipulation. 
14 MS. VAN FRANK: Thank you. 
15 Q (BY MS. VAN FRANK) After the goods were 
16 shipped to Florida, the commodities were shipped to 
17 Florida what happened? Do you have personal knowledge 
18 of what happened? 
19 A As far as — I don't understand your 
20 question. 
21 Q Was Nova Mud invoiced? 
2 2 A Yes. 
23 Q How do you know that? 
24 A Any time a shipment is picked up and assigned 
25 a pull number, the billing procedure is entered into 
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1 our collections department and it's handled from 
2 Portland, Oregon. 
3 Q Is that what happened with this account? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Here are the invoices that are set forth in 
6 Exhibits 8, 7 and 6. The tariffs are set out in 
7 Exhibit 4. Was Nova Mud invoiced the proper tariff 
8 amount? 
9 MR. GUYON: Well, wait a minute. I object to 
10 that. No foundation, no testimony about a proper 
11 tariff amount. We're still confused about his 
12 testimony regarding the proposed tariff rate and the 
13 supposed negotiated rate so I don't think it's at all 
14 clear . 
15 THE COURT: I'm not sure the question is 
16 clear, either, Counsel. Maybe rephrase it. Based on 
17 the earlier testimony I found that some of the billings 
18 were on the negotiated rate and some were on the class 
19 rate depending on which was the lowest. 
20 Q (BY MS. VAN FRANK) Let's take Exhibit 
21 Number -- let's take them one step at a time -- Exhibit 
22 Number 6. Can you explain to us how the tariffs as set 
23 forth in Exhibit Number 4 apply to the shipment as 
24 reflected on Exhibit Number 6? 
25 A In the center section of that copy of Exhibit 
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1 Number 6, it shows rate per CFWY Tariff 400, Item 
2 Number 1100, Exhibit Number 4 is the copy of the 
3 CF 400 tariff, Item Number 1100. States a rate of 
4 100 cents per mile per vehicle used. 
5 Q How many vehicles were used in Exhibit 
6 Number 6? 
7 A One trailer . 
8 Q What is the rate as set forth in the tariff? 
9 A 100 cents per mile. 
10 Q How many miles is it from Salt Lake City to 
11 Florida as set forth on Exhibit 1? 
12 A 2,329. 
13 Q For a total charge of what? 
14 A $2,329. 
15 Q Is that in accord with the tariffs as set 
16 forth in Exhibit Number 4? 
17 A Yes, it is. 
18 Q The same thing with Exhibit Number 7. Would 
19 you explain to us how the tariffs in Exhibit Number 4 
20 apply to the shipments as set forth in Exhibit 
21 Number 7? 
22 A Rated on the same Tariff 400, Item 
23 Number 2200, which states a rate of 200 cents per mile 
24 per vehicle used. 
25 Q And how many vehicles were used in Exhibit 7? 
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1 A Two. 
2 Q And how many miles from Salt Lake City to 
3 Florida are set forth in that exhibit? 
4 A 2,329. 
5 Q For a total charge of how much? 
6 A $4,658. 
7 Q And are the charges as set forth in Exhibit 
8 Number 7 in accord with the tariffs as set forth in 
9 Exhibit Number 4? 
10 A Yes, they are. 
11 Q I direct your attention to Exhibit Number 8. 
12 Can you tell me how the tariffs as set forth in 
13 Exhibit 4 apply to shipments as set forth in Exhibit 8? 
14 A Exhibit 8 is the load that was rated at 
15 class rates, seeing as how tne Item CF 400, Item 2200 
16 rate of $2 a mile was more than the existing class 
17 rate, thereby they rated the merchandise at the class 
18 rate instead of the $2 per mile rate. 
19 Q If the tariffs had been, the tariffs as set 
20 forth in Exhibit 4 had been applied to the shipment in 
21 Exhibit 8, what would the total charge have been? 
22 A $4,658. 
23 Q And could you explain to the Court once again 
24 why the lesser charge was put in this invoice? 
25 A We as a common carrier cannot charge more 
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1 than class rates to haul a commodity, 
2 Q Are the class rates set out in Utah, sir? 
3 A No, they1re not. 
4 Q Mr. perry, do you know if you've ever 
5 received any payment on any of these accounts? 
6 A Yes, we have, 
7 Q And how much was that payment? 
8 A $3,400. 
9 Q When did you receive that, do you know? 
10 A Approximately July 30th or 31st of 1987. 
11 Q If the rates had been $1 per mile per truck, 
12 the $3,400 was not -- was about $1,500 shy of what --
13 MS. VAN FRANK: Do we have a stipulation on 
14 that? 
15 MR. GUYON: I can't imagine that we do, no. 
16 THE COURT: We tried. That's what I asked at 
17 first and that was if the $3,400 would be correct based 
18 on the agreement of $1 per mile per vehicle and Counsel 
19 said no, the $3,400 was not. 
20 Q (BY MS. VAN FRANK) All right. Then, 
21 Mr. Perry, if you took three vehicles, two of which had 
22 double trailers attacned to them, one of which had one 
23 trailer attached to it, and you applied $1 per mile per 
24 vehicle rate as claimed by the defendant, can you 
25 calculate what the total bill would have been? 
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(Cross-Examination by Mr. Guyon) 
which would actually double the cost of the figures 
above. 
Q. Well, you're assuming, aren't you, in 
coming to that conclusion that a vehicle is 
considered to be an individual trailer, rather than 
a tractor with two trailers; isn't that correct? 
A. In the original negotiations, it was $2 
per vehicle as you say it, two trailers, which 
would be $1 per mile per trailer. 
Q. Right, and this figure that you come to 
(inaudible) is in fact that figure, isn't it? 
A. That's a figure based on $1 a mile for 
four trailers. 
Q. So, it's $1 per mile per trailer -- this 
f igure? 
A . Yes. 
Q. But now you're saying, as I understand it, 
that that was an incorrect figure at an incorrect 
rate, and it should have been $2 per trailer per 
mile? 
A. $2 per vehicle. Now, vehicle for your 
understanding is two trailers. 
THE COURT: We're really getting confused. 
I think your testimony was that the original quote 
82 
(Cross-Examination by Mr. Guyon) 
was $2 per mile per truck load, which was two 
trailers. 
THE WITNESS: Correct. 
THE COURT: Does that make sense to you, 
Counsel? I don't want to testify for him, but I 
think we're getting stalled here a little bit. 
MR. GUYON: Right. 
Q. Let me just ask him one more time. If we 
call a vehicle -- instead of using the word 
"vehicle", let's just use the word "trailer". 
A. Okay. 
Q. Because everybody understands the word 
"trailer". The figure 4658 in your letter of May 
15, 1986 essentially reflects a $1 charge per mile 
per trailer for four trailers; does it not? 
A . It does. 
Q. And then if you add an additional 2329, it 
comes to the figure of $6,987. Then that, by your 
own — by this letter, at least, of May 15th, 
reflects five trailers at $1 per mile, doesn't it? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Now, there was some testimony previously, 
Mr. Perry, regarding the participation by Nova Mud 
in certain tariffs. Now, is it true that a tariff 
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(Cross-Examination by Mr. Guyon' 
A. I take the initial information and I 
submit a computer message similar to what is on 
Exhibit 2 on page 2 to my supervisor requesting 
Nova Mud participation in tariff 400. 
Q. So, it's normally a formality, I take it? 
A. Correct. 
Q . And all they have to do is apply for it? 
A. Depending on the rate that's involved. 
Q. Now, as I understand it, there's a certain 
gross vehicle weight that these trailers are given 
depending on their size and capacity are limited 
to; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You have 40 and 45-foot trailers and 
27-foot trailers? 
A. The majority of 27-foot trailers. 
Q. I believe you said 90 percent of your 
company's trailers are those sizes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is the maximum amount of weight that 
can be carried on a 40 cr 45-foot trailer? 
A. A 40 or 45-foot trailer can legally haul 
between 44 to 46,000 pounds. 
Q. So, 44 to 46, I believe you said 
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(Cross-Examination by Mr. Guyon) 
approximately 45,000 pounds, I take it. Are there 
size requirements also? 
A. Most trailers are -- you mean commodity or 
the vehicle itself? 
Q. We l l , the amount of space displaced on 
actual vehicle, are there requirements there? In 
other words, how high can it go? 
A. A lot of it depends on the commodity 
itself, but the trailers themselves are 
approximately seven-and-a-ha 1f feet wide on the 
inside and seven-and-a-half feet tall. 
Q. Okay. The reason for my question is 
this. As I understand it, at least from your 
testimony approximately 106,000 pounds of 
merchandise — drilling mud — was conveyed to 
Orlando, Florida. My question is, if you divide 
that by three, you come up with less than 45,000 
pounds, much less than 45,000 pounds. The question 
then becomes, why didn't you gentlemen haul that on 
three trailers instead of five? 
A. Legally you could not. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. Three trailers into, say, if you put --
now, you're talking 27-foot trailers? 
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1 (Cross-Examination by Mr. Guyon) 
2 Q. Well, 40 to 45-foot trailers. 
3 A. 40 to 45-foot trailers, it probably would 
4 have taken two trailers. 
5 Q. Why wasn't that done? 
6 A. Because the equipment is not available all 
7 the t i me . 
8 Q. So, it had nothing -- it only had to do 
9 with the availability of your company's equipment, 
10 not the fact that it had to be — this is hard for 
11 me to ask as it is to comprehend -- and not because 
12 of some rate requirement. It had to be divided 
13 into five equal parts and carried on five different 
14 tra i1ers ? 
15 A. Correct. 
16 Q. In other words, if you didn't have — if 
17 your company didn't have the — for instance, if 
18 they didn't have two 40 -- or say three 45-foot 
19 trailers available, it's conceivable, is it not, 
20 that a person who wanted to ship on that trailer 
21 who had just enough material to fit on three 
22 45-foot trailers, if you only had two available, 
23 you might have to have two 27-foot trailers, and by 
24 J your definition you would charge them the 
25 | additional rate because you didn't have the 27-foot 
(Cross-Exami nation by Mr. G u y o n ) 
trailer available? 
A. No, sir. The rate -- the item in the 
tariff specifies it ' s either two 27-foot trailers 
or one 40 to 45-foot trailer. 
Q. So, that's already determined by the 
tariff? 
A . Right . 
MR. GUYON: I just need one second to 
confer with my client. 
Q. Mr. Perry, have you had any conversations 
with Larry Newman, who I represent is seated next 
to me, that you know about? 
A. I may have conversed with him over the 
telephone. I can't remember for sure. 
Q. Let me show you what's been marked as 
Defendant's Exhibit 1, and this is the letter 
from -- I'll let you read a copy of it there. Did 
you ever see that document? 
A . Yes, I have. 
Q. When was the first time you saw it and 
under what conditions? 
A. This was brought back to my terminal by my 
then account manager who I had asked to go over and 
see Nova Mud about the possibility of payment of 
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(Re-direct Examination by Ms. Van Frank) 
for. 
3 Q. A little while ago Mr. Guyon was asking 
4 you some questions about the one 45-foot trailer 
5 versus two 27-foot trailers, and I just wanted to 
6 clarify a little bit in my mind and maybe hopefully 
7 the Court's mind about the rates that would have 
8 applied there. Is it your testimony that the same 
9 $2 rate that applied to two 27-foot trailers would 
10 have been applied to one 45-foot trailer? 
11 A. That is correct. 
12 Q. There was a question asked with regard to 
13 this May 15th, 1986 letter. Mr. Guyon was trying 
14 to make the point that the amounts that are said in 
15 this letter actually reflect a $1 per vehicle 
16 mile -- a $1 per vehicle, meaning one truck with 
17 two trailers (inaudible) 
18 MR. GUYON I object. That 
19 mischaracterizes it. He said that it was $1 per 
20 trailer, which was (inaudible) trailer times the 
21 mileage, not per vehicle. 
22 Q. Does this letter actually reflect -- take 
23 a close look at it. You've got five trailers going 
24 to Florida at $1 per mile at 2,000 -- how many 
2 5 miles was it? 
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(Examination by Mr. Guyon) 
thought -- at the time, we wanted to ship 90,000 
pounds, and I thought perhaps we could get it on 
one set of doubles, two 40-foot trailers, and that 
was my whole idea. We could get it for — that 
would have been like $2,300 for the entire load, 
and I wasn't sure about the -- I didn't know about 
the second addition -- and we all didn't -- about 
the extra 16,000 pounds. 
Q. Okay. In any event, during the second 
conversation I believe you testified that he said, 
"Yes, I can do it for $1 a mile." 
A. That fs r ight . 
Q. Did you have any conversations at that 
time about what $1 a mile meant? In other words, 
did it mean the tractor and three trailers, one 
trailer, whatever? Did you have any conversationss 
about that? 
A. Yeah, I was hoping that we could get it 
all on one tractor -- one train, so to speak So, 
we were talking about a unit, truck unit, which was 
as Mr. Wallace said, a unit. 
Q. What was your understanding of the truck 
unit? 
Is a tractor and as many trailers as they 
1 1 Q 
1 (Examination by Mr. Guyon) 
2 Q. Now, as I understand it, you previously 
3 testified that there were some discrepancy or 
4 some — that there is additional amounts of 16,000 
5 pounds. Explain that, will you? 
6 A. Well, our initial order we were talking 
7 about was approximately 90,000 pounds, and we 
8 shipped 106, 000. 
9 Q. Did you have an understanding with 
10 Consolidated about how much that would cost to send 
11 the 16,000? 
12 A. No, we really didn't. And again, that 
13 was, I guess -- bear in mind, we were working 
14 pretty close with Consolidated. They were very 
15 helpful in trying to get this load in this, so they 
16 did a pretty good job in that end of it. 
17 So, we were — we had no reason to — I 
18 assumeed it was going to be the same rate as the 
19 other, and we would have even given some extra 
20 because they were being so, I guess, accommodating. 
21 Q. As I understand it, the 16,000 pounds was 
22 added to the agreement before any of it was sent? 
23 A. Well, yes, but it was added after the 
24 agreement. In other words, we agreed on 90,000 
25 pounds, and then there was more that came in later. 
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1 (ORAL ARGUMENT) 
2 Of course, the second is the accord and 
3 satisfaction. The cases that Counsel has cited, 
4 Judge, I don't believe apply to this case. 
5 Now, in the first place, the Caravan 
6 Refrigerator versus Supreme Beef Processor's case 
7 is a federal case from the Fifth Circuit, but on 
8 page 392, it says that our decision here is an 
9 application of the same rule, "A shipper that 
10 pleads unreasonable does not serve as a defense." 
11 Well, that's not what -- this can't apply 
12 to the facts of this case, because we're not 
13 pleading unreasonableness as a defense. We're 
14 not saying that they're trying to charge us an 
15 unreasonable fee, necessarily. 
16 The bottom line of what we're arguing is 
17 that we agree we negotiated a lower rale, and now 
18 they're trying to charge us more than we actually 
19 negotiated, assuming that there was a contract in 
20 the first place. 
21 Counsel tries to entice the Court to 
22 believe that the equitable defenses can never apply 
23 in cases such as this before the Court, and in 
24 support of that cites this Consolidated versus 
25 Standard Milling Company. That's the 508 
35 
1 (ORAL ARGUMENT) 
2 for anything like that. There were five trailers 
3 that went down there. And this $3,400 payment 
4 can't constitute a good-faith payment, because it 
5 was only -- I mean, at that point it's $4,600, plus 
6 the extra little bit that he's talking about. 
7 MR. GUYON: Thinking it was five trailers. 
8 MS. VAN FRANK: Well, they did, because 
9 they actually (inaudible) the trailers, and M. A. 
10 Newman was there when they loaded the trailers. 
11 Now, while Mr. Larry Newman may not have known 
12 that, Nova Mud was charged with what M. A. Newman 
13 knew, and M. A. Newman knew thai there were five 
14 trailers that had been loaded up, he was there. 
15 Just going through a few of the things 
16 that Mr. Guyon said, first off, I think that, you 
17 know, he's tried to distinguish this Caravan 
18 Refrigerator case on the basis that he knew that 
19 it's a federal case, which I don't understand why 
20 that would make a difference. But also he said 
21 that because we're not -- they haven't pleaded 
22 unreasonableness as a defense. 
23 Well, as I recall here at the motion for 
24 summary judgment at one point, they were pleading 
25 the fact that this was unreasonable. They wanted a 
36 
1 (ORAL ARGUMENT) 
2 referral to the ICC. If we're not going to be 
3 arguing all of those issues here at this time, and 
4 if Counsel is willing to stipulate that the law 
5 applies, then I'm happy to go along with that. 
6 The only way that he can get this Court to 
7 rule that these equitable defenses can apply, is by 
8 referring it to the ICC for an unreasonable 
9 determination. 
10 MR. GUYON: Could I verify that? We're 
11 saying that the practice is unreasonable. We're 
12 talking about the figures. 
13 THE COURT: Okay . 
14 MS. VAN FRANK: Well, I suppose that my 
15 response to that would be that, yes, then at that 
16 point Counsel must concede that the ICC has no 
17 jurisdiction to hear this case, and then the Court 
18 is bound by the regulations, because the only - -
19 this long history of law that goes along with the 
20 trucking industry from the Supreme Court from the 
21 early 1900's has said that you are bound by what is 
22 filed. And the only way around being bound by what 
23 is filed is this new thing out of the ICC, this new 
24 practice out of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
25 to pass on an unreasonableness test. 
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS, 
a Delaware Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NOVA MUD CORPORATION, 
a Nevada Corporation, 
Defendant. 
This matter was heard at a regularly scheduled trial on 
August 4, 1989 and August 28, 1989. The Plaintiff was present 
and represented by Leslie Van Frank, and the Defendant was 
present and represented by Peter Guyon. At the conclusion of 
the trial the Court took the matter under advisement. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds the following to have been established: 
In March of 1986, Charles Perry, employee of the Plaintiff 
company, was contacted by Larry Newman of the Defendant. Newman 
indicated that he wanted to ship 90,000 pounds of drilling mud 
to Cape Canaveral, Florida and asked what it would cost to ship 
the same. Perry quoted a rate of $2.00 per mile per truckload 
anticipating that two truckloads (tractors) would be needed to 
haul the cargo. Newman somehow understood that only one 
truckload was necessary to haul the 90,000 pound cargo and that 
the charge was $1.00 per mile. At some later date, Newman again 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 873009110 CV 
contacted Perry and told him that an additional 16,000 pounds 
would need to be shipped. Perry quoted a rate of $1.00 per mile 
for the additional tractor necessary-
Perry later determined that drilling mud is a class 50 
commodity, and based on the weight of 90,000 lbs., the 
applicable Consolidated Freightway tariff was No. 400, item 2200 
for the first ordered shipment, and No. 400 item 1100 for the 
second. This tariff, the court finds, is the applicable tariff 
rate in effect at the time the rates were negotiated. 
Tariff 400, item 2200 establishes a rate of 200 cents per 
mile per vehicle used. Tariff 400 item 1100 establishes a rate 
of 100 cents per mile per vehicle. 
The Plaintiff used two tractors (vehicles) with two 
trailors each to haul the original 90,000 lbs. shipment and one 
vehicle to haul the second. This number of vehicles, the Court 
finds was necessary to handle the cargo to be shipped. The 
evidence shows that employees of the defendant knew the number 
of tractors and trailors used to haul the cargo. Bills of 
lading signed by M.A. Newman of the defendant company, refer to 
the applicable tariff numbers, and indicate that five trailors 
were used. There is no evidence that anyone at Nova Mudd 
questioned the references in the bills of lading to the tariffs, 
or that the plaintiff used three tractors with a total of five 
trailors to ship the cargo. In any event, the cargo was 
satisfactorily shipped. 
At some later date a dispute developed over the amount 
actually due to the plaintiff for its services. In an effort to 
settle the dispute, Larry Newman gave a $3,400•00 check to an 
employee of the plaintiff with an attached letter indicating 
that the said payment "will satisfy all claims against Nova by 
Consolidated Freight and C. F. will dismiss all pending legal 
action • . •". The Plaintiff accepted and deposited the check 
in its bank account. 
Using the applicable tariff rates, the actual amount owed 
to the Plaintiff for the shipment to Florida is $11,645.00. The 
Plaintiff actually billed the defendant for $11,198.56. 
Finally, it is the Finding of the Court that Plaintiff, 
Consolidated Freightways, is a common carrier subject to the 
Interstate Commerce Act. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the above, the Court concludes the following: 
1. The provisions of 49 U.S.C. Section 10761 and the 
Interstate Commerce Act are controlling in this dispute. 
2. The defendant based on the above statute, is bound to 
pay the tariff rate, even if the plaintiff had in fact quoted a 
lower rate. In the case of Caravan Refrigerated Cargo v. 
Supreme Beef Processors, 864 F.2d 388, (1989), The Court cites 
with favor the opinion of Justice Brandis in the case of 
Louisville and Nashville Ry v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94 (1915) as 
follows: 
The rate of a carrier duly filed is the only 
lawful charge. Deviation from it is not 
permitted upon any pretext. Shippers and 
travelers are charged with notice of it, and 
they as well as the carrier must abide by it 
. . . . Ignorance or misquotation of rates 
is not an excuse for paying or charging 
either less or more than the rate filed. The 
rule is undeniably strict, and it may work 
hardship in some cases, but it embodies the 
policy which has been adopted by Congress in 
regulation of interstate commerce in order to 
prevent unjust discrimination. 
3. The defense of accord and satisfaction which might 
otherwise apply is not available in a case governed by the 
provisions of 49 U.S.C. Section 10761. See the case of 
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Standard Milling, 508 F.Supp. 277 
(1981). The Court finds that the legal principals in the 
Consolidated Rail case are applicable even though it is a 
demurrage case. 
Therefore, the Court finds that judgment should be entered 
against the defendant in the sum of $11,198.56, the amount 
actually billed, less the $3,400.00 paid, plus interest as 
provided by law and costs of court. 
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare the judgment, and 
submit a cost memorandum. 
Dated this /^ day of September, 1989 
Robin Ji^Reese 7 7 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
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hi* tariff provldee apaclfic Truckload or Voluon Oletence and/or fllleago tatai 
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See Itse 165) to polnta in tha Unltad Stataa served dlract by Consolidated 
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ehlpper or consignee la a qualified participant as defined in Itea 170 of 
this tariff* 
2) Shipoents picked up by cartage agents althout authorisation by CPWT oil! 
not qualify for rates or provisions of this tariff* 
3) Rates include one pickup at origin %nd **• delivery at destination* 
O Rates or charges in thia tariff 6^ not include loading or unloading and 
count of placea of freight by carrier* Carrier will* ahen requested, 
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aen heur# or fraction thereof aubjact to a ainiejo of 960*00 per 
occurrence* 
C5) Rates neaed in thia tariff reaove the application af mny ether coaaodlty 
rate publlehed ta apply froa and ta tha aaaa polnta ever tho aaaa routes* 
faxf tho charges accruing tit\4mr claaa rataa w loaer than tha charges 
accruing under tha coaaodlty rataa published in thia tarifft tha loaer 
charges resulting froa such class rates aill apply* 
(6) This tsrlff is not applicable ^n C«0«0. or Order Notify shlpaentat nor on 
thipaents aubjact to Section 10721 af tha tnteratate Coeeerce Act aovlng en 
Governaent sills of Coding ahen the transportation charges paid to tho 
carrler(e) by tha consignor or consignee are to be rolabursed by tha 
gotfernaent* 
C7> This tariff la nat applicable on ahlpaenta of Class A* • er C exploelvee. 
(I) Rates In thia tariff are Intended to attract apaclfic shlpaanta of 
Truckload or Voluae traffic in backhaul lanes share current eapty allot aey 
teoperarlly create inefficient operations and an econoalc burden on the 
carrier* Participation by a shipper or consignee is therefore Halted to 
the tiae period specified in Xtoo 175* 
(I) Revenue generated by freight aovlng aubjact to the provisions of this 
tariff aill not be included in tne base revenue figures of any incentive 
tariff provision* 
V 
.10) A shlpaent aubjact to thia tariff aey be stopped for partial loeding or 
unloading at a rate of $50.00 per atop. When tho provisions of this 
paragraph are utilized* the alleage to deteralne applicable freight charges 
aill be calculated froa points of origin to point of destination through 
each atop—off point* (Stop-off provisions of this tariff apply only ahen 
frsight charges are prepaid. 
(II) All ehipeonte aovlng under this tariff are aubjact to a released value of 
not aer* than $1.25 Q^r pound. 
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<1) Unless otharaisa provided^ ahere ratas ere bas#d on allesgef ailesge shall 
ba tha distanca batatan tha point of origin and point of destination by tha 
shortest raaularly travalad available hlghaay routas and shall ba 
ascartained ay tha caapilation of distance in HGB Mileage Guide 100 
(Strles)t Supplements ta or successive issues thereof* 
C2) Except as otharaisa providad# tha ratas published in this tariff only spply 
over regular United States Inter-State and Stata Paved ftasda *n4/*r 
Iapreved Roads via Carrier^ ar carriara handling shlpaent aa authorize* tha 
carrier or carriara to travel %r pass oy%r tha authority ahoan in thalr 
cartlficata or coapllance ardar issued thea by tha Interstate Coaaarca 
Coeaisslsn* 
<3> " When# for •carrierfs convenlenca"! shlpaants ara transportod over an 
altarnata route ahich ia in sxcass of tha shortast routa# tha ratas ta 
apply alii ba those ahich aould have appliad if tha shlpaent had baan 
trsnspartad over tha ahartaat reute« 
(4) yhtOf at tha request of tho shlppart a longer route than tha shortest 
avsllabla ragularly travalad hlghaay routs la usadt the actual ailesge %\t%r 
the longar routa alll<apply* 
(5> Where tha rataa ara not shoan for tha actual distancet tha rataa givan far 




When on shipaanta subject to stop-offs for partial loading or unloadlngt 
alleags aill ba deteramed fraa origin to dastinatlan through tha stop-off 
point or points* 
If opsration over the shortest or specified route is not feasible because 
of oparatlng haxsrdSf load llaltatlons of the hlghaay or bridges* 
underpasssst or other nijhaay llaltatlons* tha ailesge coaputed over the 




shlpaants aova under apeclal paraltSf as raquirad by or obtained froa 
niclpalt Stata or Federal Regulatory Sody or Coaolssion9 ahich spscify 
routa to be traveled by the aotor vehicles the ailesge to be used aill 
be the olleage via the route specified in the speclsl perelt. 
ITEM 
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J£?yeo_Jui y 1. 1985 EFFECTIVE:
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CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE 
secrxa* 1 
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CD A shipper ar ceneignee dae l r lng to p a r t i c i p a t a l a tha ra taa contained in 
tn ie t a r i f f auat requeat p a r t i c i p a t i o n * An authorised representat ive af 
Consolidated Frelghteaye auat approve such p a r t i c i p a t i o n and e l l l 
acltnoeledge tha p a r t i c i p a t i o n by giv ing tha ahlppar or conalgnaa a unique 
f l l a nuaber* Participant w i l l also receive a letter of acknowledgement. 
C2> Tha f i l a nuaber auat ba eheen en tha b i l l of lading at tha t l a e af ahlpaant 
far tha agraad upon r a t a to bo v a l i d aad a record af p a r t i c i p a t i o n a l l l ba 
aainta lnad by tha c a r r i a r under t h l a f l l a nuaber* 
C3) P a r t i c i p a t i o n a i l l ba l l a l t a d to a p a c l f l c or lg lna and apac l f i c daat inat iao 




Tha efftctlve data of participation alll ba tha day fallaalng tha eatabllshaant 
af tha flla nuaber ahich la dono by coeputer in Portland* Oregon* Tha rataa 
alll raaala in affact far 14 calendar" days total. 
Any shlpeente occurring aftar tha Tiaa Llalt auat have a aaa flla nuabar to 
participate* 
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TkfiZff ICC CFWT 400 u r i g i o i i r«o« * * - c 
CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE 
SECTION 2 
OlSTANCc" ANO/OR HIC£AG£ C0AH00ITT «AT£S 
F«0K: A l l p o i n t s %*rv4 d i r e c t by CFWT 
TO* A l l p o i n t s served d i r e c t by CFWT 
COHrtOOITY: F r e i g h t a l l k i n d s 
RATE: 97 c e n t s per a l i o per v e h i c l e used* 
S u b j e c t t o I t e a s 160 mn4 1 7 0 * 
ITEM 
i m 
F*0HI All points M%ry6 direct by CFWT 
TO* All points **rv4 direct by CFWT 
C3MM00ITT: Freight ail kinds 
RATE* 9* cents per alle per vehicle used* 
Subject to Iteas 160 and 170. 
U9d 
PRO*: All points served direct by CFWT 
TO: All points served direct oy CFWT 
C0MM03ITT: Freight all kinds 
RATS: 99 cents p^r alle QT vehicle used* 
Subject to Iteas 160 and 170* 
1399 
FROH: All points served direct by CFWT 
TO: All points served direct by CFWT 
COMMODITY: Freight all kinds 
^AT£S 100 cents per alle per vehicle used* 
object to I^eas 160 •nd 170. 
1100 
For explanation of abbreviations or reference marks not explained on this page, see the last page of this tariff. 
issueo 
CORRECTION NO.: 




E.V, Taylor, *Jdent. Pricing 
hi TARIFF ICC 
1 
1 
I I FRQHt 
il1Ql 
I C O H H O D I T Y : 
1 RATE* 





| | Sub jec t l a 
II FROM 
II T ° : 
II COHIOOITT: 
II RATE: 
I ) S u b j e c t t o 
I FROM! 
II T ° : 
| | C O M W O O I T T : 
II RATE! 
| | Sub jec t t o 
| | F R O M : 
1 T 0 1 
[I COAMOOITY: 
I 8 A T E I 
| Sub jec t t o 
CFWT 4 0 0 ( ' O r i f l i n e l Pao« 40«%J j | 
CONSOLIOATEO FRclGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE 
SECTION 2 
OXSTAMCE ANO/OR MI16ACC COHNOOXTY RATCS 
A l l p o i n t s servad d i r e c t by CFWY 
A l l p o i n t s served d i r e c t by CFWY 
F r e i g h t e l l k inds 
196 cents p^r a l i o per v e h i c l e used* 
X teas 162 and 1 T 0 . 
A l l p o i n t s served d i r e c t by CFWY 
A l l p o i n t s served d i r e c t by CFMY 
F r e i g h t a l l k i n d s 
197 can ts per a l i a par v e h i c l e used* 
X t e a s 162 and 170* | 
A l l p o i n t s served d i r e c t by CFWY 
A l l po l f t ts served d i r e c t by CFWY 
F r e i g h t a l l k i n d s 
191 c a n t s per a l l e p e r v e h i c l e used* 1 
Z t e a s 162 and 1 7 0 * 
A l l p o i n t s s^rwd d i r e c t by CFWY 
A i l p o i n t s M9r^94 d i r e c t by CFWY 
F r e i g h t a l l k inds • 
199 cents per a l l e per v e h i c l e used* 
Xteas 162 and 170* 
A l l p o i n t s served d i r e c t by CFWY 
A l l p o i n t s ^r^md d i r e c t by CFWY 
F r e i g h t a l l k inds 
200 cents per a l l e Qmr v e h i c l e used* 
Xteas 162 and 170* 
ll For explanation of abbreviations or reference marks not explained on this page, see the last page of this tariff 





16 | | 
2196 l l 
16 | | 
2199 | | 
16 I 
2200 | | 14
 I 
11 
1935 | | 
--* 
CORRECTION NO: .»«. ISSUED BY: 
E«V. Taylor, Vice Pretident. Pricing 
P.O. Box 3032 - Portland, Oregon 97203 
- 4 0 - J — 
; M l X 1 0 0 ••  0 4 8 M I L E i 1A!• E R ~ MI!..E A GE IHQu I R Y 
U S E ft : B R C D A f E : 0 8 i 0 8 7 
f; :i: r Y / s f A T E S P L C M I L E A G E S T A T u s 
W JORDAN UT 762981 000 




OPT GEO BKL'J 
CLR USER ID 
RETURN 
CLEAR 
COPYRIGHT 1985, 1983 BY 
RAND MCNALLY-TDM, INC. 










^Cancels Mileage GMWe(yo.l2) 
• " *£ . ; ;-'-:*3f' 
iW!fEii^i<il 
- •£•% ; C ; ^ ^ | ^ 
containing 
Maps and Charts 
for Determining Distances 
in Highway Miles 8YJWO/W9WU.Y I 9




"11 l i 
h is 
OUGWAY - J / j Oovtf^ 
P80VING I fig)] | Sif***i"y 
I Cock f o « 
1









/ / , Jkww I }\M°I5r!/M« Pi«wnt 
'<£ / 
M , 2f i /T**Vr iLJ>«^ \ I Hunting 
fiitWi vu.# 7 -J ^-
CunniwoV*—<i«r^^/0,^_ 
a^^r 
Mm <w# * I «» i 
J
 v 8urh flock/ / /S-^ ^ ^ • / - © r ^ L i S ^ v ' / ""./ST [* M»HOOJI I < 
5 * / J ^ ^ ^ > & ^ / ^ 3 ^ ^ a ^ ^ k-ti'Tfr? P I 
• * " • ? - ¥ ' ' " / ^^,^ l• " • f>i T yni / ^ T / o r \ \ »<•/«• S^ii^-^/T/^^' \ V " « %""» 
CJJ \—... IT^HLH^^T1^^^^—rr-rr^ 
C O C O A , FL TO 
odgeCrtv. KS 1491 
orav<*e, GA 46S 
othan, AL . . . 
ougtas, AZ ... 
over, 0€ 
oylestown. PA 
ubUn. CA . . . . 
uBols.PA . . 
ubuque, IA . . 
ututh.MN 
385 
. . . 1964 
.'A 934 
. . . 1009 
. . .2814 
. . . 1028 
. . . 1260 
1582 
unklrk.NY J120 
urango, CO 1953 
urham.NC 609 
(yertburg, TN . : 829 
agto Pass, TX 1328 
agle River, Wl 1459 
last Aurora, NY 
last Liverpool, OH 
•aston, Mb 
•aston, PA . . . . . 
laatOranoe.NJ'. 
astport,fe 2825 
* u CUra. Wl 1429 
•dmonton, AB 2740 
1163 




COCOA, a TO 
Hammonton, NJ 1004 
Hampton, IA 1391 

















Effingham, L 960 
•ICentro.CA •••2329 
•IDorado.AA 898 
Eldorado, I §64 
ElOorado.KS 1321 
El£abeth,*NJ WV.WW! 11059 
Elizabeth City, NC 730 
ERzabethtown, KY 801 
Elkhart, IN 1100 
Elklns.WV 831 
Ellensburg, WA 2959 
Ellsworth, ME 1520 
Elmlra.NY 1111 
El Paso, TX 1727 
Ely, NV 2482 
Eryria. OH 1021 
Emerson, MB 1892 
"mporia.KS 1319 
mporla, VA 684 
Endicott.NY 1132 
Enid. OK 1319 
Erie. PA 1073 
Escanaba.Ml 1439 
Escondldo.CA 2453 
EsthervWe. IA 1501 
Eufauta, AL 409 
Eugene. OR 3038 
Eureka, CA 3110 
EvansviBe, IN „ 845 
Everett, WA 3061 
Fairbanks, AK 4633 
FaWekJ.CA 2847 
Fairmont, WV 868 
Faith, SO 1938 
Fallon, NV 2706 
Fall River, MA 1285 
Falmouth, MA 1316 
Fargo. NO 1751 
Fanbautt. MN 1489 
Farmington, NM 1931 
Fayettevifle, AR 1110 
Fayetlevffle, NC 546 
Fenton, MO 1004 
Fergus Falls. MN 1696 
F'mdtay, OH 1027 
Fhchburo, MA 1272 
Flagstaff, AZ 2076 
Hancock, MO 
Hancock. Ml 
Hannibal,MO . . . 




HarrisonvUle. MO . 
Hartford, CT . . . . 
Hasting*, NE . . . . 
Hattlesburg, MS . 
Havana, I 
Havre, MT 
Hawarden,IA . . . 
Hawetvit.KY . . 
Hayward, W l . . . . 
Hazard, KY 
Haztoton, P A . . . . 
netene, M I . . . . « - - ^  * * 
Henderson, NC -644 
Henryetta,OK 1183 









Hornosatsa$poj.,a . . . 1 2 9 
Hopktosvie, KY 765 
HomaiNY 1137 
Hot Sprs., SO 1910 
Hot Sprs. N. P., AR 981 
Hourton,ME 1620 
Houma,LA 723 
Houston, TX 994 
Hoxie, AR 896 
Hudson, NY 1187 
Hugo, OK 1101 
Huntington, M 1042 
Huntington, WV 821 
Hunts*!. AL 632 
Huntsvie.TX 1018 
Huron, SO .1717 
Hutchinson, KS 1392 
Idaho Fals, O 2390 
Uion,NY 1219 
imlay City. Ml 1170 
Independence, KS 1227 
C O C O A , a TO 
Lock Haven, PA 1025 
Lodl. CA 2801 
Logan, UT 2306 
Logan, WV 773 
Logansport. IN 1032 
Logansport, LA 953 
London, KY 736 
London, ON 1238 
Lone Star, TX 1011 
Long Beach, CA 2487 
Long Shot, NV 2722 
Longvtew, TX 989 
Loogootee, W 892 
Lorain, OH 1030 
Lord*burg,NM 1872 
LosAlamos,NM 1774 
Loe Angela*, CA 246$ 
LostHis,CA 2610 
Louisiana, MO 1079 
Loulsvie.KY 846 
Lowel, MA 1288 
Lubbock, TX 1433 
















Jacksboro. TX 1203 
Jackson, KY 765 
Jackson, Ml 1123 
Jackson, MS 714 
Indiana, PA . 
Indianapois, W . . 
Indlo.CA 
Internal. FaHs, MN 
Iowa City, IA 
Iron Mtn., Ml . . . . 
Ironwood, Ml 
Jackson, OH 
Jackson, TN . . . 
Jacksonville, FL 






Fond Ou Lac, Wl . . 
Forest City, IA . . . . 
Ft. Collins, CO . . . . 
Ft. Oodge, IA 
Ft. Lauderdale, FL . 
Ft.Lee.NJ 
Ft. Macleod, AB . . 
Ft. Madison, IA . . . 
Ft. Morgan, CO . . , 
Ft. Myers, FL 
Ft. Pierce. FL 
Ft. Scott, KS 
Ft. Smith, AR . . . . 
Ft. Stockton, TX . 
:t. Wayne. IN . . . 
Ft. Worth, TX . . . 
Fox Lake, 1 . . . . 
Frankfort, N . . . . 
Frankfort,-KY . . . 
Franklin,NC . . . . 
Franklin.OH . . . . 
Frankln.PA . . . . 







Jamestown, NO 1847 
Janesvie, Wl 1226 
Jasper, AL 607 
Jasper, W 871 
Jasper, TX 915 
Jefferson Ctty, MO 1110 
Jenkins, KY 708 
Jersey City, NJ 1071 
Jesup,QA 248 
JohnsonOty, TN 623 
Johnatown, PA 962 
Jotot.1 1117 
Jonesboro, AR 876 
Jopiln,MO 1155 
Junction, TX 1294 







































Mcafen, TX. . 
Mccomb, MS 
Mccook, NE i w » 
Mcmlnnviie, TN 640 
Mcra«,GA 305 
Macedon,NY 1196 
Mackinaw City, Ml 1383 
Macon, GA 379 
Madawaska. ME 1722 
Madison, IN 889 
Madison, Wl 1262 
MadlsonvWe, KY 798 
Magnolia, AR 933 
Maida, NO 1948 
Malone, NY 1373 
Manchester, NH 1309 
Manhattan, KS 1361 
Manitowoc, Wl 1299 
Mankato, MN 1508 
Mansfield, OH 982 
Manteca, CA 2779 
Many,LA 911 
Marietta, OH 859 
Marinette, Wl 1383 
Marlon, t 888 
Marlon. IN 1015 
Marion, KY 817 
Marion, OH 982 
Marlborough, MA 1264 
Marltnton, WV 767 
Marquette, Ml 1504 
Marshal. MN 1613 
Marshal, MO 1172 
Marshatftown, IA 1332 
Marshfidd, Wl 1395 
Martin, SO 1800 
MsftlnsvtHe. VA 640 
MarysvWe.OH 967 
MaryvKle, MO 1333 
Mason City. IA 1413 
Mattoon, 1 980 
Mayfield, KY 830 
Maynard, MA 1272 
Maysville.KY 857 
Meadvtlie. PA 1038 
Medicine Hat. AB 2530 
Medina, NY 1200 
Medina, OH 995 
Melbourne, FL 22 
Memphis, TN 806 
Mena, AR 1047 
MenJoPark.CA 2819 
Menlor, OH 1029 
Merced. CA 2726 
C O C O A , a TO 
New York, NY 1090 
Niagara Falls. NY 1180 
Nogales, AZ 2054 
Norlolk, NE 1535 
Norfolk, VA 747 
Norman, OK 1257 
Nomstown, PA 990 
North Adams, MA 1237 
Northampton, MA 1229 
NorthBay.ON 1466 
North Platte, NE 1657 
North Sydney.NS 2086 
NorthTarrvtown,NY . . . . 1 1 0 0 
Norton, KS 1567 
Norton, MA 1266 
NorweJk.OH 1019 
Norwich, CT 1205 
Norwich, NY 1175 
Nyack, NY 1103 
OakHi.OH 854 
Oakland, CA 2837 









C O C O A , a TO 
Rota, MO 1058 
Rome.GA 523 
Rome, NY 1230 
Roseau. MN 1853 
RosweH, NM 1597 
Rumford, ME 1459 
Russeflville, AR 1006 
Ruston, LA 863 
Rutland, VT 1303 
Sacramento, CA 2833 
Saginaw, Ml 1202 
St. Augustine, FL 116 
St. Cloud. MN 1581 
St. Croix Falls. Wl 1522 
St. Francis. KS 1671 
St. John. N8 ^ 1 7 0 0 
SI. John's, NF -08 2772 
•UJM 
Mercer. PA 
Meridian, MS 627 
Kansas Oft, KS . 
Kansas City, MO . 
Keene.NH 
Kelso, WA 




Michigan City, W 




Midland. TX . . . 
MHan, TN 
Miles City, MT . . 
MiHord.PA .-.-., 
Miitedqeviiie, GA 
MMersburg. PA . 
Mills, MA 





Omaha, NE 1424 
O'nei.NE 1610 
Oneonla,NY 1183 
Ontario. OR 2652 
Ope«ka,AL 451 
Opeiousas,LA 782 
Orangeburg, SC 392 
Orlando, FL 46 
Ortonvie, MN 1677 
Osceola, IA 1304 
Oshkosh, Wl 1297 
Oskaloosa.lA 1267 
Osoyoos.&C 2971 
Oswego, NY 1219 
Ottawa, ON 1383 
Ottumwa, IA 1240 
Owego.NY 1121 
Owensboro.KY 821 
Oxford, MS 751 
Paducah,KY 832 
Page.AZ 2146 
PaJusviHe, KY 769 
Palatka .a . . \ 116 
Palestine, TX 1046 
Palmdate.CA 2493 
PanamaOiy,a 385 
Paris, L 967 
Paris, TN 798 
Paris, TX 1075 
Parker. AZ 2273 
Parkersburg, WV 849 
Park Rapids. MN .1703 
Pascagoula, MS 569 
Pasco, WA 2882 
Patchogue, NY 1133 
Paterson.NJ 1081 
Pecos. TX 1535 
Peeksk*,NY 1117 
Pekin, 1 1094 
Pembroke, ON 1444 
Peno1eton,OR 2817 
Pensacota,FL 480 
Peoria, 1 1098 
Perry.a 237 
Perryton, TX 1500 
Perth, ON 1361 
Peterborough, ON 1342 
Petersburg. VA 724 
Philadelphia. MS 665 
Philadelphia, PA 983 
PhUpsburg. PA 1002 
Philips, Wl : . . 1475 
PhWpsburg, KS 1536 
.1175 Phoenix, AZ 2112 
. 921 Pierre, SO 1813 
. 1226 Pine Bluff, AR 910 
. 1442 Pipestone, MN 1608 
. 801 Pittsburg, KS 1176 
.2160 Pittsburgh, PA 951 
.1101 Pmsf.etd,MA 1214 
. 383 PUkwiew, TX 1454 
. 982 Pittsburgh. NY 1366 
.1271 Plymouth,* 1078 
OQ1 Oum/Mrfh MM 13fifl 
.1008 
SI.Johnsbury.VT 1391 
SI. Joseph, Ml 1134 
St. Joseph, MO 1293 
SI. Louis, MO 991 
St. Marys, OH 1001 
St. Marys, PA 1053 
St. Paul, MN 1513 
SL Petersburg, FL 140 
Salem, MA 1300 
Salem, OH 993 
$alem,0R 3043 
Saflda. CO 1857 
Salna,KS 1417 
Salnas,CA 2773 
Saisbury.MD 'A 878 
SaWsaw.OK 1110 
Salmon, D 2547 
Salt Lake City. UT 2306 
SanAngelo.TX 1357 
San Antonio, TX 1186 
San Bernardino, CA 2428 
SanOlego.CA 2439 
Sandusky, OH 1036 
Sanford, NC 564 
San Francisco, CA 2845 
SanJose.CA 2801 
San Luis Obispo, CA . . . . 2663 
San Mateo, CA 2829 
Santa Ana, CA 2469 
Santa Barbara, CA 2573 
Santa Clara, CA 2803 
Santa Cruz, CA 2808 
Santa Fe.NM 1741 
Santa Maria. CA 2633 
Santa Rosa, CA 2895 
Saranac Lake, NY 1357 
Sarasota, FL 166 
Saskatoon, SK 2418 
Sauk Centre, MN 1624 
Sautt Ste. Marie, Ml . . .'C 1439 
Savanna, 1 1217 
Savannah, OA 287 
Schenectady, NY 1224 
Scoftsbiuff, NE 1830 
Scranton, PA 1076 
Seaford, OE 'A 899 
Seattle, WA 3064 
SedaHa,MO 1170 
Selma,AL 534 
Seminole, OK 1217 
Shakopee, MN 1525 
Shawano, Wl 1355 
Sheboygan, Wl 1272 
Shefcy.MT 2554 
Shctbyville, IN 937 
Sherbrooke, PQ 1466 
Sheridan. WY 2156 
Sherman, TX 1138 
Shreveport. LA 930 
Sidney, NE 1775 
Sikeston.MO 895 
Sioux Clty.tA 1517 
Sioux Fate. SO 1600 








Somerset. KY . . . 
Somerset, PA . . . 







South Amboy, NJ 1053 
South Bay, FL . . . 
South Bend, W . . . . 
South Boston, VA . . 
Sparrows Point, MD 
Spartanburg, SC . . . 
Spencer. tA 
Spokane, WA 
Springerviflc, AZ . . . 
Springfield, L 
Sprkigfleid, MA . . . . 












COCOA, a TO 
Va&y City. NO 
Valparaiso, W . 
Vancouver, 80 
Vancouver. WA 
Van Wert, OH . 
Ventura, CA .. 





WgWa Beach, YA . . . • 









Washington,0C . . . . 
Washington,GA . . . . 
Washington,NC . . . . 
Washington,PA . . . . 











Wsxanachie, TX . . . . 
Waycross. GA 
Waynesboro. TN . . . 








West Chicago, t 
WestfieW,NY 
Westminster, M0 .. . 
West Palm Beach, a 
West Plains. MO . . . 
West Point, VA . . . . 
Wheeling, WV 
Wnitehorsc. YT . . . . 
While Rains, NY 
White River Jet 
Wichita, KS 
W<hita Falls, TX . . . . 
Wfces-Barre. PA... • 
Wftesboro, NC 
waiamsburq. VA . . . . 
Wifcamson. WV 













Winslon-Salem, NC . 
Winter Haven, FL . . . 
Wisconsin Delis, Wl . 
Wisconsin Rapids, Wl 
Woodstock,! . . . . 
Woodward. OK . . . . 
Woonsocket. Rl .. . 
Woosier. OH 
Worcester. MA . . . . 
Wortand, WY 
Worthinglon. MN . . . 




Yazoo City, MS . . . . 
York, PA 
Yorkton.SK 
Youngstown. OH . . . 
YpsHanli, Ml 























• " 1 * 












• • • • % 
T«rif / r 
j ^ a ^ 694 FOCKf MOUNTAIN UCTOtf U R i f T BU^tVU. HC AGcNl *i ih a*</ts«a 
SECTION: 6 
»"j:to*» *.n t h i s t a c t i o n ar« 10 n* o s t d on ly in c?nr l t .c<ion * : t n i *T« Dd'-U. m.«nb*rs 
nan«d In S f C t i o r 5 3f m i a t a r i f f ^far a p p l i c a t i o n s*o i : e « IS^I 
irn f a c t o r c o l u w wh»"a 4 0 ^pp^arj i t i n < n r « ; # $ m a t no ' i i c i v i s i n v o l v e a/ j 
'•'ia r*\e s;-»\i'. nonpar for tno *>at»c ;Mp ««pt>l:9*. 
TLOttlOA 
I 
3 : 5 0 1 - 2 3 : 
•J2501-23 
32501-231 
3 ^ 5 P1 > 2 3 
323C2-23, 
3 H O I - 2 3 
3 2 5 0 1 - 2 3 
3 2 5 0 1 - 2 3 















3 2 6 0 1 - 1 4 
3 2 6 0 1 - 1 4 
3 2 5 0 1 - 1 4 
J I C O I - 14 




3 2 6 0 1 - 1 4 
W5C1 14 




3 2 6 0 1 - 1 4 
>.'',P: - 14 j 
. c CI - 1 4 ' 
I 
ll'Jjl ' 4 . 
j . . 6 : : -141 
3 2!>C1 -14 
\ r : o i - i 4 
• j o O l - M 1 
3 ; n c l - 1 4 ' 
3 , 5J 1-14 
l.Vj.'l -14 
* : e o : . 14 
W 3 1 -14 
3 /60 i -H> 
3 2 6 0 1 - 1 4 
facto- 710 C01« OJ'-e z i p < -J v.'. o 
; r, c /«i c A 
13 , i 3^666 
3 , | 32667 
ID .' 32666 
30 I 32669 
30 ,, 32670-7* 
| I 
30 •. 12679 
0 !, J2630 
0 !, 32681 
0 32662 
10 !| 32663 
10 Ii 32684 





























20 ' | 3270) 
10 J' 12705 
30 , 32/05 
10 i 





JO 1! 32711 
1C j j 32713 
10 , (C) 3271* 






20 !' 32721 
/.' , 3 2 77li 
20 1• 327JQ 
1 ' 
2'*t , j 3 2V 30 
20 ! i :<;/3i 
1 .* i 3 2 7 3 2 
10 | ' 32733 
1C *2734 
20 I 32 35 
10 3 27 36 
2) | | U 7 3 7 
10 !I 32739 
10 * j 3 2740 
10 || 37741 
20 1 1 3? N 4 
i j > 2 M 5 
32001- 14 
32601-14 
3 2601 14 
32601-14 i 




























J2801 -9'.; I 
32801-99| 
32801-99) 








3 2 / i 0 i - 9 i 
3 7 6C1-99 
32SCI-99! 
12801-9«4' 










1 0 i 


















2 0 j 
10 
ic 1 

































 2i too* | 
KLOWi'J^ 






























































3 292 2.""2 4 
32925 
v«m 
3 JO 35 * 
32^30 
'. 2 -) 4 8 
«i94a 
3 79-30 





3 29 39 
32960-43 
17»fi5 























3 2 6 0 1 - 9 9 ; 



















3 2 8 0 1 - 9 9 ' 






































































 F M o c t W i July I . 1945 
o a a r i o n . jr . g t t c u t l v * Oi^ac tor 
;
 7 I3Q* *> 7/|a D o v e r CO 8C2i 1 
it. f i f g * 05 t a r i f f . (583-5251) 
* , 83 f l / 2 
• ICC AHS S i * 
u n 8 # * i s o < i P a g * n 7 PuCkY MOUNTA'N MC'OP I AR I f * OUf'MU i w : N < U * ' 
S i c r i o s •> 
F a c t o r s >n tr»*.» s e c t i o n ^ i f t o u» us-^d u~l» I n r o n n e - M o i « : j » r « t o o«". ls n j n o « « s 
n*mtf J i n S e c t i o n *» of M» > u n t f , 101 a u p U c a t x «n •,!*•: l t « w 155* 
I n m * U c u r v o l u i * * wnoru a 0 i p o c n * l i 1 ><1Uales v*«i no f a c t o r 1$ i n v o l / c d ant 
t r * / j ; o OrfSJs i>j«roor (o r t i n D«»3o M o j p p l l t * 



























- ) > 













































| 84101 9Q 
845,, 
84101 <ii 
| 84131 99 
























































1 ICO I 















































j S 4 3 I i 
j o431f 


















































0 4 40! 99 
1
 84401 99 
c440l 99 
j 0 4 401 99 
| 84 101 99 
I 84401 rl9 
' 04-.C1 99 
j 84401-99 
I 3 4 ^ . 9 9 
J4401-99 
j 44401-99 
1 84401 99 
1 84401-99 
1 
| 84401 99 
factor 1 
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TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT OFFICE 
MRU I 
•BLDG 1063 DOOR 1 
PICKUP • 
L A K K I t K N O 
DATE 
SHIPPER (FROM) 
NOVA MUD CORP 
V?R"BS 
S l K C t l 
7956 SOUTH 1530 WEST 
CITY STATE 










ATTS: JIM BRIGGS 




HM Kind of Packaging, Description of Articles, Special Marks and Exceptions 
Weight 
(SUBJECT TO CORRECTION) Rate 
CHARGES 
( f o r C o r r i « r u i * o n l y 
1.2 PALLETS DRILLING MUf) ITEM 138640 20000 LBS 
RATE PER CFWY TARIFF 400 ITEM //PD HLktfc- & 'ozW£^ 
XXXSBBR 
12 PALLETS ON TRLR XXK2B3. 11-268 AT 20000fl SEAL NO 295482 
t^ Hg**-
*-** 
SHIPPERS LOAD AND COUNT 
Note — W h e r e 'he rate is dependent on value shippers a'e required to stdte specif colly 
ant ing the agreed or declared value of 'he property 
The agreed or declared value of the property is hereby spec ficolly stated by the shipper 
Subiect to section 7 of the conditions, if this shipment is 
to be del ive 'ed to the consignee without recourse on the 
consignor the consignor shall sign the fo l lowing statement 
The corner shall not make delivery ol this shipment 
without payment of freight and all other lawful charges 




I RTIGHT PnTPAir) < » 
oxrop t v/' ion c*i 
i box at r ight — 
\ is checked w__ 
3ES: | 
. k 1 M tl 1 
\r<;» , <iro 1 
1 to ba 
j collect The agreed value on household goods or porsonal effects does not exceed IOC per lb. p«r article, unless otherwise specified. 
"THIS'IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE-NAMED MATERIALS ARE PROPERLY CLASSIFIED] DESCRIBED, PACKAGED, MARKED AND LABELED AND AREIN PROPER 
CONDITION FOR TRANSPORTATION ACCORDING TO THE APPLICABLE REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION/' 
RECEIVED subiect to the classifications and tariffs in effect on the date of the issue of this Bill of Lading, the property described above in apparent good order except as noted 
(contents anci condition of contents of packages unknownl marked, consigned, and deslmed as indicated above which said corner (the word carrier being ufiderstood throughout 
this contract as meaning any person or corporation in possession of the property under the contract) agrees to carry to its usual place of delivery at said destination, if on its route, 
otherwise to deliver to another carrier on the route to said destination If is mutually agreed as »o each carrier of all or any of said property, over all or any portion of said route to 
destination and as to each party at any time interested in all or any of said property, that every service to be performed hereunder shall be sub|ect to all the bill of lading terms and 
conditions in the governing classification on the date of shipment 
Shipper hereby certifies that he is familiar with all the bill of lading terms and conditions in the governing classification and the said terms and conditions are hereby agreed to 
by the shipper and accepted for himself and his assigns 







m MVII 1 1 .1 4»;uci v X^EJBB^/ ;^ i 
g 3 _ n i t u | [ / | ' J — 1 2 m t & F & + MS/ ' 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ K . ORG SIC > SS H F CIRCLE ONt 0ES7 Sir I M3JE 
1 (-UNL.IGNLL ( I U ) > ^ , " \ 
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT OFEICE , ( l l j 
L STRFET V _ ^ 
BLDG 1063 DOOR 1 
CITY, STATE 






SHIIM'I k (1 k'f )AA) 
NOVA MUD CORP 
STREET 





 * FLORIDA 











Kind of Packaging, Description of Articles, Special Marks and Exceptions 
PALLETS DRILLING MUD ITEM 138640 
RATE PER CFWY TARIFF 400 ITEM 2200 
Weight 
(SUBJECT TO CORRECTION) 
46655 LBS 
11 PALLETS ON TRLR 11-4373 AT 24710# SEAL NO. 29544p 
13 PALLETS ON TRLR 15-317 AT 21945?? SEAL NO. 29547p 
r-Jyfa-d* &6,-027^/£> 
SHIPPERS LOAD AND COUNT & 
here the 'ate is dependent on value shippers are required to state specifically 
jgreed or declared value of the property 
d or d<>c*w<>d va lu f of (he property is hereby specifically stated by the shipper 
Sub|ect to section 7 of the cone 
to be del ivered to the consignee 
consignor the consignor shall sign 
The corrinr shall not make d 
itions if this shipment is 
without recourse on the 
the fo l lowing statement 
eliver< of this shipme^ 
ZIP 
84084 
VEHICLE N O 
Rate 
CHARGES 
(for Corrnr u t« Onl^  
TOTAL k [ 




rx>< n\ r ight 
[_ ik checked 
Check oo» 
ch«rg«« ari 
< -•; to b« 
1
 1 colloi The agreed value on household goods or personal effects does not exceed 10C per lb. per article, unless otherwise specified. 
"THIS IS TO CERTJFY JHAT THE ABOVE-NAMED MATERIALS ARE PROPERLY CLASSIFIED, DESCRIBED, PACKAGED, MARKED AND LABELED AND ARE IN PROPER 
>CdND!TION/FORTRANSPORTATION ACCORDING TO THE APPLICABLE REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF.-fRANSPORTATION/; . . , , ^ 
RECEIVED, subject to the classifications and tariffs in effect on the date of the issue of this Bill of Lading, the property described above in apparent good order, except as noted 
(contents and condition of contents of packages unknown), marked, consigned, and destined as indicated above which said earner (the word carrier being understood throughout 
this contract as meaning any person or corporation in possession of the property under the contract) agrees to carry to its usual place of delivery at said destination, if on its route, 
otherwise to deliver to another carrier on the route to said destination It is mutually agreed as to each earner of all or any of said property, over all or any portion of said route to 
destination and as to each party at any time interested in all or any of said property, that every service to be performed hereunder shall be sub|ect to all the bill of lading terms and 
conditions in the governing classification on the date of shipment 
Shipper hereby certifies that he is familiar with al l the bill of lading terms and conditions in the governing classification and the said terms and conditions are hereby agreed to 
by the shipper and accepted for himself and his assigns 
SHIPPER 
&VA /Hub CozD LIDATED FREIGHTWAYS 
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE I

/Ml 3? 07 1 ,83 
• ;CC| is(/L 
ORG SIC; SS F l ; CIRClE'ONCv DEST SIC-;£>£ 
# 




TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT OFFICE 
SHIPPER (FROM) 
NOVA MUDH CORP 
STREET 
•1LDG. 1063 DOOR 1 
STREET 
7956 SOUTH 1530 WEST 
CITY STATE 














H M Kind of Packaging, Description of Articles, Special Marks and Exceptions Weight (SUBJECT TO CORRECTION) Rate 
CHARGES 
(lor Carrier us* only) 
17 PALLETS DRILLING MUD ITEM 138640 40?25 LBS 
RATE PER CFWY TARIFF 400 ITEM 2200 
T 
8 PALLETS ON TRLR 11-4295 a t 19150A s e a l n o . 2964m 
9 PALLETS ON TRLR 15-5096 a t 21075# s e a l n o . 2954196 
SHIPPERS LOAD AND COUNT 
Note—Where the rote is dependent on value shippers ore required to siote spec f colly 
n wr i ng the agreed or declared value of the property 
The agreed or declared value of the property s hereby -specifically stated by the sh pper 
to be not enceed ng 
Sub|ecf to section 7 of the conditions |f this shipment is 
to be delivered to the conj gnee yv thput recourse on the 
cons gnor the consignor shall s gn the following statement 
The carrier shall not make delivery of this sh pme^ 
w thou) payment of fre gHt and oil other lawful charges 
TOTAL 
CHARGES • 
(S gno u e of Cons gnor) 
FREIGHT CHARGES: 
FREIGHT PREPAID Check box If 
except when charges are 
bo* at r'ght i—i 
The agreed value on household goods or personal effects does not exceed 10C per lb par article unless otherwise specified 
RECEIVED $ub|ect fo the classifications and tariffs in effect on the date of the issue of this Bill of Lading the property described above in apparent good order except as noted 
(contents and condition of contents of packages unknown), marked consigned and destined as indicated above which said carrier (the word carrier being understood throughout 
this contract as meaning any person or corporation in possession of the property under the contract) agrees to carry fo its usual place of delivery at said destination if on its route 
otherwise to deliver fo another carrier on the route to soid destination It is mutually agreed as fo each carrier of al l or any of said property over al l or any portion of said route to 
destination and as to each party at any time interested in al l or any of said property that every service to be performed hereunder shall be subject to all the bil l of lading terms and 
conditions in the governing classification on the date of shipment 
Shipper hereby Certifies that he is familiar with al l the btll of lading terms and conditions in the governing classification and the said terms and conditions are hereby agreed to 
by the shipper and accepted for himself and his assigns 
SHIPPeR 
"j/aM-tfivlS £*j> CARRIER SOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS 
Al/AORIZED SIGNATURE 
A1 A- fao/tH 
DATE 
APPENDIX D 
1986 ICC opinion 
NATIOKfiL INDUSTRIAL TRANS-GRTATIDK LEAGUE - PETI~I""s TI 
INSTITUTE RULEMAKING ON NEGOTIATED MOTOR COMMON CARRIER 
RATES 
EX PARTE NO. MC-177 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 
SLIP OPINION 
October 14. 198E 
«yw»«g53BgMMf_»_ia ! <F* * * * iB fe^ 
JBdSbiB&fcgftH^^ 
iHrfeerfftajw^ ^ ft proposal to adopt a rale 
:lanng a negotiated (bat unpublished) motor carrier rate to De the maximum 
SLIP OPINION 
isonable rate Mif the shipper acted u?i th a good faith belief that the 
>gotiated rate was the legally applicable rate" is denied. 
WEL: 
DECISION 
By the Commission, Chairman Gradison, Vice Chairman Simmons, Commissioners 




Under 43 U.S.C. 1076=(a)* a motor common carrier must collect the rate 
: * : i s h e d i n i t s t a r i f f . 
rt**&tt&EJK»r%flDS^ 
*e i s s u e d an a d v a n c e n o t i c e of p r o p o s e d r u l e ^ a ^ i n c <ANDR-' [ 5 / F e ^ . n e : . 
: o 'U oer f e m b e r 12* 1 3 8 5 : i n
 r e s D o r ! S e t o a P e t i t i o n f i l e d by t b e N a t i o n a l 
L_eagj- < K i 7 _ > , Tne AN111 l r ^ ' i t e : P u b . i c c o r i e n t • 
" h a t Li:?.1 i c d e c l a r e a n e c o t i a r e a * ba~. unc-ub 1 i s nee ) 
t n e ma.vinur. r e a s o n a i i e r a t e " : *" t o e s r u t « p e r a c r e 
:~r- n e g o t i a t e d r a t e uar. t h ~ l e g a l l y a p ^ i i c a r l e 
:
r
--s: i n o l o r - r ^ E i o r encLiiC a c c c * a r_.Ae s : : r ; 
P I r»i 
•"CTi c a r r i e r r a t e t c r_*e t n 




1A»1 ; - ^ ^ £ r o p O *bcru j ^ i c > w_a>I,ttS 
ii^M**^*^ w men 
' ~ ' ' ' ' £ that "Tne 
More than TOO separate comments were received, n2 Shippers, and shipper 
sociations generally agree that quoting but not publishing rates is 
SLIP OPINION 
opening too often in the motor common carrier industry, and favor adoption of 
? rule proposed by NITL. Carriers* carrier associationst rate bureaus, and 
/era! trustees in bankruptcy* among others• generally oppose any Commission 
cion in this area. Some parties believe that, while a rule in this area is 
:essary • the rule proposed by NITL should not be adopted without change. 
n2 Un February 5, 1986, Cooper Industries, Inc. filed a motion to file 
tments out of time. Under 49 CFR 1110.5, we wi 11 accept Cooper's comments. 
On Hay 8. 1986, die held an open voting conference on the NITL proposal. We 
ed to adopt a policy statement announcing that, in light of the Motor Carrier 
of 1980 the filed rate doctrine does not necessarily bar equitable defenses 
adv ismy that, if a case is referred to the Commission* ue will decide if 
collection of undercharges would be an unreasonable practice. 
PRELIMINARY HATTER 
In June 12. 1986, as supplemented July 7< 1986, Carrier Credit and Collection 
3> filed a petition requesting reopening on the present record so that the 
ussion could reconsider* due to changed circumstances ana material error, 
decision to adopt the policy statement announced at the May 8, 198b voting 
erence. n3 CCC argues that the Commission's policy statement conflicts 
SLIP OPINION 
i the recent decisions in Square D Co. v, Niagara Frontier Traffic Bureau* 
• S. (1986) (Square D) n4 and Regular Common Carrier Conference* et al • v 
ed States, et al., 793 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1985). n5 Because o* tre 
rtance of the issues presented by CCC, pursuant to 49 CFR 1110*5 ye will 
t CCC's petition and the replies thereto as late-filed comments, and 
ider them. However, as discussed below* neither Square D nor the Regular 
OTI Carrier case preclude us from adootmg this policy statement. Thus, 
3 petition to reopen is denied* 
i By notice published at 50 Fed* Reg* 26956• July 28* 1986, the Commission 
:ed a petition filed bv the National Retail Merchants Association request ir,«; 
itension of time to 
: ion to reopen were 
repiy 
f i lee 
pet 11ion. Sever* replies to CCC 
• ne case involve*: 
a; ieoec.v f i > e: i 
private antitrust action based on 
iiiart to an agreement 4 orb icoer D, 
ourt ne:c tnat the carriers were not sur.\ie--: 
- 1 l!^_J •_; e 7\±ie o r k e o c r v.. Cn i cag - : 6 Nor t n ^ e s r e 
) , tiihicr. n e i c t n a t an aujarc; o* ~ r e b l e d a n a g e s i s no 
•c a p r i v a t e s ' . i D P v r c ; a : r : - n c t n ^ t t n - r a r e suc-Ti 'Tte 
. C lw * 1 i €• O ( .cil 'M • 
; a w a g e s 1 1 ar> i i 1 1 
.^ pro-'en 
s . L> a : 
'
VJT -an- 5r 
ar»L-r or-r I atr-
---vr *; i L l l 1 ' 
r>5 The court held there that a particular ("average rate") tariff did not 
•duce a "filed rate" and thus did not comply with the requirement in Section 
61 that rates be "contained in a tariff." 793 F,2d at 379-380. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
fiany of the parties question our authority to adopt the NITL's proposed rule. 
carriers, carrier associations, and rate bureaus argue that the Commission 
not adopt NITL's proposal because: <1) carrier rates must be on file to be 
id under 43 U.S.C. 10762: and (2) the rule is tantamount to a class exemption 
m the requirement that common carriers charge only the rates contained in a 
iff that is in effect, and thus uouia abrogate 43 U.S.C. 10761<a> nb and 
03 (which subject carriers and shippers to criminal sanctions for failure to 
erve the filed rate). These Parties also contend that the proposal exceeds 
Commission's authority over these claims, because the Commission lacks 
tial jurisdiction over rate reparation and collection actions and that, while 
"Upper might have a cause of action against an unreasonable or unlawful 
ztice, the Commission has no authority to award damages* Only the courts can 
it a remedy. 
ib Section 10761(a) provides that: 
SLIP OPINION 
.xcept as provided [in the Interstate Commerce Act 3 a carrier providing 
asportation • , • shall provide that transportation . • . only if the rate • 
is contained in a tariff that is in effect [under 43 U.S.C, 10761, et. seq.] 
; carrier may not charge or receive a different compensation for that 
isportation • , . than the rate specified in the tariff « . . 
'arious shippers and shipper associations argue that 49 U.S.C. 10701(a), n7 
ther with 49 U.S.C. 10101(b). 10321, and 10704, form an adequate basis for 
rule* They rely on the few rail cases where the Commission has recognized 
table defenses in tariff applicability cases* e.g.. No. 37635, Buckeye 
uiose Corp. v. L & N R.R. Co., 1 I,C.C.2d 767 <!385) (Buckeye), aff'd sub. 
, Seaboard System R.R. Inc. v. United States, 794 F.2d 635 (llth Cir. 1986) 
board). These parties contend that the rule would not abrogate section 
1 because tariff rates uould still apply to the traffic they were intended 
over* Further, they stress that, although motor carrier undercharge cases 
be filed in court, 49 U.S.C, 11706. the courts car: refer the question of 
her a motor carrier practice in fact violates the Act to the Commission, 
r the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 
1 Section 10701(a) provides: 
.~*.i. nc Under trie proposal* the ^egoi ia:ec ra:-, rstne; t",ar. the tariff rac 
O U I G apply unless the Conmssior; determined that the shipper lacked a goes 
aith belief that the negotiated rate was legally applicable. The rule is 
irtually a per se determination that, as a matter of law. the negotiated rat< 
ould apply and is. thus, in direct conflict with the statute. 
n8 Even the shippers favoring the HilL proposal characterize 
ebuttable presumption that the negotiated rate uculd apply. 
it as creating 
In addition, as some parties point out * the Commission does not have 
unsdiction over claims challenging the reasonableness of motor carrier rates 




uaiver undercharges We 
TKlTnK 
± I t 1 :_J f * 
ddress the question of what rates should have been charged by a carrier only j 
n advisory capacity upon referral from a court. ^or these reasons, ue will nc 
dopt NITL's proposal. 
While we conclude that NITL's specific proposal conflicts with the 
equirements of section 10761 and the long-standing judicial construction of 
hose requirements, n3 the policy statement we adopt instead is both justified 
no within our jurisdiction. Contrary to the carriers' concerns about the NITL 
roposal• this policy statement does not abrogate Section 10761. Seaboard* 
upra, 794 F.2d at 638. See Nepera Chemical. inc. v. Sea-Land Service, 794 F.2 
88. 693 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Rather• we emphasize that carriers must continue tc 
harge the tariff rate• as provided in the statute. The issue here is simply 
hether we have the authority to consider all the circumstances surrounding an 
ndercharge suit. 
n9 In the past, ignorance or misquotation of rates generally was not an 
xcuse for paying less than the tariff rate. See, e.g.. Southern Pacific 
ransp. Co. v. Commercial Metals, 456 U.S. 336 (1982); Louisville & Nashville v 
axweli. 237 U.S. 94. 97 <1915); A. J. Poor v. Chicago B.I.O.* 12 I.C.C. 418 
1907). 
SLIP OPI! ON 
tnouqn beet ion 10 7 b1 requires 
mi i i U i i Li . w L J 
wiLhui i Ly Lu maize 
carriers must charge 
*fl~Tariff rate* M[tlhe statute does not say what renedy is available if less 
han the tariff rate has in fact been charged ana paic for Past shipments" 
emphasis added). Seaboard at 638. Moreover• while the Interstate Commerce Ac 
till embodies the policy of nondiscrimination, "[tine primary authority to giv 
is reposed in the ICC.M Id. "if1 flW'f 
J T ^ n t h P S t a t u t e i ijiid «»"•»• iiwipi i |<n
 t p i !»•••• 4 * • • < • * W ^ * * * " ^ 
-J ™ 
f f e c t t o [ t h a t p o l i c y ] 
r.iiLp-lhi in?t Ti i * i f T i n r n n v i a 
*~% 
The courts consistently have recogni 
taints and "adant [our] rules a no rraiticeE 
langjng econor-y .n See, e.g. . ^ nerics- Tru_Cf 
\h ( "! 9b • ' \ Sear-oard . SUPr E. * kes t ~ rr L os I \ T 
.2c: 772 (5th Cir. :98?> <er Dane) cert. de~ 
:>uriy Ndvication Di-.tiic; !';.. ' v. 12; , 67-
OIIT aut hor i ty 
the nst ion ' s 
reinterpret the 
- - >
 f - - 7 » i 
C-C ." «-• 
• z -'. > t a i ^ 
r
 H C; / ) . 
OC "7 
~J - ' • 
N ue c e \ 
c e r t . 
?n : e o • bU'J >0 t ( 1SL-3> . 
fi, 10^ s. Ct. 2456 <";S84>; Atchison. T.S.h.R. Co. v. kichita Board o: Trade. 
2 U.S. 800. 823-24 (1973); National Insulation Transp. Committee v. ICC, 683 
2d 533, 540-44 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Genstar Chemical Ltd. v. ICC. 665 F.2d 1304 
Cir 1381), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 305 (1382; 
s s O ^ p f g ^ 
icaeHJEamfift^^ 
g f e | f ^ § | ^ £ S u i f » ^ 
n11 We did not intend Atlas Foundry & Machine Co. v. IML Freight. Inc. (not 
mted)• decided April 17 
consider the situations 
1385, to be read as a wholesale refusal on our part 
involved here as unreasonable practices. 
n12 The fact that the courts historically have refused to consider equitable 
fenses does not preclude our adopting this policy statement. Seaboard, supra* 
A F.2d at 638. As the court in Seaboard explained (id.), the courts have 
ver held that the Commission lacks authority to prohibit the unreasonable 
llection of undercharges. Moreover, the Commission had not waived 
dercharges in the cases precluding equitable defenses. 
SLIP OPINION 
appropriate for us take a tresn .uuj ^ regulatory environment makes ^ L c^ h•-x •-••-•- x^^xz • wx ^^ ».%_. co^-. ^ .i^^i, 
at the proper regulatory response to the matter of unfiled negotiated motor 
ier rates. ^nwm&kSGckm^^ 
i ooay 
.rr »n * v m & * £ G c i m 
g^gfeu^ m,iM&noppc>ri»qre-oaFi^ b^ g^ gte^ c^  n shipper and carriSX« 
*4fti>^iaMgpw™y^4cigiafii^^ Kequiring strict adnerence 
the tariff rate was intended to avoid intentional carrier misquotation of 
.tes as a means to offer secret discounts to particular shippers. See 
ansp. Co. v. Wilson, 682 F.2d 1227, 1230 (7th Cir. 1382). In the 
gulatory environment prior to the Motor 
-236 (MCA), carriers did not enjoy 
.rticuiarized rate 
sentiaiiy the same 
Carrier Act of 1380, Pub. 
Western 
strict 
L. No • 
to negotiate the flexibility they nou enjoy 
arrangements with shippers. Consequently, they charged 
rates for freight in a given traffic lane, and it generally 
.s not difficult to ascertain the published rate. In that regulatory climate 
ippers rarely were excused from paying the published rate. 
In Buckeye, supra* w* modified this strict tariff applicability standard for 
ii carriers because the deregulated pricing atmosphere created in the Staggers 
t and tne particular facts of the case led us to conclude that a more flexible 
•proach was necessary -- and that carriers were unlikely to use rate 
squotations as a means to discriminate in favor of particular shippers today, 
found there that the railroad had engaged in an unreasonable practice under 
U.S.C. 10701(a)(1) and 10704(a)(1) because the meanino of the published 
SLIP OPINION 
.rut was not plain tc the ordinary user, the applicable rate was 
er a long period of time. anG tne shipper relied, in good faith, 
SQucted rate. In Seaboarc. supra, 794 r.2c at 638, the reviei: 
x
:rrrieG exercise of our unreasonaoie practices jurisdiction IT 
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J.S.C. * 10761(a) that carriers must charge the tariff rate. 
It is not entirely clear why the problem ye are here addressing has 
developed. Some carriers argue that it is purely inadvertent that tariffs 
reflecting negotiated rates are not filed. Certain shippers believe the 
practice is intentional. Whatever the reason, the potential for this problem 
significant. We are directed to encourage competitive, innovative, and 
individualized price and service options to meet changing market demand. 49 
U.S.C. 10101(a)(2)• As parties such as National Gypsum Co.. et al. emphasize, 
hundreds, or even thousands, of individual motor common carrier rates are 
negotiated daily. In these circumstances* it can be extremely difficult for 
snippers to determine, prior to movement, whether the agreed rate is actualiy 
file -
SLIP OPINION 
The question that ue are addressing here is whether a shipper must pay the 
rate established in a tariff where a motor common carrier has negotiated a low 
rate anc has indicated that the negotiated rate would be the one charged (an 
therefore presumably filed as a tariff). n13 We believe, in the highly 
competitive motor carrier industry anc- economy in general, equitable defenses 
ngic application of filed tariff rates should be available on a case-by-case 
basis and that our unreasonable practice jurisdiction authorizes such an 
approach. 
Furthermore* fc»e are firmly convinced that our prior policy of applying 
tion 10761 strictly regardless of the circumstances is inappropriate and 
ecessary to deter discrimination today* As the shippers point out. the 
lety of price and service options permitted under the MCA and NTP permit 
lvity that previously would have been considered discriminatory. E.g.» Rates 
a Named Shipper, 367 I.C.C. 959 (1984)* Moreover, with the elimination of 
prohibition against dual operations, a motor carrier not desiring to publish 
rates can simply seek contract carrier authority. See Exemption of Motor 
tract Carrier from Tariff Filing Requirements. 133 M.C.C. 150 (1963), aff'd 
tral & Southern Motor Freight Association v. United States. 757 F.2d 301 
C- Cir. 1985). cert, denied. 54 U.S.L.K. 3392 (1385). Thus, changed 
cumstances clearly warrant a tempering of the former harsh rule of adhering 
the tariff rate in virtually all cases. In short, as was the case in 
keye, (see Seaboard* supra* at 638): 
"the inability of a shipper to reiy on a carrier's interpretation of a tariff 
a greater eviil than the remote possibility that a carrier might 
entionally misquote an applicable tariff rate to discriminate illegally 
ween shippers.'1 
In response to carrier contentions that we are without jurisdiction to order 
ver of motor carrier (as opposed to rail) undercharges, we now set out the 
SLIP OPINION 
her limited naiure of our role m motor carrier undercharge cases -- and 
lain why it cosports with the statutory scheme. As some parties point out• 
Commission lacks initial jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the 
sonahieness of motor carrier rates charged in the past* or to order the 
ver of undercharges. However, this does not mean that we lack authority to 
ress the question of what rate should have been charged by a carrier (the 
iff rate, the negotiated rate or some other rate) if the carrier brings an 
ion for undercharges in district court, 43 U.S.C. 11705(b)(3) , 11706, and the 
rt refers the question of whether the collection of undercharges would be an 
easonable practice to us under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. n14 
board, supra. 734 F.2d at 638: Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator. 259 
. 285, 231 (1927): National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 
Supp. 90f 92 (1967), aff'd 393 U.S. 18 (1968); Western Transp. Co. v. Wilson, 
ra, b82 F.2d at 1231-32. In the latter case, the Seventh Circuit held as 
tment here that we have authority to determine when motor carrier practice's 
iate the Act. despite our mobility to award reparations. In determining the 
Btion whether a motor carrier practice is unreasonable. the Commission uill 
jjDe its traditional role in unreasonable practice cases, weighing the facts 
circumstances in light of its experience and expertise, and aiding the court 
making necessary administrative determinations. Consistent with the 
tutory scheme, the court retains its authority to set the remedy and accept 
reject the Commission's conclusions. 
SLIP OPINION 
r14 Recently. :r its order cf June 11• 1386 in No. 83 Civ. 2803 <RJW>. 
rmationai Distribution Centers. Inc., v. Rhapsody Blouse anc Sportswear. 
. . D-rencar:; ar-: Third Party Plaintiff, and Gerald K. Esi. ois. ^-iirC ^'arty 
^ndant, the on:tec States District Court tor the Southern District oi New 
iriGicated that tne Lorer. ission is not precluded fror COT:S ider i :-_ E shipper s 
- tat; lz- defense - ^ r, exar.-mnQ the question of whether a carrier's collection 
-pdei snarqer is an unreasonable practice. -. 
-
r
 -:-?7t, wi •;::-:r to une'er^ti; "an adv isory * anai ys is OT whether a i^eqo t i ated 
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?eternin~. based or- a: : relevant circurstances » L^etner collection or 
mdercharges based on the rate contained in the filed tariff would constitute c 
unreasonable practice and, if a negotiated rate is found to exist, whether 
:his amount is all the carrier should be permitted to collect. The referring 
:ourt would retain final authority to set the remedy, if anyt and review our 
ietermination> Accordingly, as the NITL and others contend, the instant policy 
>tateir»ent is consistent u?ith the statutory scheme, 
n15 We note that we performed similar analyses pursuant to Ex Parte No* 
J58-F* Change of Policy-Railroad Contract Rates* 
SLIP OPINION 
As previously indicated, CCC argues that the recent decisions in Square D ai 
\CCC. reaffirm the validity of the filed rate doctrine and therefore refute the 
-Commission's new policy. It believes we must, therefore, reverse the policy 
idopted at the hay 8th open conference. We do not view our new policy -- whicl" 
j * course is firmly supported by the recent Seaboard court case -- as 
inconsistent with those decisions. Neither Square D nor RCCC involved the 
question of equitable defenses to a claim for undercharges, and neither decisi( 
indicates that the Commission is precluded from passing on the reasonableness < 
carrier practices pursuant to its express statutory authority in Section 
10701(a). Further, as discussed earlier, we are not abolishing the requiremen' 
DT Section 10761. Thus, the portions of Square D reaffirming that carriers mw. 
file their rates do not mean that we lack authority to find, in a particular 
case, that allowing a carrier to collect the tariff rate would be unreasonable 
In implementing this policy statement case-by-case, we will resolve what th< 
tariff rate is and then analyze, under our practices jurisdiction, whether 
collection of the tariff rate is a reasonable practice. Indeed, the Commissioi 
also supports the view expressed by some parties that carriers who engage in 
illegal behavior by intentionally disregarding the tariff filing requirements 
should be properly dealt with under the antitrust laws, and/or other punitive 
statutes. n16 See Nepera Chemical, supra, allowing a private damage action for 
negliqence in applying for leave to refund and waive shipping charges where 
SLIP OPINION 
the carrier voluntarily represented that it would seek: a specified rate 
correction. The Commission's intent in adopting this new policy is simply to 
make clear that the filed tariff rate need not and should not be appliced 
automatically in the limited circumstances covered by our policy statement* 
Both the statute and the applicable case law permit us to tate this action. 
n16 In Square D, the Court made it clear that it was not holding the carrie 
harmless, but merely precluding a treble-damages antitrust action. 
This decision will not significantly affect either the quality of the human 
environment or the conservation of energy resources. It is issued pursuant to 
j-S.C. 553 and 49 U.S-C. 10221, '0701(a), and 10704(b)(1). 
11 is orderec: 
',
 The petition ;:iec on February Z7 . 1985. Dy tne National incus trial 
" ransDc-r tat ion ^eaguc-, is ceniec. 
^ * A pel icy statenent. as described aDove, is aooptec. 
; nc PST it :•"'"• r.*'t< -''-'eope^  *' -ied ? &> Ca~-i:er Credit and Collection is oemec 
i - & 
4. This proceeding is discontinued, 
5, This decision is effective on November 29, 1986* 
SENTBY: LAMBOLEY 
COMMISSIONER LAMBOLEY. commenting: 
I support fully the concept that in the post-Motor Carrier Act of 1980 
ironment. the "fiiec-rate doctrine" does not necessarily bar equitable 
enses. Indeed, our decision in No. 37635, Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. L & N 
• Co,. 1 I.C.C. 2d 767 <i985). aff'd sub. nom•, Seaboard System R.R. Inc. v. 
tea States, 794 F. 2d 635 (Itth Cir. 1386), recognized that the encouragement 
market-based arrangements likewise requires us to consider the variety of 
uations that lead to neu transportation price/service options. 
In the course of negotiating and developing those neu options there will be 
reservations• inducements and reliance on the part of the respective parties, 
this environment, there is reason to anticipate that certain problems of 
duct and interpretation may arise, just as those which have prompted the 
eral rule here requested by NITL. 
SLIP OPINION 
Although our policy statement focuses on the questions framed by the 
itions, the issues addressed here involve the broader elements of 
ountability, i.e.. as people participate in the marketplace, their conduct 
now be evaluated and potentially measured as to reasonableness of the 
ctice. 
In my view, this policy statement neea not be confined to the case specific 
biems of negotiated rates and collection of undercharges in bankruptcy or 
er judicial settings. It likewise reaches the potential equitable 
siderations in various circumstances and the Commission's willingness to 
ermine whether an unreasonable practice exists as a result of the 
ationship and conduct o + the parties. 
I do not believe court referral is an essential element to the exercise of 
jurisdiction. In short, there is no reason in these caser-'to require 
&rrai before a party may petition for redress from alleged unreasonable 
ciice(s). Ct . 49 U.S.C. Section 117 0 5 < b > < 3 >• 11706: Informal Procedure for 
Brmining Motor Carrier and Freight Forwarder Reparations, 335 I.C.C. 403 
o3> <remedial focus on rates, reparations and waiver of undercharges.) 
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MOTOR CARRIER AUDIT & COLLECTION CO., Plaintiff, 
v. 
UNITED FOOD SERVICE, INC., Defendant. 
Civ. A. No. 87-C-298. 
United States District Court, D. Colorado. 
May 4, 1987. 
Lee E. Lucero, Denver, Colo., for plaintiff. 
Stephen P. Villano, Holland & Hart, Denver, Colo., for defendant. 
ORDER 
CARRIGAN, District Judge. 
Plaintiff filed this action to recover an alleged undercharge for 
transportation services provided to the defendant by the plaintiff's assignor, 
Transpo International, Inc. Defendant has filed a motion to stay these 
proceedings and to refer issues to the Interstate Commerce Commission ('ICC'). 
The parties have thoroughly briefed the issues and oral argument would not aid 
my decision. 
Defendant contends that (1) there was no error in computing the charges for 
COPR. <C> WEST 1988 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
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the services provided by Transpo International, and (2) if higher tariffs were 
applicable, negotiated rates were understood and agreed to by the parties. 
Defendant claims that its contentions raise three questions of administrative 
law that, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, must be referred to the 
ICC. These questions are• 
1. What tariff rates apply to the services provided by Transpo, 
2. If there was an undercharge based on these tariffs, then were lower, 
negotiated rates agreed to; and, 
3. Would allowing the plaintiff to collect the undercharges constitute an 
unreasonable practice. 
Plaintiff contends that none of these issues should be submitted to the ICC. 
Plaintiff is correct. 
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction 
'applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into 
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, 
under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an 
administrative body, in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending 
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views. 
* * * * * 
Thus the fi'rsi question- presented is whether effectuation of tne statutory 
purposes of the Interstate Commerce Act requires that the Interstate Commerce 
POPR (C) WEST 1988 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
Commission should first pass on the construction of the tariff in aiapute here; 
this, in turn, depends on whether the question raises issues of transportation 
policy which ought to be considered by the Commission in the interests of a 
uniform and expert administration of the regulatory scheme laid down by the 
Act.' United States v. Western Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64-55 (1555 ). 
The first question of administrative law' raised by the defendant is what the 
appropriate tariff rates were. This question does not raise issues of 
transportation policy, but rather of the proper tariff rate to apply f.o a 
particular transportation service. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is 
simply not implicated under these circumstances. See I.C.C. v. J. B. 
Montgomery, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 279 (1980). 
A common carrier that is subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC under 49 
U.S.C. 55 10501 et seq. and has filed a tariff for a particular service 'may 
not charge or receive a different compensation for that transportation or 
service than the rate specified in the tariff. . . .'49 U.S.C. ss 10761(a). 
This provision has been strictly applied. (FN1) Indeed, it appears that a 
shipper cannot even recover a portion of the undercharge where it alleges that 
the carrier fraudulently misquoted the rate. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. 
Rutledge Oil Co., 669 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1982); Consolidated Freightways Corp. 
v. Terry Tuck, Inc., 612 F.2d 465 (9th Cir 1980), cert, denied 447 U.S. 907 
(1980). 
COPR. (C) WEST 1988 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOUT. WORKS 
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It is clear from the above that the parties may not enter into a valid 
contract for transportation at a rate lower than that contained in a published 
tariff. In the instant case, neither side claims that a published tariff was 
not in effect during any relevant period. Therefore, the fact that the parties 
may have negotiated a rate lower than that contained in the tariff is 
irrelevant. 
Defendant attempts to avoid this result by-arguing that the plaintiff's act of 
negotiating an agreement for a lower rate constitutes an 'unreasonaole 
practice', and that the plaintiff should be barred from collecting the 
undercharge as a result. 
The Interstate Commerce Act grants the ICC jurisdiction to determine whether a 
rate, classification, rule, or practice related to transportation or service 
provided by a carrier subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC is reasonable. 
Moreover, the ICC has offered to provide the courts non-binding advisory 
opinions as to whether, under the circumstances presented, it would be 
unreasonable to allow a carrier to collect an undercharge. National Industrial 
Transportation League-Petition to Institute Rule Making on Negotiated Motor 
Common Carrier Rates, Ex Parte No. MC-177 (Oct. 14, 1986). A finding that 
allowing collection of an undercharge would be 'unreasonable' would amount to a 
recommendation that a shipper should be allowed to assert equitable defenses to 
a carrier's claim. As the ICC states^ 'We believe, in the highly competitive 
COPR. (C) WEST 1988 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
moior carrier industry and economy in general, equitable defenses to rigid 
application of filed tariff rates should be available on a case-by-case basis 
and that our unreasonable practice jurisdiction authorizes such an approach.' 
Id. at 6-7. It is the position of the ICC that this change is required to give 
substance to the Congressional intent embodied in the Motor Carrier Act of 
1980. 
As the ICC itself admits, 'the commission does not have jurisdiction over 
claims challenging the reasonableness of motor carrier rates charged in the 
past nor authority to order the waiver of undercharges. Id. at ~. Rather, it 
can only provide the courts with an advisory opinion as to whether a shipper 
should be allowed to assert equitable defenses to a carrier s claim. While the 
ICC may so advise a court, it is difficult to understand how, in the light of 
clear precedent establishing that equitable defenses are not generally 
available, a court could adopt the ICC's recommendation that a defendant be 
allowed to assert those defenses. In Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Traffic 
Bureau, U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 1922 (1986), the Court was asked to 
reconsider its prior holding that carriers were not subject to treble damages 
liability in private antitrust actions based on ICC filed tariff rates. Among 
the grounds offered for reconsideration was that the prior ruling was __ 
inconsistent with the policy of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. The Court made 
short work of this argument, stating-
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'We may assume that this is the case . . . but it nevertheless remains true 
that Congress must be presumed to have been fully cognizant of this 
interpretation of the statutory scheme, which had been a significant part of 
our settled law for over half a century, and that Congress did not see fit to 
change it when Congress carefully reexamined this area of the law in 1980.' 
Id. at 1928 (footnote omitted). 
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 did not amend 49 U.S.C. s 10761(a). 
Presumably, this is because Congress was satisfied with the interpretation the 
courts had given the section. 
Defendant relies on Seaboard System R.R., Inc. v. United States, 784 F.2d 635 
(11th Cir. 1986), to support its request that this case be referred to the ICC 
for a determination of whether allowing the plaintiff to recover the alleged 
undercharge would be reasonable. Seaboard, however, arose on different facts. 
There a carrier brought suit to collect an alleged undercharge. Subsequent to 
the filing, but prior to resolution of that action, the shipper filed an 
administrative complaint with the ICC, requesting that the Commission determine 
that no undercharge was owed. Additionally, the shipper moved to stay the 
district court proceedings pending the outcome of the ICC investigation. The 
district court granted the stay. Subsequently, the ICC issued an order holding 
that it would be an unreasonable practice for the carrier to collect the 
undercharge because the filed tariff was confusing to an ordinary user, the 
misquotation to its detriment. The carrier appealed the order to the Eleventh 
Circuit. That court affirmed the order, holding that the ICC had jurisdiction 
to bar recovery of the undercharge by virtue of its authority to review the 
reasonableness of a carrier's practices and to order a carrier to stop any 
practice found to be unreasonable. Id. at 638-639. 
The Eleventh Circuit neatly sidestepped the inconsistency of this order with 
legal precedent through a two-step process. First, it ruled that the order '15 
not contrary to Maxwell and related cases, as those dealt only with the courts' 
authority to grant equitable defenses to undercharge actions.' Id. at 63S. 
Second, the court was careful to point out that the order was not an advisory 
opinion provided as a result of a referral from the district court. Id. at 
639. (FN2) 
While the ICC may have the authority to issue an advisory opinion concerning 
the reasonableness of allowing the plaintiff to collect the alleged 
undercharge, absent some indication that the Congress sought to change the law, 
this court cannot adopt such an opinion as its holding if doing so would 
contradict clear precedent. Neither the decision in Seaboard nor the policy 
statement issued by the ICC in Ex Parte No. MC-177 excuse this court from its 
obligation to follow clear Supreme Court precedent. And, as stated, the fact 
that the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 did not amend 42 U.S.C. s 10761(a) indicates 
COPR. (C) WEST 1988 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOUT. WORKS 
Not Reported in F.Supp. R 6 OF 9 P 8 OF 9 ALLFEDS P 
that Congress did not intend to change the strict interpretation given that 
section. Therefore, referring this matter to the ICC would serve no useful 
purpose. See G.M.W. v. Certified Parts Corp., No. 86-1086 (Wise. Ct. App. Dec. 
18, 1986), Fed. Carr. Rep. (CCH) paragraph. 83,802. 
Accordingly, IT.IS ORDERED that the defendant's motion staying proceedings in 
this action and referring issues to the Interstate Commerce Commission is 
denied. 
FN! Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915) ( 
'Deviation from (the applicable rate) is not permitted upon any 
pretext. . . . Ignorance or misquotation of rates is not an excuse for 
paying or charging either less or ^\ore than the rate filed.'); Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Central Iron Co., 265 U.S. 59, 65 (1924) ('Thus, (the 
charges due) were fixed by law. ^o contract of the carrier could reduce 
the amount legally payable; or release from liability a shipper who had 
assumed an obligation to pay the charges. Nor could any act or omission of 
the carrier (except the running of the statute of limitations) estop or 
preclude it from enforcing payment of the full amount by a person liable 
therefor.'); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 737 
F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1984),, cert, denied 469 U.S. 982 (Shipper liable for 
lawful tariff where shipper and carrier erroneously thought lower tariff 
app1 led ). 
FN2 This second holding was raised in the content of an attach on the 
Eleventh Circuit's jurisdiction to review the ICC'5 order. Orders of the 
ICC are reviewable by appellate courts unless an Act of Congress provides 
otherwise. 28 U.S.C. 5 2321(a). Congress has provided, however, that, 
where tne ICC order resulted from a referral of a question to the ICC by a 
district court, jurisdiction to review the order is vested m the district 
court that referred the question. 28 U.S.C. 1336(b)). 
D.Colo., 1537. 
Motor Carrier Audit & Collection Co. v. United Food Service, Inc. 
1987 LiL 19008 (D.Colo. ) 
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1989 MCC LEXIS 333, * 
ni This decision embraces MC-C- 3009Q, National Industrial 
Transportation League-Petition for a Declaratory Order on 
Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates. 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 
1989 MCC LEXIS 333 
June 14, 1989 
SYLLABUS: 
C*13 
Commissions authority to determine unreasonable practices clarified. 
Unreasonable practice issues arising in motor common carrier negotiated rates 
cases will be entertained without court referral. Petition requesting a general 
order declaring unreasonable the practice of negotiating but not publishing 
rates held in abeyance. 
PANEL: 
DECISION 
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *1 
OPINION: 
The National Industrial Transportation League (NITL) has requested that we 
issue a general declaratory order finding that it is an unreasonable practice, 
and thus a violation of the Interstate Commerce Act, for a motor common carrier 
to conduct business on the basis of a negotiated and agreed-to rate while 
failing to publish the rate in an effective tariff on file at the Commission. 
We instituted a declaratory order proceeding under 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) and 
requested comments on the proposal. 
More than 40 comments were submitted. n2 The majority were from shippers and 
shipper trade associations supporting the C*23 proposal. Two motor 
carriers, a water carrier, two practitioners, counsel for an unsecured 
creditors1 committee, a tariff publishing agent, an agent for bankrupt estates, 
and the Household Goods Carriers' Bureau, Inc. oppose any Commission action in 
this area. Two other parties, the Regular Common Carrier Conference and the 
American Trucking Associations, Inc., suggest that we await congressional action 
on the subject. 
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *2 
n2 National Motor Freight Traffic Association, Inc. filed a motion for 
acceptance of its comments one day late. Under 49 C.F.R. § 11105, we will 
accept these comments. Transport Audit Service, Inc. also late-filed its 
comments, but without a request for late acceptance. However, since 
consideration of its views will not prejudice any party, we will also accept its 
comments into the record. 
N 
5) 
By the Commission, Chairman Gradison, Vice Chairman Simmons, Commissioners 
Andre, Lamboley, and Phillips. Commissioners Andre and Phillips commented with 







After considering the NITL proposal in light of the comments received and our ^ff 
growing experience in the area, we have decided instead to reopen NITL — Pet. $ 
to Inst. Rule on Negotiated Motor Car., 3 I.C.C.2d 99 (1986) (Negotiated Rates) 
to clarify: that we have primary jurisdiction over unreasonable practice issues; ^ | 
now en te r t a i n unreasonabxe prac t ice claims based on negot iated rates wi thout § 
awai t ing a court r e f e r r a l . We bel ieve i t is preferab le a t t h i s point to ^ 
continue to handle negot iated rates claims on a case-by-case basis. (We have ^ 
d i rec ted our s ta f f to develop a f l e x i b l e docket management plan for these cases 
which w i l l include p a r t i c i p a t i o n by our Of f ice of Hearings to ensure t h e i r 
expedi t ious handl ing.) We w i l l hold the p e t i t i o n in MC-C- 30090 in abeyance 
Poor Brain Co. v. C.B. & Q. Ry. Co.., 12 I.C.C. 418, 422-423 (1907); Louisvi l le & 
Nashville R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915) (Maxwell) . During an era of 
substantial entry, rate regulation, and contracting l imitat ions s t r i c t adherence 
to the t a r i f f rate was seen as necessary to avoid intentional misquotation of 
rates by carriers seeking to discriminate in favor of particular shippers. See 
Western Transp. Co. v. Wilson and Company, Inc . , 682 F.2d 1227, 1230 (7th Cir. 
1982). 
c 
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *3 
for further consideration based on experience gained after implementation of 
these measures. 
BACKGROUND 
A motor common carrier is required, by 49 U.S.C. § 10761(a), to file tariffs 
setting forth its charges for all transportation services offered and to collect 
only the rates published in such filed tariffs. n3 However, the statute also 
contains a requirement, in 49 U.S.C. § 10701, that a carrier's practices C*43 
be reasonable. n4 
n3 Section 10761(a) states that a "carrier may not charge or receive a 
different compensation for that transportation or service than the rate 
specified in the tariff * * *" 
n4 Section 10701(a) states, "A rate (other than a rail rate), classification, 
rule, or practice related to transportation or service * * * must be 1 
reasonable." M 
In the past, the filed rate requirement of S 10761(a) was applied strictly. W 
Indeed ignorance or misquotation of a carrier's rates generally was not accepted I 
as an excuse for a shipper to pay other than the tariff rate. See, e.g., A.G. * W 






In the more competitive, more flexible pricing atmosphere created by 1980 
deregulatory legislation, however, there is C*53 little likelihood of 
carriers using a rate misquotation as a means to discriminate in favor of 
particular shippers. Thus, in Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. L&N R.R. Co., 1 
I.C.C.2d 767 (1985) (Buckeye), Afffd sub nom. Seaboard System R.R. Co., Inc. v. 
United States, 794 F.2d 635 (11th Cir. 1986) (Seaboard), we determined that a W 
rail carrier's collection of undercharges would be an unreasonable practice, J2 
prohibited by S 10701, where the carrier's tariff was unclear to the ordinary p 
user and the shipper had relied on the carrier's misquotation of the applicable to 
rate in determining to use the carrier for the involved transportation. 
v 
r 
( In Negotiated Rates, supra, we extended the unreasonable practice analysis to 
certain, narrowly defined circumstances in the motor carrier industry. We had © 
observed a disturbing pattern that, in the highly competitive environment 
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created by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, certain carriers tiadrfailed to file W 
some of the many rates negotiated daily. At the time of shipment", £hese ' 1 
carriers had charged the rate they had negotiated to attract the traffic, but V 
then later (often^much later) they, or more often their trustees in bankruptcy, ^ 
actions (or omissions), Jld frustrate tne national tra purLdtiun puju^y UT 
encouraging pricing innovation and competition, and would not be necessary to 
prevent discrimination. 
Ue recognized that, under 49 U.S.C. §§ 11705(b)(3) and 11706(c)(2), 
undercharge claims are brought in Federal District Courts, not before the 
Commission, Therefore, we lack the authority ourselves directly to waive motor 
carrier undercharges. Accordingly, we offered, upon court referral, to give our 
"advisory opinion" as to whether in a particular case collection of undercharges 
would constitute an unreasonable practice. 
Since then, numerous courts have referred individual claims to us for an 
unreasonable practice determination under our Negotiated Rates policy statement. 
n5 However, as NITL points out, some courts have denied shipper motions for 
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referral of an unreasonable practice claim. n6 NITL believes that these denials 
of referral C»73 requests are prompted by our own characterization of our 
decisions as "advisory." Courts viewing our unreasonable practice finding as 
merely a non-binding recommendation may believe they are bound by the statute 
and by stare decisis to enforce collection of the filed rate. 
n5 The Commission has issued decisions on the merits based upon its 
Negotiated Rates policy in over 50 cases. Numerous other cases referred by the 
courts have been decided on other grounds, such as tariff applicability. 
n6 See, e.g., Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. Robert Yaquinto, Jr., 869 f.2d 
1487 (5th'Cir. 1989); Motor Carrier Audit & Collection Co. v. United Food 
Service, Inc., (Case No. 87-C-29998, (D. Col. May 4, 1987), and West Coast Truck 
Lines, Inc. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Co. (Ho. C-87-QQ48 MHP), (N.D. Cal. " 
July 28, 1987). 
NITL argues that our issuance of its proposed declaratory order would 
terminate the controversy among the courts by establishing that: (1) our 
jurisdiction over reasonableness issues is plenary and exclusive; and (2) our 
findings of unreasonableness are binding upon the courts (unless timely appealed 
and overturned on court review). NITL also*argues that a general [*83 
finding would reduce litigation burdens by allowing courts to apply that 
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finding to the facts of particular cases without going through the referral 
process. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. Commission Jurisdiction. 
We now see that our "advisory opinion11 language may have been a source of 
confusion and requires clarification. n7 It was used only to illustrate that 
this agency's unreasonable practice finding in certain instances may not be 
self-enforcing (since courts, not the Commission, have the more narrower 
authority to order or deny payment of undercharges in a particular case), and 
would be issued only in response to a court referral of the unreasonable 
practice issue. 
n7 An additional notice and comment period is not necessary merely to clarify 
our prior decision in Negotiated Rates, supra. However, since NITL raised the 
"advisory opinion" issue in MC-C- 30090, all interested parties have had, in 
fact, an additional opportunity to comment on this matter. 
In fact, it is well-established that a transportation regulatory agency such 
reasonable. Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elev. Co., 259 U.S. [*93 285, 
291 (1922) ("Whenever a * * * practice is attacked as unreasonable * * *, there teg 
must be preliminary resort to the Commission"); United States v. Western Pac. R. P 
Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 304 ^ 
(1976)(Nader). The Commission has possessed this authority, to declare motor H 
carrier practices unreasonable, since 1935. n8 The many courts that have 11 
recently referred negotiated rates claims to us have recognized this agency's W 
proper role in these matters. n9 ^ 
n8 As originally enacted, Section 216(b) of the tlotor Carrier Act of 1935 
provided: 
It shall be the duty of every common carrier of property by motor vehicle * * 
* to establish, observe, and enforce * * * just and reasonable regulations and 
practices relating [to transporation of property in interstate or foreign 
commerce] * * *. 
49 Stat. 558 (1935). 
n9 See, e.g., Orr Y. Sewell Plastics, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 676 (W.D. Tenn. 
1988), appeal pending, Nos. 89-51089 and 89-5110 (6th Cir.MOrr); Maislin 
Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 1401 (W.D. Mo. 
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *9 
1988), appeal pending, No. 88-2267-WM (8th Cir.) (Maislin). 
m o This is not to say that at some future date we could not issue a rule 
that the courts could apply themselves to individual cases. This has happened 
in the past when, for example, courts have applied Commission-established 
principles in misrouting cases. SeeJohnson Machine Works, Inc. v. Chicago, 
Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co., 297 F.2d 793, 796-799 (8th Cir. 1962). . 
More fundamentally, these determinations involve a harmonization of two 
different provisions of the same 0113 statute. Section 10761 is only part 




Some courts, however, in declining to refer claims [*1Q] to us, have * 
suggested that our unreasonable practice findings are no more than responses to 
ordinary contract questions and thus do not require an expert agency's 
consideration. This is an inappropriately narrow view of our role. Our 
Negotiated Rates policy stems from our expert analysis of current regulatory and 
competitive conditions in the nation's motor carrier industry. While the ^ 
factual determinations in each case do have contract elements, the facts are r 
evaluated and ultimate conclusions reached in the context of what practices are • 
reasonable under current conditions in the industry. This is precisely the Kind 





r of an overall regulatory scheme; it should not be elevated over the unreasonable 
practices provision of § 10701. Rather, there must be a balance drawn among the W 
sometimes competing congressional goals of fairness, competition, J^ 
nondiscrimination, and uniformity. The prime authority to harmonize and give ^ 
effect to these policies in a reasonableness determination is the Commission, as ^ 
the agency charged with administering the statute overall. Seaboard, supra, 794 
F.2d at 638, citing Nader, supra, 426 U.S. at 304; Hudson Transit Lines, Inc. v. 
ICC, 765 F.2d 329, 336 (2nd Cir. 1985). C 
0 
B. Interplay Between Filed Rate Requirement and Reasonable Practice 
Requirement. 
Some courts have concluded that they are barred from giving effect to our 
not determine whether a ..frier's solicitation, publication and billing 
practices are unreasonable- Orr, supra, 703 f. Supp. at 679. Maxwell, supra 
"dealt with the courts' C*123 authority to grant equitable defenses to 
undercharge actions." Seaboard, supra, 794 F.2d at 638 (emphasis in original). 
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Our unreasonable practice findings are legal, rather than purely equitable 
determinations and derive from our obligation under § 10701 to ensure that 
practices in the nation's motor carrier industry are reasonable. n11 An 
unreasonable practice determination is separate and apart from the filed rate 
doctrine embodied in § 10761(a); it is a determination of a violation of 
another, co-equal provision of the Interstate Commerce Act, prohibiting carriers 
f^om engaging in unreasonable practices. If rates and practices are not 
reasonable, the filed rate requirement does not apply, as the Supreme Court 
specifically recognized in Maxwell, supra, 237 U.S. at 97: Under the Interstate 
Commerce Act, the rate of the carrier duly filed is the only lawful charge. 
Deviation from it is not permitted upon any pretext. Shippers and travellers 
are charged with notice of it, and they as well as the carrier must abide by it, 
unless it is found by the Commission to be unreasonable. (Emphasis added.) 
n11 We recognize that Negotiated Rates, supra, and some of our subsequent 
decisions spoke in terms of "equitable defenses" to claims for undercharges. 
While our unreasonable practice rulings are "equitable" in the sense that they 
are intended to result in decisions that are fair to the parties, they are based 
upon the legal requirements of § 10701 and may be more appropriately viewed as 
the basis for a counterclaim or as mooting the original action for undercharges, 
See Orr, supra. 
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Rather than creating an exception or defense to the filed wte doctrine, what 
the Commission is finding to be an unreasonable practice is a course of conduct 
consisting of: (1) negotiating a rate; (2) agreeing to a rate that the shipper 
reasonably relies upon as being lawfully fijed; (3) failing, either willfully or 
otherwise, tD publish the rate; (4) billing and accepting payment at the 
negotiated rate for (sometimes) numerous shipments; and (5) then demanding 
additional payment at higher rates. C*133 
The Court amplified this in Arizona Grocery Y. A.T.S.F. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 
370, 384 (1932), where it distinguished between legal rates, "that is, those 
which must be charged to all shippers alike", and lawful rates, which are those 
that are reasonable. Legal rates are lawful only if they are reasonable; "* * * 
the shipper was bound to pay the legal rate; but if he could show that it was 
unreasonable he might recover reparation." Id. Similarly, a court refusal to 
enforce the (legal) tariff rate when the collection of that rate is unlawful 
(i.e., when the Commission has determined that the collection of the tariff rate 
constitutes an unreasonable practice) accords with established law. n12 In these 
circumstances, rather than abrogating the filed rate doctrine (as some carrier 
interests have argued), this construction of the Act appropriately reconciles SS 
10701 and 10761. n13 
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n12 Maxwell and Arizona Grocery involved the reasonableness of the rate 
levels rather than the reasonableness of the practices. However, the same 
statutory language applies to both. See 49 U.S.C. S 10701(a) 
still as valid as ever, out where the doctrine is applitu in a wooden, rigid 
manner that is contrary to congressional policy with respect to the interstate 
trucking industry, the ICC has decided that it will consider all the 
circumstances before determining whether an undercharge assessment is consistent 
with the spirit of the statute. Nor does this policy undercut the mandate of 49 
U.S.C. § 10761(a) that a "carrier may not charge or receive a different 
compensation for that transportation or service than the rate specified in the 
tariff* * * * This blanket prohibition is tempered by the ICC's jurisdiction to 
declare some practices to be "unreasonable" under 49 U.S.C. § 10701(a). 
Accord Carolina Motor Express, Inc. v. Delaware Valley Shippers Ass'n, No. 
SE-C-87-147, slip opinion at 7-8 (W.D. N.C. April 20, 1989) ("To hold the filed ^ 
rate doctrine to be infallible under all circumstances would, in effect, allow |J 
common carriers to have their cake and eat it too * * * a finding of the ICC ^ 
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' * 
that a collection of undercharges would be an unreasonable practice is not 
contrary to law in appropriate cases.11); Maislin, supra, 705 F. Supp. at 1406 (" 
* * * we emphasize that the ICC is not abolishing the requirement in S 10761 * * 
*
 M ) . C*143 
The fact that the Commission may not have exercised its unreasonable practice 
authority in the negotiated rates area in this manner until recently does not 
wean that the agency lacks such authority or cannot use it in this manner. See 
National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 682, 693-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 
cert, denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974), citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 
U.S. 632, 647-48 (1950) (neither failure of the FTC since its creation to 
exercise certain power nor intermittent statements that it lacked such power 
deprived agency from exercising a power granted by Congress). The present 
exercise of this authority responds to current marketplace developments and 
problems and is warranted and justified on the evidentiary record of the cases 
presented to the Commission. 
The court referral procedure is not new, nor is it unlawful (as some carrier 
interests have suggested) because it permits the courts and the Commission 
acting together to allow defenses the court could not entertain alone. It has 
long been recognized that the statute implrcitly permits a judicial remedy (with 
initial referral to the Commission) for unreasonable practices. See 




Hewitt-Robins C*153 v. Freight-ways, 371 U.S. 84 (1962). 5 
That implicit authority was later made explicit by Congress, and discussed in £ 
the rate reasonableness context in Informal Procedure for Determining ^ 
Reparation, 335 I.C.C. 403 (1969). Briefly, prior to 1959, the Act conferred no 
explicit authority upon the Commission to award reparations in cases involving 
motor carrier rates or practices. The Commission, however, took the view that 
it had implicit authority to pass on the lawfulness of motor carrier rates, but ® 
(since it lacked authority to award reparations) refrained from exercising that 
authority except upon a court referral. In 1959, the Supreme Court ruled that 
neither the courts nor the Commission could consider, in post-shipment 
litigation, the reasonableness of a motor carrier's rates. n14 As a result, in 
1965 Congress passed the provisions that are now codified at 49 U.S.C. SS 
11705(b)(3) and 11706(c)(2). n15 
< 
r 
n14 T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959). For unreasonable 
practices, Hewitt-Robins found that an implicit judicial remedy was consistent ^ 
with the statutory scheme, and that T.I.M.E. therefore did not apply to practice w 
cases. Hewitt-Robins, 371 U.S. at 89. ^ 
n15 Prior section 204a for motor carriers. 0163 $ 
Section 11705(b)(3) imposes liability for damages resuming from violations 
of the Act upon motor common carriers. n16 Section 11706(c)(2) permits recovery 
of damages under § 11705(b)(3) in a "civil action" instituted within two years 
after the claim accrues. n17 Uhat Congress intended was to restore the procedure 
that existed prior to T.I.(I.E., supra (see n. 13): that shippers1 recourse for 
reparations must be to the courts, but before a court may award reparations, it 
must refer to the Commission any counterclaim that the rates (or, as here, 
practices) have not been reasonable. Informal Procedure, 335 I.C.C. at 413. 
Accord United States v. Associated Transport, Inc. 505 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 
1974), 
n16 Section 11705(b)(3) states: "A common carrier providing transportation or 
service subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under subchapter II [motor 
carriers] * * * is liable for damages resulting from the imposition of rates for 
transportation or service the Commission finds to be in violation of this 
subtitle." 
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The referral of negotiated rates cases to the Commission for determination of 
the unreasonable practice issue, followed by enforcement of the Commission's 
findings by the court, thus follows a long-standing procedure — codified in 
1965 but based upon authority that was implicit before that. Contentions by 
carrier interests that Commission findings may be ignored because the Commission, 
cannot enforce them, or that court adoptions of them are somehow unlawful 
because courts may not themselves grant "equitable defenses" to undercharge 
actions, are thus without merit. n18 
n18 Ue emphasize again that our findings vis-a-vis the statutory provisions 
concerning unreasonable practices under § 10701 are not "equitable defenses" but 
enforcement of affirmative statutory requirements and obligations. 
C. Policy Considerations. 
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CTlhe Commission, faced with new developments or in light of reconsideration 
of the relevant facts and its mandate, may alter its past interpretation and 
overturn past administrative rulings and practices * * *. Regulatory agencies 
do not establish rules of conduct to last forever, they are supposed, within the 
limits of the law and of fair and prudent administration, to adapt their rules 
and practices to the nation's needs in a volatile changing economy. They are 
neither required nor supposed to regulate the present and the future within the 
inflexible limits of yesterday. 
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 387 U.S. 
397, 416 (1967) (ATA) . 




n17 This is in contrast to §§ 11705(b)(2) and 11706(c)(1), which impose 
l i a b i l i t y for damages on r a i l (subchapter I) and water (subchapter I I I ) carriers ^ ^ ^ 
and expressly authorize persons to " f i l e a complaint with the Commission" to ^ ^ ^ 
recover damaaes. 0173 • 
As we have explained, our negotiated Rates policy does not represent a 
relaxed interpretation of S 10761, but rather a separate determination under S 
10701. But even i f i t were viewed as a reinterpretation of a previously strict 
construction of § 10761, i t would be one that is well within this agency's . 
authority (and indeed duty) to reinterpret the Interstate 0183 Commerce a 
Act, based upon experience gained and changing circumstances. As explained by 





carrier negotiated rates 0193 abuses, where the shipper's reliance on the | 
rate quoted was reasonable under the circumstances, should not lead to any ^ 
widespread disregard for the tariff filing requirement. In fact, there has been * 
nothing in the records of the cases we have reviewed to suggest that it was the J 
intent of the parties to establish secret, discriminatory rates. Rather, the ! 
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carriers simply negotiated these rates to attract business, not with any intent g 
to prefer one of their shippers to the disadvantage of others. Indeed, the 
effort was to promote and sell the carrier's service generally, not to attact a 
particular customer. The shipper made its determination to use the carrier's 
service based on the quoted rate. To permit the carrier subsequently to collect 
a substantially different higher rate for the past transportation service » 
because if failed to publish the rate would be antithetical to a fundamental I 
purpose of publishing rates — i.e., to permit shippers to choose the best rate " 
for their shipments from among those offered by competing carriers. I 
Nor do we anticipate this policy, which is limited to narrow circumstances, ^ 
to lead to unreasonable discrimination. Shippers in today's marketplace $ 
[*203 are protected from unreasonable discrimination by vigorous competition. J 
As a result of changes in the law and our interpretation of it, the range of I 
activities considered discriminatory is much narrower than it formerly was. 
One of the most significant changes in the motor carrier industry has been " 
the substantial loosening of entry controls. In 1979 (immediately prior to the <s 
Motor Carrier Act of 1980), there were approximately 17,000 regulated motor 
common carriers. n19 Because of relaxed entry requirements, there are now more • 
than 39,000 motor carriers of property operating in the United States. n20 i 
Moreover, prior to 1980, carriers' operating authority was often narrowly -
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circumscribed, both with respect to the territory to be served and the J 
commodities to be carried. Today, carriers can obtain readily a license to \ 
transport virtually all types of commodities throughout the contiguous 48 j 
states. n21 Thus, today, shippers do not depend upon regulation to protect them 
from discriminatory pricing; in most circumstances, there are simply more | 
competitive options. Cf. Cent. & Southern Motor Freight Tariff Ass'n v. U.S., ' 
757 F.2d 301, 325-326 (D.C. Cir. 1986). < 
n19 H.Rep. No. 96-1069, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Ad. News, 2283, 2284. 
n20 Forthcoming Interstate Commerce Commission 1988 Annual Report Appendix E, i 
Table 1. 
n21 See Acceptable Forms of Requests for Operating Authority, 133 M.C.C. 329 | 
(1984), and cases cited therein. C*213 
In addition, given the statutory policy of encouraging a variety of price and 
service options, activities are now permitted that previously would have been 
considered discriminatory. Negotiated Rates, 3 I.C.C.2d at 106. Volume 
discount rates, for example, are not per se discriminatory. Lawfulness of Vol. 
Discount Rates-Mot. Com. Car., 365 I.C.C. 711 (1982). They may, for example, j 
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be justified by cost savings achieved by the carrier. Id. at 715. There are • 
other means of lawfully and reasonably assessing different rates for different | 
shippers. For example, rates specified for a particular shipper are no longer . 
per se discriminatory. Rates for a Named Shipper or Receiver, 367 I.C.C. 959 
( 1 9 f t 4 ) . r ^ r r i p r c ; mav l i m i t thp QhinnprQ t n whom r^tvc, a n n l u hu P^tah l U h i n n I 
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n22 Deletion of 49 C.F.R. § 1004.3 Dual Operations Policy (not printed), 
served July 2, 1980; Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-296, section 
10(b), 94 Stat. 793, 800 (codified at 49 U.S.C. S 10930(a)). 
n24 Cent. & Southern Motor Freight Tariff Ass'n, supra at n, 152, citing 49 
U.S.C. §§ 10704(c) and 10741(b). 
n25 Id., section 10(a)(1), 94 Stat, at 799-800. 
n26 Id. at section 10(a)(3), 94 Stat, at 800 (codified at 49 U.S.C. S 
10923(d)(1)). C*233 
Hundreds, or even thousands, of individual motor common carrier rates are now 
negotiated daily. Moreover, reduced tariff rates may now be filed to become 
effective on one day's notice. n27 In these circumstances, it would be extremely 
difficult for shippers to determine, prior to an initial movement, whether the 
agreed-upon rate is actually on file (or what rates their competitors are 
paying). Moreover, as we have said before, "an inflexible policy [would] 
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frustrate the intent of the [national transportation policy] to encourage price 
innovation, since it could chill rate negotiation between shippers and carriers, 
and inhibit legitimate pricing initiatives." Negotiated Rates, supra, at 106. 
n28 Preventing unreasonable discrimination is only one of several important 
goals set forth by Congress, and should not necessarily be elevated above all 
other concerns, n29 
n27 Short Notice Effectiveness for Independently Filed Rates, 1 I.C.C.2d 146 
n28 Accord In re: Carolina Motor Express, Inc., supra, slip op. at 8; Orr, 
supra, 703 F. Supp at 680. 
tt Most significantly, a carrier may now hold both common and contract operating authority. n22 For operations conducted under contract authority, carriers do not have to file their rates, n23 nor are they subject to the antidiscrimination 
C*223 provisions of the Act. n24 The 1980 Act also greatly broadened the scope 9 
of contract service by, inter alia, removing limits on the number of shippers a 
contract carrier could serve n25 and by removing restrictions on the nature of 
shippers, commodities shipped, and permissible geographic scope of contract 
carrier permits. n26 Therefore, motor common carriers that desire for some 
reason to discriminate among shippers in their rates (for example, to offer ^ ^ 
lower rates to large shippers) may do so lawfully simply by obtaining contract ^ ^ 
carrier authority. ™ 
IT 
<J 
n23 Exemption-MTR. Contr. Car . -Ta r i f f F i l i n g Requirements, 133 M.C.C. 150 ® 
(1983), a f f ' d sub nom. Central & Southern Motor Freight Associat ion v . United 
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(1984), a f f ' d sub nom. Southern Motor Carr iers Rate Conference Y . U.S., 773 mm 
F.2d 1561 (1985). W 
3 
n n29 Some courts have cited Square D. v. Niagara Frontier Traffic Bureau, 476 U.S. 409 (1986) for the proposition that, because Congress has not abolished the tariff filing requirement, the Commission (and the courts) cannot disturb the ^ 
filed rate doctrine. Square D is inapposite because it dealt with the courts' ^ ^ 
authority to depart from long-standing court created precedent, which was deemed 
to have worked well and was believed to have been adopted by Congress, not an 
agency's right to interpret (see Morton Salt, supra) or reinterpret (see ATA, 
asiae T U K U KH.C3 iuny uc jt- unt. •/ww nvu. AIIUCCU, ^qud /u, bupra, contains 
three specific references LO the Commission's power to set aside rates contained 
in published tariffs. Square D, supra, at 416; 416, n. 18; and 418, n. 22. 
Moreover, court adherence to court-created precedent of long standing is not 
inviolable. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 57 U.S.L.W., 
4539, 4541, Justice Stevens' dissent. Thus we are not pursuaded that the policy 
announced in Negotiated Rates, supra, would be foreclosed even if it had been 
based on no more than our reinterpretation of § 10761. 
However, as discussed supra, while the pro-competitive policy in the 1980 
legislation and the resulting sweeping changes in the motor carrier industry 
provided the changed circumstances that were sufficient to justify reexamination 
of the file rate doctrine, they were not the source of our authority to make the 
limited exception thereto embodied in the Negotiated Rates policy. That 
authority came from S 10701 itself and our judicially recognized authority to 
determine what constitutes an unreasonable rate practice in the transportation 
industries we regulate. 024] 
In sum, we are persuaded that the carrier practice of negotiating a rate, 
failing to publish that rate, and then later (often many months or years and 
numerous shipments later) billing at a higher rate is unreasonable in today(s 
environment in the motor carrier industry. We are also satisfied that this 
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conclusion is fully consistent with the language and goals of the Interstate 
Commerce Act, and indeed is necessary because of the many changed circumstances 
in regulation and competition that have occured in the motor carrier industry. 
D. Court Referral. 
As a matter of administrative procedure we previously stated that we would 
exercise our discretionary declatory order authority to resolve unreasonable 
practice claims based on negotiated rates only upon a court referral of the 
case- n30 We explained that the typical case affects only the immediate parties 
involved and has no overriding policy issues beyond those already addressed in 
our Negotiated Rates, supra, decision. n31 In addition, these cases were likely 
to-go to court eventually, and there would bg little or no savings in legal 
costs in coming tD the Commission first. n32 
n30 Negotiated Rates, supra, served August 25, 1987. We also believed that 
following a number of decisions on referral: (1) the courts would implement our 
negotiated rates policy through application of our precedent; and/or (2) 
carriers or their agents would no longer seek to recover undercharges in .the 
face or our consistent findings. 
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n31 We had previously announced a policy as to tariff applicability 
questions, which were numerous and complex, that because of limited agency 
resources, we would resolve only those disputes that are referred by a court or 
involve broad issues of industry-wide application. Docket No. 37476, Intercity 
Transportation Company Petition for Declaratory Order - Classification of 
Battery Pack Cabinets (not printed), served August 30, 1983, aff'd., Intercity 
Transportation Company, et ai. v. United States, 737 F.2d 103 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
n32 The decision also noted that we waive our usual filing fee for cases 
referred to us by a court. We have recently stated our belief that "it is 
appropriate to take a consistent approach with respect to the assessment of fees 
for * * * [negotiated rates] cases, whether or not they are referred to us by a 
court." Ex Parte No. 246 (Sub-No. 7), Regulations Governing Fees for Services 
P e r f o r m e d i n C o n n P C t i n n W i t h I i r o n c i n n nnrf Qoln + ori Cf>r-wi^r>r- _ ^ o n n__i...t.- ,__u_ 
i c t : ^ i n u i c ^ c ^ D C J i n d D c q u c i i L u^ei re t : upua t t f p rDce j n g . M I U . L * /DJ 
In light of our experience since then, we now have decided to accept 
petitions for a declaratory order based on negotiated rates claims without a 
prior court referral. n33 As with the "advisory opinion" language, it is 
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possible that our prior reluctance to hear these cases may have suggested to 
courts an ambivalence on our part as to our proper role in this area. Our 
decision to entertain these petitions without a court referral reflects and 
underscores our primary jurisdiction over the unreasonable practice issues that 
arise in these cases. 
n33 We may announce our intention to entertain such declaratory order 
petitions without seeking public comment on the specific question. Whether or 
not to issue a declaratory order is a discretionary matter, and we have in the 
past, without prior notice and comment, made general pronouncements about our 
willingness (or unwillingness) to entertain particular Kinds of declaratory 
order petitions. See Battery Pack Cabinets, supra. In any event, the general 
question of declaratory order requirements was presented again in the NIT1 
petition in No. MC-C- 30090. Thus, advance notice (even though not required) 
has been provided. 
Moreover, C*263 while each individual case affects primarily the parties 
to that case, each case is also part of what now is clearly a growing pattern 
and nationwide problem of large scope, and, cumulatively, may affect litigation 
in other cases. As mentioned above, we have already resolved over 50 negotiated 
rates cases and there have been numerous others that district courts have 
declined to refer to us. Millions of dollars are involved in these cases. 
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The Congressionally mandated goals of encouraging competition, innovative 
pricing, nondiscrimination, and reasonable practices are also at stake. To the 
extent that entertaining declaratory order petitions without awaiting court 
referral will increase uniformity in court decisions and help in resolving this 
national problem, we must commit ourselves tQ doing everything within our 
jurisdiction to solve the problem. 
We clearly have the authority to accept such petitions whether or not a court 
suit had been filed. Under section 554(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
we have broad discretion to "issue a declaratory order to terminate a 
controversy or remove uncertainty." A controversy or uncertainty can exist even 
if no court proceedings are C*273 pending at the time of the administrative 
proceeding. See State of Texas Y. United States, 866 F.2d 1546 (5th Cir. 1989). 
Once a carrier has billed for undercharges that the shipper believes are 
unreasonable, an uncertainty or controversy can exist. 
E. NITL's General Finding Request 
In light of our clarification and modification of our negotiated rates policy 
and procedures here, we believe that it is preferable to implement these matters 
first. If experience shows that NITL's petition for a general declaratory order 
remains necessary or useful, we can act at that time. 
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NITL's primary reason for the declaratory order — to answer the confusion 
stemming from our "advisory opinion" language — has been met by our 
clarification here of our primary jurisdiction over questions of the 
reasonableness of practices. Commission consideration of these cases will 
permit a uniform (and appropriately limited) application of our negotiated rates 









This decision will no. significantly affect either thu quality of the human ^ 
environment or the conservation of energy resources. It is issued pursuant to 5 *8 
U.S.C. § 553, and 49 u.S.C. §§ 10321 and 10701(a). It is ordered: g 
© 
* 
3. Our prior findings in Ex Parte No. MC-177 are clarified and modified to | 
the extent discussed above. \ 
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1. The late-filed comments of the National Motor Freight Traffic 
Association, Inc. and of Transport Audit Service, Inc. are accepted. 
2. Ex Parte No. MC-177 is reopened and consolidated with Ex Parte No. 
MC-C- 30090. 
4. The petition for declaratory order filed by the National Industrial 
Transportation League will be held in abeyance. 
5. Notice of this decision will be published in the Federal Register and the 
ICC Register on June 30, 1989. 
6. This decision is effective on June 29, 1989. 
DISSENTBY: ANDRE; PHILLIPS; SRADISON (In Part) 
DISSENT: 
COMMISSIONER ANDRE, commenting: 
granted the petition in MC-C- 30090 without holding that proceeding in 
( 
i 
While I agree with the approach taken in this decision, I would have also § 
abeyance. t 
I 
COMMISSIONER PHILLIPS, commenting: . 
The "negotiated rates" or "undercharge" issue has brought substantial \ 
uncertainty and turmoil to the shipping f>293 community in recent years. <§ 
Under current law, carriers are obligated to file tariffs with the Commission » 
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showing each rate negotiated, and the "f i led rate doctrine" prohibits variations I 
from these f i led t a r i f f s . Unfortunately, for any number of reasons, carriers at I 
times do not f i l e t a r i f f s for rates that have been agreed upon by the shipper $ 
and the carr ier . While shippers should seek to ensure that carr iers do f i l e
 t 
t a r i f f s for rates which they have negotiated and upon which they have agreed, i 
the fact remains that the shippers alone frequently are being held accountable I 
for carr iers1 fa i lures to f i l e t a r i f f s , often years af ter the transportation in * 
question occurred. I 
I am very pleased with the Commission's action in this decision, in which we * 
further c lar i fy and enunciate our policy regarding negotiated rates cases. By 
reopening Ex Parte No. MC-177, we are clarifying the following: (1) that our 
opinions in negotiated rates cases represent the exercise of the Commission's 
primary jur isdict ion and thus are binding and only subject to j u d i c i a l review 
under the arbitrary and capricious standard; (2) that we w i l l consider i 
negot iated rates cases without court r e f e r r a l ; and (3) tha t [*30] we w i l l I 
continue to handle these cases on a case-by-case bas is . : 
I bel ieve the Commission's act ion here w i l l strengthen the l e g a l posture of | 
shippers who seek to re ly on the Commission's MC-177 po l i cy in ob ta in ing r e l i e f 
in negot iated rates cases. Further, I am hopeful tha t our c l a r i f i e d po l icy w i l l 
encourage swi f ter reso lu t ion of these cases. Las t l y , I support our decis ion 
to continue to handle t. ie cases on a case-Dy-case Das. /for the present. A 
declaratory order stating in general terms the circumstances when the collection <§ 
of alleged undercharges would constitute an unreasonable practice would leave 
the determination as to whether any particular set of facts amounts to an 
unreasonable practice to the courts. Under current case law, it is not clear 
that such an approach would be sufficiently persuasive to so&ie courts to 
increase the probability that a shipper making the types of showings required by 
such a declaratory order would prevail. This is not to say, however, that the 
declaratory order approach does not have merit. Rather, I believe that by 
holding the petition in MC-C- 30090 in abeyance, in conjunction with our action ^ ^ 
in Ex Parte Mo. MC-177, the Commission will f>313 be able to assess the ^ * 
progress made under the policies enunciated in this decision and to reconsider 
adoption of the MC-C- 30090 petition should it appear to be the most 
advantageous course of action in the future. 
CHAIRMAN 6RADIS0N, dissenting in part: 
The majority refuses to take the one final step which could be taken 
administratively to help alleviate the negotiated rates difficulties which 
continue to plague shippers. The majority fails to articulate why it will not 
do the one thing which the petitioner has asked us to do: issue a declaratory 
order finding that it is an unreasonable practice and thus a violation of the 




Interstate Commerce Act for a motor common carrier to conduct business on the 
basis of a negotiated and agreed to rate while failing to publish that rate in a 
tariff on file at this Commission. Surely the petitioner is in the best 
position to know what administrative assistance would be most helpful to its 
members in defending themselves against the unreasonable carrier practices 
addressed in this proceeding. Under these circumstances, the majority's 
decision falls short of providing the full measure of regulatory relief 
available by its reluctance to provide 0323 all of the assistance requested. ® 
n 
o 
Three years ago when the Commission first began its endeavors in Ex Parte No. 
MC-177 we moved very cautiously along the then uncharted waters surrounding K 
motor common carrier negotiated rates problems. Today, after gaining several ^ 
years experience, there can be no doubt thajt the Commission can, and must, move 
decisively to counteract the blatant abuse of a regulatory system by a small, 
but persistent, group of motor common carriers. Out of overriding concern for 
those shippers who must continue to defend themselves against these unreasonable 
rates practices, I would go a full step further than the majority and grant the 
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LOUIS, k NASH. R. R. >• MAXWELL. 
We are of the opinion that Congress used the words 
'employ^' and 'employed* in the statute in their natural 
sense, and intended to describe the conventional relation 
of employer and employ^ It was well known that there 
were on interstate trains persons engaged in various serv-
ices for other masters. Congress, familiar with this situa-
tion, did not use any appropriate expression which could 
be taken to indicate a purpose to include such persons 
among those to whom the railroad company was to be 
liable under the Act. 
We conclude that the plaintiff in error was not an em-
ploy6 of the defendant company within the meaning of 
the Employers' Liability Act, and that the judgment 
must be affirmed. 
JtupenUJimed, 
LOUISVILLE k NASHVILLE RAILROAD COM-
PANY v. MAXWELL. 
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP 
TENNESSEE. 
No. 181. Submitted March 8,1915.—Decided April 5,1915. 
Under the Act to Regulate Commerce the duly filed tariff of t ie carrier 
must be charged by it and paid by the shipper or passenger without 
deviation therefrom. 
Shippers and travelers are charged by the duly filed tariff and must 
abide thereby, unless it is found to be unreasonable by the Intestate 
Commerce Commission. 
Neither misquotation of rates nor ignorance is an excuse for charging 
or paying less or more than the filed rate. 
Although a passenger might have gone and returned by direct route 
to and from the point of destination, if he expressed the desire to go 
and come by a different route via specified points, he must pay the 
filed tariff rates for the route taken, notwithstanding a misquotation 
95 
237 U.S. 
would relieve the passenger. 
In a case here under \ 237, JudL Code, if the filed tariffs are not included 
in Uie record, this court takes the findrngs of the state court 
If the taH&s are not included in the record of a case to recover excess 
over an undercharge, and this court revises a judgment against 
the carrier on the Endings of the state court, and it appears on further 
proceedings that ^m was no undercharge, the carrier cannot 
recover in ti& court below. 
THE facts, which involve the construction of the Act 
to Regulate Commerce and the right of the carrier to 
recover from a passenger the amount of an undercharge 
on sale of railroad tickets, are stated in the opinion. 
Mr. J o h F r M e and Mr. Ei T. Seoj for plaintiff1 
in error, submitted. 
Mr. Jok A. Pitts and Mr. X. T. M(£mnh for defend-
ant in error, submitted. 
M B , JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the court. 
This action was brought, before a Justice of the Peace 
in Tennessee, by the Louisville k Nashville Railroad 
Company to recover $58.30 as the amount of an alleged 
undercharge on the sale of railroad tickets. Judgment 
for the defendant was affirmed by the Court of Civil 
Appeals and by the Supreme Court of the State. The 
case comes here on error. 
The facts, which were said to be undisputed, were 
found by the state court to be as follows: 
Defendant in error, G. A. Maxwell, after repeated 
interviews, and correspondence, with the representatives 
of the Louisville k Nashville Railroad Company in regard 
to rates on round trip tickets to Salt Lake City, pur-
96 OCTOBER TERM, 1914. 
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chased on or about the first day of June, 1910, "two 
passenger tickets from Nashville, Tennessee, to Salt 
Lake City, by way of Chicago, 111, Denver, Colo, and 
routed to return by Denver, Colo, Amarillo and Fort 
Worth, Texas, and Memphis, Tennessee, and paid for 
each ticket the sum of $49.50. 
"There were at the time, published rates under the 
provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act by which 
fares over the route actually traveled, going and coming, 
aggregated $78.65 each, or $29.15 each more than was 
charged and collected therefor, making a difference of 
$58.30 between the amount paid by Mr. Maxwell for 
the tickets in question, and the amount that should have 
teen ehargeAand collected. 
"Mr. Maxwell was informed ¥hen he fiist made in-
_ -a. 
quiry about the tickets in January, that there were no 
special rate tickets at that time, but likely would be by 
May or June first, He then, and on several occasions 
thereafter, made known his desire to go to Salt Lake 
City by one route, and return by another, and was told 
that he could not be furnished reduced rates except by 
going and coming over the same route, but after repeated 
inquiries, and the correspondence referred to, he was 
informed that he could make the trip on reduced rates one 
way, and return another; and when he went finally to 
purchase the two tickets, he stated to the agent that he 
wanted to go by way of Chicago and Denver and return 
by way of Stamford, Texas, and was given the tickets 
routed as hereinbefore noted, at the rates mentioned. 
At that time, he in fact could have gone to Salt Lake 
City at the rate which he paid, but over other routes, going 
and returning through Chicago and Denver, or through 
St. Louis and Denver, or through Memphis and Denver, 
or going through St. Louis and Denver and returning 
through Denver, Amarillo and Memphis. 
((Mr. Maxwell was in no way at fault in the matter. 
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He did no more than tell the agent the points to which he 
wished to go and make it known that he did not wish to 
go and return by the same route. The agent fixed the 
routing in the tickets a,nd named the fare, and Maxwell 
paid without further question." 
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the rate of the 
oarrier duly filed is the only lawful charge. Deviation 
from it is not permitted upon any pretext. Shippers and 
travelers are charged with notice of it, and they as well 
as the carrier must abide by it, unless it is found by the 
Commission to be unreasonable. Ignorance or mis-
quotation of rates is not an excuse for paying or charging 
either less or more than the rate filed. This rule is un-
deniably strict aud i t obviously may work hardship in 
s^orne cases^u t i t embodiesiherpdky which has been 
adopted by Congress in the regulation of interstatecom-
merce in order to prevent unjust dismmination.^ The Act 
(§ 6) provides: 
"Nor shall any carrier charge or demand or collect or 
receive a greater or less or different compensation for such 
transportation of passengers or property, or for any serv-
ice in connection therewith, between the points named in 
such tariffs than the rates, fares, and charges which are 
specified in the tariff filed and in effect at the time; nor 
shall any carrier refund or remit in any manner or by any 
device any portion of the rates, fares, and charges so 
specified, nor extend to any shipper or person any privi-
leges or facilities in the transportation of passengers or 
property, except such as are specified in such tariffs.^ 
The scope and effect of the provisions of the statute as 
to filing tariffs (both in their present form and as they stood 
prior to the amendments of 1906) have been set forth in 
numerous decisions. (MJ, Col & knla Fe Rwy, v, fiejlei/, 
158 U. S. 98; Tex. & Pw. Rwj. v. Mm 202 U. S. 242; 
Tex. & Pw. Rwy. v. AbUm Cotim Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 
445; Arnmr Podinq Co. v. VmUd S t o , 209 U. S. 
VOL. ccxxxvir-7 
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56,81; N. Y. C. & E. R. R. v. VtM State, 212 U. S. 
500,504; Cbkaqo & Alton R. B. v. flrty, 225 U. S. 155, 
166; fcts Cento! R. R. v. fferuferson Co, 226 U. S. 441; 
Xonsos Southern % v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639,653; Penn-
syfoania R. R. v. Iniernaiiona! Coal Co, 230 U. S. 184, 
197; Boston <fc Maine R. R. v. M e r , 233 U. S. 97,110-
113; George N. Fierce Co. v. Weh, Fargo & Co, 236 U. S. 
278,284. In tne Mugj Case, supra, it appeared that a 
rate, less than the lawful scheduled rate, had been quoted 
to the shipper by the agent of the railroad. The shipper 
had relied upon the quoted rate in making his shipments 
and sales. But it was held that he was bound to pay the 
established rate and was not entitled to the delivery of 
the goods without such payment. This was upon the 
ground that it was beyond the power of the earner to 
depart from the filed rates and" that the erroneous quota-
tion of the rate by its agent did not justify it in making 
a different charge from that which was lawfully appli-
cable* to the shipment. As was said in Kansas Southern 
Rwy. Co. v. Car!, supra: "Neither the intentional nor 
accidental misstatement of the applicable published rate 
will bind the carrier or shipper. The lawful rate is that 
which the carrier must exact and that which the shipper 
must pay. The shipper's knowledge of the lawful rate is 
conclusively presumed, and the carrier may not be re-
quired to surrender the goods carried upon the payment 
of the rate paid, if that was less than the lawful rate, 
until the full legal rate has been paid."—It was "the 
purpose of the Act to have but one rate, open to all alike 
and from which there could be no departure." Boston 
& Maine R. R. v. Hooker, supra, p. 112. The rule is 
applicable to the transportation of passengers and their 
baggage, l i 
The Supreme Court of the State fully recognized the 
established principle, but stated that the majority of the 
court were of the opinion that it was not controlling here, 
237 U S Opinion of the Court. 
for the reason that Mr. Maxwell could have gone to the 
point of destination, Salt Lake City, on one route, and 
have returned on another route, at the price actually 
paid for the tickets, and that, therefore, 'the mere mis-
routing of the ticket by the Railroad Company' was not a 
discrimination. In thus holding, the assumption was that 
there was an error on the part of the Railroad Company 
in the routing, by which he was misled, and that, as it is 
said, Mr. Maxwell 'could have gone to Salt Lake City at 
the price paid over other routes going and returning 
through Chicago and Denver or going through St. Louis 
and Denver and returning through Denver, Amarillo and 
Memphis, either one of which would have met his require-
ments.' 
We are unable to reach the conclusion that this ground 
of decision was available under the findings of fact. A 
misstatement, or misquotation, of the rate over a given 
route is one thing; misrouting is a different matter. We 
do not think that it can be said that there is a ' misrouting,' 
in any proper sense, when the route given by the company 
is that requested by the shipper or passenger. SeeSpred-
eb v. MoMngokk R. R , 181. C. C. Rep. 190,191. Ac-
cording to the findings of fact, it appears that, after his 
interviews and correspondence, Mr. Maxwell finally 
'stated to the agent that he wanted to go by way of 
Chicago and Denver, and return by way of Stamford, 
Texas.' His request covered four points,—Chicago, 
Denver, Salt Lake City, and Stamford. It appears by the 
findings that he could have gone, at the rate actually 
paid, through St Louis and Denver, returning through 
Denver, Amarillo and Memphis, or that he could have 
made the trip, at that rate, 'going and returning through 
Chicago and Denver, or through St. Louis and Denver, 
or through Memphis and Denver.'" But according to the 
findings, he was not entitled at the rate which he paid 
to make the trip through Chicago and Denver, returning 
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as he desired through Stamford, Texas. We are not con-
cerned with the reasons for the differences in rates on the 
various routes, but merely with the fact that they existed 
under the applicable tariffs as filed. Under these tariffs, 
' the findings of fact show that the amount paid was less 
than the amount due over the route selected. 
The counsel for the defendant in error insist that as the 
tariffs are not included in the record, the judgment cannot 
be reversed. But, as we have said, we take the findings of 
the state court. 
It is further insisted that, on reference to the tariffs, 
it will appear that the Railroad Company is mistaken inits 
assertion that there was an undercharge, and that the 
rate actually paid was, in truth, the lawful rate. The tar-
iffs have not been submitted to us and it is sufficient to 
say that if in the further proceedings in this case it shall 
appear that the defendant in error is right in this conten-
tion, it will necessarily follow that the Railroad Company 
will be unable to recover. But we cannot so hold upon the 
case as it is now presented. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS dissents. 
GUFFEY v. S M I T E 101 
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GUFFEY 9. JAMES A. SMITH. 
CEETIOBABI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOB THE 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT, 
No. 86. Argued December 2,3,1914.—Deoded April 5,1915. 
Under the settled rule of decision in Illinois an o3 and gas lease like that 
involved in this suit passes to the lessee, his heira and assigns, a 
present vested freehold interest in the premises, and an option on 
the part of the lessee to surrender does not create a tenancy at will, 
give the lessor an option to compel surrender or make the lease void 
as wanting in mutuality. 
Decisions of the highest courts of the State in which the property 
is situated are accepted and applied by the Federal courts as rules 
of property in passing upon the estate and rights passing by such 
a lease. 
Where, as is the case in Illinois, the holder of such a lease cannot 
maintain ejectment in the state courts, he cannot, under §§ 721 and 
1914, maintain such an action in the Federal courts in that State. 
Where ejectment cannot be maintained by one holding a gas and oil 
lease against another claiming under a later lease, and no other 
action affords an adequate remedy, the earlier lessee may maintain 
a suit in equity to restrain the later lessee and for accounting and 
discovery in the Federal courts where the requisite amount is in-
volved and diverse citizenship exists, even though such a suit, by 
reason of the lessee having an option to surrender, could not be 
maintained in the courts of the States. 
Remedies afforded and modes of procedure pursued in the Federal 
courts sitting as courts of equity are not determined by local laws 
or rules of decision, but by general principles, rules and usages of 
equity having uniform operation in those courts wherever sitting. 
According to the general principles and rules of equity enforced in the 
Federal courts, a clause in a lease permitting the lessee to surrender 
it is not an obstacle to enforcing the lease in equity against those who, 
under a later lease, are committing waste. 
Whether a lease is so unfair and inequitable that it cannot be enforced 
by the lessee in equity must be determined in view of the circum-
stances under which it was given; and in this case held that an oil 
and gas lease of undeveloped land requiring all expenses to be paid 
by the lessee and providing for reasonable royalties and fixed rental 
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parens patriae capacities. Without discuss-
ing all of the arguments raised by both 
sides, the court agrees with the state's view 
that "representation of mentally disabled 
persons b the paradigm case for parens 
patriae standing." Plaintiffs1 memoran-
dum at 30. See, & g.f Hawaii v. Standard 
Oil Co., 406 U.S. 251, 257, 92 S.Ct 885, 888, 
31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972) (discussing modern 
expansion of parens patriae concept from 
common law origin of King "as guardian of 
persons under legal disabilities to act for 
themselves"). See generally O'Connor v. 
Donaldson; 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct 2486, 45 
LE&2d 396 (1975). The Supreme Court 
recently reaffirmed the state's parens patri-
ae interest in this area: "The state has a 
legitimate interest under its parens patriae 
powers in providing care to its citizens who 
are unable because of emotional disorders 
to care for themselves." Addington v. Tex-
as, 441 U.S. 418, 426, 99 S.Ct 1804, 1809, 60 
LEdJM 323 (1979). The court concludes, 
therefore, that the state has standing to 
bring this suit on behalf of its mentally 
retarded citizens. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' motion to dismiss the com-
plaint for lack of jurisdiction and for lack of 
standing to sue is denied. Defendants are 
directed to file an answer to the complaint 
within 20 days of receipt of this court's 
memorandum and order. 
The parties are also directed to appear 
before-the court on March 19, 1981 at 9:00 
a. m. for a status conference to discuss the 
future course of this litigation. 
SO ORDERED. 
3 K£Y*U*«ttSTOtM> 
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STANDARD MILLING COMPANY, 
Defendant 
No. CIV-80-577E, 
United States District Court, 
W. D. New York. 
Feb. 18, 198L 
Railroad brought action to recover de-
murrage charges. On milling company's 
motion for summary judgment, the District 
Court, Elfvin, J., held that: (1) railroad 
may not compromise a claim for demurrage 
charges, and (2) carrier's agreement to ac-
cept a specified sum in payment for the 
demurrage charges does not bar an action 
to recover the full tariff rate if for any 
reason it later appears that the sum re-
ceived was less than the amount actually 
due under the tariff. 
Motion denied. 
1. Carriers <*=»35 
Carrier may not compromise a claim 
for demurrage charges. Revised Interstate 
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 10741(a). 
2. Carriers «=»35, 189 
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, 
filed tariffs have the_/orce of law and 
therefore may~notrbe~modified by private 
agreement 
3. Carriers «=>35 
A carrier may not settle a claim for 
charges due under a tariff. Revised Inter-
state Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 10741(a). 
4. Carriers *=»35 
Carrier's agreement to accept a speci-
fied sum does not bar an action to recover 
the full tariff rate if for any reason it later 
appears that the sum received was less than 
the amount actually due under tariff; even 
though check sent by milling company to 
railroad to cover demurrage charges was 
SO$FSofV.—S 
278 508 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 
accompanied by a letter which specifically 
stated that acceptance of the check would 
be in full payment for all demurrage 
charges, railroad could negotiate the check 
and later recover the additional demurrage 
charges. Revised Interstate Commerce 
Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 10741(a). 
Moot, Sprague, Marcy, Landy, Fernbach 
& Smythe, Buffalo, N. Y., for plaintiff 
(Ruth R O'Keefe, Buffalo, N. Y., of coun-
sel). 
Jaeckle, Fleischmann & Mugel, Buffalo, 
N. Y., for defendant (Henry W. Killeen, III, 
Buffalo, N. Y., of counsel). 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
ELFVIN, J. 
Plaintiff ("ConRail") seeks to recover 
$69,691.00 in demurrage charges said to be 
owed by defendant ("Standard"). Standard 
has interposed the defense of accord and 
satisfaction and moved to dismiss the Com-
plaint under Fed.RCiv.P. rule 12(b). I am 
treating said motion as a motion for sum-
mary judgment 
Standard operates grain elevators and 
other milling facilities and receives ship-
ments of grain via rail service provided by 
ConRail. Standard's rail yard is capable of 
holding approximately twenty-three cars. 
When grain shipments of more than twen-
ty-three cars are received, ConRail delivers 
the maximum number of cars to Standard 
which unloads the cars and then requests 
ConRail to remove the empties and deliver 
more cars. This process is repeated until 
the entire shipment is unloaded by Stan-
dard 
Under applicable tariffs, Standard is giv-
en a certain period of time in which to 
unload the cars after they have been made 
available to it If Standard fails to unload 
the cars timely it becomes liable for demur-
rage charges for each day the cars are 
retained beyond the specified free time 
Standard would not be liable for demurrage 
charges if the delay in unloading was 
caused by ConRaiL 
In 1979, ConRail billed Standard for de-
murrage charges totalling $72,481.00. 
Standard refused to pay the charges be-
cause it considered that ConRail was re-
sponsible for the unloading delays. James 
Bahleda, a Vice President of Standard, sent 
a letter December 28,1979 to W. E. Brown, 
ConRaiPs Manager of Demurrage, in which 
he stated that the demurrage charges were 
"improper" because ConRaiPs service had 
been "erratic at best" and that Standard 
could not be "responsible for CoiriiaiPs fail-
ure to provide probtfs«d service • • V 
Bahleda's letter noteiLlhjjK .Standard might 
be liable for someof the charges and j#n-
cluded: 
" • • * [W]e do not concede that any 
demurrage is omnj^on these trains. In 
order to resolve thishntire dispute with-
out^urther controversy, however, we are 
willing to make a payment of $2,790.00 
for demurrage on the larger train of 62 
cVs in full settlement of all demurrage 
charges referred to in this letter. 
"Therefore, I am enclosing our check in 
the amount of $2,790.00 which, // accept-
ed, shall be in full payment for all demur-
rage charges incurred by us for the peri-
ods February 20-23, 1979 and August 7-
October 1, 1979." [Emphasis added.] 
ConRail negotiated the check that had been 
enclosed with the letter. 
In March 1980, counsel for ConRail at-
tempted to return Standard's payment on 
the grounds that ConRail had no authority 
to compromise the demurrage charges 
against Standard. Standard refused to ac-
cept return payment, its counsel explaining 
that ConRaiPs acceptance of Standard's 
check constituted "a valid accord and satis-
faction which cannot be repudiated * * V 
ConRail commenced this action to recover 
the demurrage charges less Standard's pay-
ment thereon. 
[1] Standard's motion raises the initial 
question whether ConRail may legally settle 
a claim for demurrage charges. The Inter-
state Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10741(a), 
provides that a common carrier such as 
ConRail: 
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 * • may not charge or receive from a 
person a different compensation • • * 
for a service rendered • * • in transpor-
tation the carrier may perform under this 
subtitle than it charges or receives from 
another person for performing a like and 
contemporaneous service in the transpor-
tation of a like kind of traffic under 
substantially similar circumstances." 
Under 49 U.S.C. § 10761(a), a carrier may 
not charge or receive a rate different than 
the rate prescribed in the applicable tariff. 
ConRail argues that these statutory provi-
sions prevent it from compromising a claim 
for demurrage charges. I agree. 
[2,3] Under the Interstate Commerce 
Act, filed tariffs have the force of law and 
therefore may not be modified by private 
agreement III Cent Gulf R. Co. v. Golden 
Triangle, Etc, 586 ?2A 588, 592 (5th Cir. 
1978); In re Penn Central Transportation 
Co., 477 F.2d 841, 844 (3d Cir. 1973). It is 
stated in L & N.R.R. v. Centra/ Iron Co., 
265 U.S. 59, 65, 44 S.Ct. 441, 442, 68 L.Ed. 
900 (1924): 
"The amount of the freight charges legal-
ly payable was determined by applying 
this tariff rate to the actual weight 
Thus, they were fixed by law. No con-
tract of the carrier could reduce the 
amount legally payable; or release from 
liability a shipper who had assumed an 
obligation to pay the charges. Nor could 
any act or omission of the carrier (except 
the running of the statute of limitations) 
estop or precludejtj^rom enforcing pay-
ment of theHfuinamount by a person 
liable therefor/' 
Thus, it is generally held that a carrier may 
not settle a claim for charges due under a 
tariff. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Ready 
Mixed Concrete Co., 487 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 
1973); In re Penn Central Transportation 
Co., supra; Baker v. Southeastern Mich. 
Shippers Co-Op Ass'n, 376 F.Supp. 149 (E.D. 
Mich.1973); Norton v. Shotmeyer, 72 
F.Supp. 188, 191 (D.NJ.1947). See, also, 
Locust Cartage Co. v. Transamerican 
Freight lines, Inc., 430 F.2d 334, 343 (1st 
Cir. 1970) ("a carrier can recover underchar-
ges from a shipper regardless of contrary 
agreement, misquotation by the carrier, re-
liance, or other equitable defense'*); <A//e-
ghany Corporation v. Romeo, Inc., 392 
F.Supp. 38, 40 (W.D.Pa.1975) (-no defenses 
such as estoppel by conduct of the carrier, 
reliance by the shipper, innocence of the 
shipper, hardship on the shipper, [or] agree-
ment by the parties may avail a shipper"); 
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Higgins, 
223 F^upp. 396, 401 (D.N.D.1963) (44a carri-
er cannot tfaive or be estopped from collec-
ting full charges prescribed by published 
tariffs"). 
[4] Standard concedes that a carrier is 
prohibited from accepting less than the full 
tariff charge, but argues that "the carrier 
has substantial freedom in establishing 
what the proper charge under the tariff 
actually is" In this respect Standard seeks 
to bind ConRail to an alleged agreement 
that proper demurrage charges totalled 
$2,790.00. It is clear, however, that a earn-
er's agreement to accept a specified sum 
does not bar an action to recover the full 
tariff rate, if for any reason it later appears 
that the sum received was less than the 
amount actually due under the tariff. Ill 
Cont Gulf R Co. v. Golden Triangle Etc, 
supra; Locust Cartage Co. v. Transameri-
can Freight Lines, Inc., supra. 
Moreover, Standard's attempt to distin-
guish cases such as In re Penn Central 
Transportation Co., supra, overlooks their 
underlying rationale. In limiting the de-
fenses available to a shipper in an action to 
recover tariff charges, courts have ^ex-
pressed concern that the parties~may seek 
through sham devices to avoid application 
of the tariffs. See, e. g, Chicago, B. & O. 
R Co. v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., supra, 
at 1267; In re Penn Central Transportation 
Co., supra, at 844. The court in III. Cent 
Gulf R Co. v. Golden Triangle, EXc, supra, 
at 592, explained that to permit a shipper to 
invoke estoppel against a railroad would 
permit "rate discrimination to occur 
through the subterfuge of a carrier's delib-
erately misinforming a shipper as to the 
proper charges for services to be rendered." 
The same rationale is applicable in the 
present case; the defense of accord and 
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satisfaction would allow carriers to treat 
favored shippers in a preferential manner 
by compromising "disputes" over the 
amount of demurrage charges due. 
Standard points out that under Interstate 
Commerce Commission regulations a carrier 
is authorized to settle claims for over-
charge, 49 C.F.R. § 1008.8. A claim for an 
overcharge implies that the shipper has al-
ready paid the carrier's claim. 49 U.S.C. 
§§ 11705(bXl) and 11706(b). This distinc-
tion may seem trivial but the Commission's 
regulations are designed to ensure compli-
ance with the tariffs. The regulations pre-
scribe certain procedures to be followed in 
disposing of overcharge claims and there 
has been no showing that the procedures 
have been followed here. 
Therefore, Standard's motion to dismiss is 
hereby ORDERED denied. Standard may, 
of course, plead and attempt to prove its 
defense that the demurrage charges sought 
by ConRail were caused by ConRail's own 
fault 
O I UTMUMSCR SYSTEM^ 
Everett SLAVEN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Patricia R. HARRIS, Secretary of Health 
and Human Service*, Defendant 
No, <>3-7!MHJa 
United States District Court, 
S. D. Ohio, W. D. 
Feb. 19, 1981. 
Claimant objected to the report and 
recommendation of magistrate recommend-
ing affirmance of decision of Secretary of 
Health and Human Services denying his 
claim for disability benefits and supplemen-
tal income. The District Court, Rice, J., 
held that evidence did not support adminis-
trative law judge's finding that claimant 
was able to return to his vocationally rele-
vant past work as a grinder and punch 
press operator and, in light of doctor's -De-
port conditioning a finding of mental im-
pairment on the existence of medical inabil-
ity to perform work and in light of the lack 
of an articulated basis for failing to other-
wise reach a "disability" decision seemingly 
required by new regulations, there was 
good cause for rdfeanding the case to the 
Secretary. 
Remanded. 
1. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<*=»143.70 
Claimant ultimately bears mt burden 
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence 
in establishing "disability" under the Social 
Security A t Social Security Act, §§ 223, 
1601, 42 ILSG.A. §§ 423, 138L 
2. Social Security and Public Welfare 
«=> 143.45 
If claimant succeeds in establishing a 
prima facie case of disability under the 
Social Security Act, then the burden of 
proving the claimant's ability to engage in 
some other substantial gainful activities ex-
isting in the national economy temporarily 
shifts to Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, even though the inability to en-
gage in such other work is, technically, an 
element of "disability" as defined in the 
Act. Social Security Act, § 223(dX2), 42 
U.S.C.A. § 423(dX2). 
3. Social Security and Public Welfare 
«=> 143.70 
Although it was not clear how many 
months claimant had been employed as a 
grinder and punch press operator, he dem-
onstrated more than adequate familiarity 
with the nature and functional require-
ments of the occupation so as to be reason-
ably expected to prove his inability to per-
form such work and, therefore, magistrate's 
reference to claimant's "vocationally rele-
vant past work" as a grinder and punch 
press operator, in determining that claim-
ant failed to establish a prima facie case of 
disability under the Social Security Act, 
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inadvertent; exception to rule is recognized 
when misrouting is shown. INMAN FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC and 
Jim S. Green, Trustee, Appellees, 
Cross-appellants, 
v. 
OLIN CORPORATION, Appellant, 
Cross-appellee. 
No*. 85-2110, 85-2111. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Eighth Circuit. 
Submitted June 9, 1986. 
Decided Dec. 2, 1986. 
Motor carrier sought undercharges 
from consignee of shipments of projectile 
parts and radioactive materiaL The Dis-
trict Court, Stephen N. Limbaugh, J., 614 
F.Supp. 1355, held that consignee was lia-
ble for undercharges incurred by carrier 
and consignee and carrier appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Bright, Senior Circuit 
Judge, held that* (1) Interstate Commerce 
Commission did not have primary jurisdic-
tion over action; (2) carrier misrouted ship-
ments BO as to avoid lower commodity rates 
for period of time during which proposed 
destination carrier could have participated 
in joint routes, despite fact that route was 
not shortest possible route; and (3) carrier 
was not estopped from seeking underchar-
ges from consignee, which had paid freight 
charges as provided by bills of lading. 
Affirmed in part and remanded in part 
1. Commerce «=»89<14) 
Interstate Commerce Commission did 
not have primary jurisdiction over dispute 
between motor carrier and consignee over 
undercharges on shipments of projectile 
parts and radioactive material where rea-
sonableness of tariffs was not in dispute, 
so that ICC expertise was not required to 
resolve issues. 
2. Carriers «=»189 
Generally, if carrier shows that pub-
lished rate was not charged, it may recover 
undercharge even if mistake was mutual or 
3. Carriers «=»189, 200 
When carrier misroutes a shipment, 
carrier is liable for any overcharges al-
ready paid and may not recover any under-
charges after discovering that higher rate 
may have applied to shipment 
4. Carriers <s=>189 
Motor carrier misrouted shipments by 
not using interchange which would have 
resulted in lower commodity rates only dur-
ing approximately five-month period during 
which proposed destination carrier could 
have accepted shipment, where proposed 
destination carrier obtained required bilat-
eral concurrence to applicable tariff only at 
the beginning of that time, and at the end 
of that time obtained permanent authority 
to serve both points, so that it could not 
participate in joint routes; thus, carrier 
was not entitled to recover undercharges 
from consignee for shipments carried dur-
ing that period of time. 
5. Carriers «=»189 
Initial motor carrier could have inter-
changed with proposed destination carrier 
through route which would have provided 
lower commodity rates despite tariff which 
required that radioactive material be 
shipped via shortest available route in that 
only small number of total shipments car-
ried radioactive materials, tariff required 
only that shortest available route rather 
than shortest possible route be used and 
35-mile difference between two routes was 
de minimus when considered with distance 
of entire trip; thus carrier misrouted ship-
ment during period in which proposed desti-
nation carrier had authority to interchange 
through route with lowest commodity rates 
and therefore carrier could not recover un-
dercharges for shipments carried during 
that period from consignee. 
6. Carriers *»189 
Federal regulation which preserves 
commodity rate even in absence of publish-
ed concurrence to tariff did not apply to 
tariffs which contained routing instruc-
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tions; thus, proposed destination motor 
carrier could not have been available carri-
er prior to time it acquired published con-
currence to tariff. 
7. Carriers <S=>189 
Estoppel «=>87 
Carrier may be estopped from collect-
ing freight charges when consignee relies 
on misrepresentation and is asked to pay 
double applicable charges, but estoppel de-
fense is not available in suit for underchar-
ges when carrier simply misquoted rates; 
rather, consignee must have paid full appli-
cable rate to consignor in order for carrier 
to be estopped from collecting from con-
signee. 
8. Carriers «=>189 
Motor carrier was not estopped from 
seeking undercharges from consignee for 
shipments of projectile parts and radioac-
tive material, where consignee paid freight 
charges as provided by bills of lading but 
had not paid full freight charges set forth 
in applicable tariff. 
9. Federal Courts <t=»939 
Failure by district court to address is-
sue of prejudgment interest to carrier enti-
tled to payment for undercharges required 
remand. 
Ross L. Thorfinnson, Hopkins, Minn., for 
appellant 
Steven C. Weiss, Chicago, I1L, for appel-
ice. 
Before McMILUAN, Circuit Judge, 
BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge and BOW-
MAN, Circuit Judge. 
BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge. 
Olin Corporation (Olin) appeals from the 
district court's! judgment holding it liable 
in the sum of $150,885.18, plus costs, for 
undercharges incurred by Inman Freight 
Systems (Inman) for carriage and delivery 
I. The Honorable Stephen N. Umbaugh, United 
States District Judge for the Eastern District of 
of motor freight c&rgo. For reversal, Olin 
argues that the district court erred when it 
(1) rejected Olin's affirmative defense of 
misrouting; (2) misapplied the tariffs to the 
subject shipments; and (3) refused to apply 
an estoppel defense against Inman. In its 
cross-appeal, Inman claims that the district 
court erred by not awarding prejudgment 
interest After oral argument, this court 
asked the parties to submit supplemental 
briefs addressing whether the issues in this 
case fall within the primary jurisdiction of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICQ. We have considered these briefs 
and conclude that we must decide the ap-
peal; not remand to the district court for 
referral to the ICC. For reasons set forth 
in this opinion, we affirm in part but direct 
that the judgment be reduced because no 
undercharges may be collected during the 
period from November 14, 1980 to April 1, 
1981. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This dispute arises out of shipments con-
taining projectile parts and radioactive ma-
terials from Honeywell, Inc. to Olin be-
tween September 4, 1980 and June 22, 
1981. Honeywell tendered the shipments 
to Wintz Motor Freight, Inc. (Wintz) at 
New Brighton, Minnesota for delivery to 
Olin at Marion, Illinois. Because Wintz 
lacked ICC authority to serve Marion, 
Wintz needed to interchange the shipments 
with another carrier. Wintz interchanged 
all of the subject shipments with Inman at 
St Louis, Missouri and Inman delivered 
each shipment to Olin. 
Honeywell, as consignor, prepared the 
bills of lading and prepaid all freight 
charges as billed by Wintz. Honeywell 
also included in the bill of lading a section 
prohibiting recourse against it for any un-
dercharges subsequently determined by the 
carriers. Honeywell paid a total of $100,-
401.82 in freight charges based upon a 
Missouri. The district court's opinion is report-
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commodity tariff rate2 published in Mid-
dlewest Bureau 200 Series Tariff (MWB 
200). 
Inman subsequently declared bankruptcy 
and an audit revealed that the Honeywell-
Olin shipments were billed incorrectly at a 
commodity rate substantially lower than 
the applicable class rate. Inman's trustee 
in bankruptcy then filed the instant lawsuit 
to collect the undercharges from Olin, the 
consignee of the subject shipments. 
After a bench trial, the district court 
found that Wintz had incorrectly assessed 
the rates named in the MWB 200 tariff. 
Instead, the rates named in the MWB 50) 
tariff applied to the subject shipments be-
cause it was the only published tariff in 
which both Wintz and Inman participated. 
The MWB 200 tariff did not apply to the 
subject shipments because Inman was not 
a party to the MWB 200 tariff. The MWB 
501 tariff named only a class rate that was 
substantially higher than the MWB 200 
commodity rate actually charged 
The district court also rejected Olin's af-
firmative defense that Wintz had misrouted 
the shipments. The trial court found that 
Associated Truck Lines (ATL) could not 
have been used as a destination carrier to 
preserve the commodity rate by interchang-
ing through Chicago, as claimed by Olin. 
Furthermore, the governing tariff NMF 
100-G stated that hazardous shipments 
should be moved along the shortest route. 
Because the St Louis route was shorter, 
ATL was not an available alternative carri-
er. 
The court also rejected Olin's claim that 
Inman be estopped from collecting the un-
dercharges because Olin had reasonably re-
lied on the prepaid bills of lading in accept-
ing the shipments and in its subsequent 
ed as inman Freight Sys. v. 
F.Supp. 1355 (E.D.Mo.1985). 
Olin Corp., 614 
2. A commodity rate establishes charges between 
specific points and is usually lower than a class 
rate, which establishes charges for general deliv-
ery. A commodity rate is a preferential rate 
and the carrier is expected to preserve it, if 
possible, htman, 614 FSupp. at 1357. 
payments to Honeywell. The court noted 
that estoppel is not favored in suits to 
collect undercharges and has been applied 
only in the few cases in which the party 
sued had already paid the full freight 
charges. In the instant case, the court 
found that the full charges according to the 
applicable tariff had not been paid and thus 
estoppel was not justified. The district 
court awarded Inman $150,885.18.* 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Primary Jurisdictions 
[1] As explained in our discussion be-
low, we do not remand this case to the ICC. 
The trial court received evidence and testi-
mony from experts on which tariffs ap-
plied. Reasonableness of the tariffs was 
not in dispute. Accordingly, the ICC's spe-
cial expertise is not required for considera-
tion of issues at dispute in this case. See, 
e.g., United States v. Western Pac. &/ZL, 
352 U.S. 59, 66, 77 S.Ct 161, 166, 1 LEA2d 
126 (1956); Distrigas of Massachusetts 
Corp, v. Boston Gas Co., 693 F.2d 1113, 
1117-18 (1st Cir.1982). 
The matter of equitable defenses, how-
ever, raises a different matter. On Octo-
ber 29, 1986, the ICC issued a policy state-
ment that reversed its previous position on 
equitable defenses. National Indus. 
Transp. League, — I.C.C.2d — , Ex Parte 
No. MC-177 (Oct 14, 1986). The ICC es-
sentially stated that in cases referred to it, 
it would consider whether collection of un-
dercharges would constitute an unreason-
able practice considering all of the relevant 
circumstances. 
We note that the ICC's new policy does 
not apply directly to this case. The ICCs 
statement specifically applies to cases in 
which the parties negotiate a rate, but such 
3w This amount reflects the entire amount of 
undercharges due to both Inman and Wintz. 
Although Wintz is not a party to this suit, recov-
ery of the entire amount by Inman is proper. 
Southern Pac Co. v. Miller Abattoir QK 454 
¥2d 357, 359 (3d Cir.1972); Pennsylvania RJL 
v. Greene, 173 F-Supp. 657. 658 (SJXAla.1959). 
Since both companies are in bankruptcy* pre-
sumably a division of the award will be made 
there. 
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rate is not pu Wished. The parties do not 
argue here that a negotiated rate was un-
published but instead question the applica-
tion of the lower published rate to the 
shipments in question. Accordingly, we do 
not refer this case to the ICC for possible 
application of its new policy. 
Other considerations support this conclu-
sion. Olin has never asked the district 
court to stay the proceedings and refer the 
case to the ICC. The events at issue here 
occurred six years ago and further delay is 
simply not warranted. Although the ICC's 
new policy does not specifically apply here, 
we recognize that if the ICC were present-
ed with this case, it may well come to a 
different conclusion. We, however, decline 
to apply the ICC's newly stated policy our-
selves and we do not assume that this 
policy applies in this case. As discussed 
below, we will apply existing case law to 
the estoppel defense. We now turn to 
01in'8 defenses. 
B. Misrouting 
Olin argues that it cannot be held liable 
for any undercharges because Wintz misr-
outed the shipments. Specifically, Olin 
contends that Wintz could have transferred 
the freight at Chicago using ATL as the 
interline carrier and thereby preserved the 
commodity rate. Because Wintz failed to 
use the route with the lowest available 
rate, Olin asserts that Inman may not re-
cover any additional charges. 
[2,3] Generally, if a carrier shows that 
the published rate was not charged, it may 
recover the undercharge even if the mis-
take was mutual or inadvertent Louis-
ville & N. ML v. Mead Johnson & Co., 
737 F.2d 683, 686 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 
469 U.S. 982, 105 S.Ct 386, 83 LEd.2d 320 
(1984). An exception to this rule is recog-
nized when misrouting is shown. Misrout-
ing occurs when several routes with differ-
ent rates are available and the carrier fails 
to move over the route with the lowest 
rate. I±; Johnson Machine Works v. Chi-
cago, B. & Q. R.&, 291 F.2d 793, 795 (8th 
Cir.1962). When the carrier misroutes a 
shipment, the carrier is liable for any ov-
ercharges already paid and may not recov-
er any undercharges after discovering that 
a higher rate may have applied to the ship-
ment Johnson Machine, 297 F.2d at 793. 
[4] In the present case, the district 
court found that an alternate route was not 
available. The court observed that Wintz 
could not have interchanged with ATL in 
Chicago before November 14, 1980 and af-
ter April 1, 1981. Wintz and ATL did not 
have the required bilateral concurrence to 
the tariff until November 14, 1980. ATL 
could not participate in joint routes be-
tween New Brighton and Marion after 
April 1, 1981 because it then obtained per-
manent authority to serve both points. 
These findings are amply supported by the 
record. Accordingly, Olin's defense of 
misrouting fails, at least for the shipments 
carried before November 14,1980 and after 
April 1, 1981. 
As for the period between these two 
dates, the district court found that Wintz 
had an obligation pursuant to the NMF 
10O-G tariff to ship the freight over the 
shortest available route because the ship-
ments contained radioactive material. Be-
cause the St Louis route is thirty-five 
miles shorter than the route through Chica-
go, the court held that the commodity rate 
was not available to Wintz. Accordingly, 
the court denied Olin's misrouting defense. 
[5] We disagree with the district court's 
conclusion. The NMF 100-G tariff re-
quires the shortest available route which 
may not be the shortest possible route. 
Secondly, only about fourteen of the 
eighty-five shipments carried radioactive 
materials. Finally, the thirty-five mile dif-
ference between the St Louis and Chicago 
routes is de minimus when considered in 
the context of the entire trip from New 
Brighton to Marion. Thus, between No-
vember 14, 1980 and April 1, 1981, Wintz 
could have interchanged with ATL through 
Chicago. Accordingly, Olin has shown 
misrouting during the dates indicated and 
Inman may not recover undercharges for 
shipments carried during that period. 
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C Misapplication of Tariffs 
16] Olin argues that the district court 
erred when it held that 49 C.F.R. § 1300.64 
did not apply to Wintz and ATL. Olin 
apparently contends that the regulation 
preserves a commodity rate even in the 
absence of a published concurrence to the 
tariff. Thus, ATL could have been an 
available carrier for the shipments prior to 
November 14, 1980. 
Olin, however, fails to mention that 49 
C.F.R. § 1300.64 applies only to those tar-
iffs that contain no routing instructions. 
The district court specifically found that 
the MWB 200 tariff contained routing in-
structions. Even though based on docu-
mentary evidence, we may not overturn 
this finding unless clearly erroneous. Fed. 
R.Civ.P. 52(a); Anderson v. City of Bes-
semer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct 1504, 
1512, 84 LEd^d 518 (1985). The record 
clearly supports the district court's finding 
and accordingly the regulation has no appli-
cation to the tariffs at issue in this case. 
D. Estoppel 
Olin argues that the district court erred 
when it rejected Olin's estoppel defense. 
Olin claims that it should not be held liable 
because the bills of lading were marked 
prepaid, Olin reimbursed Honeywell accord-
ing to the bills of lading, and Olin had no 
notice that further freight charges were 
owing. 
[7] A carrier may be estopped from col-
lecting freight charges when the consignee 
relies on a misrepresentation and is asked 
to pay double the applicable charges. 
Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commercial 
Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336, 351, 102 S.Ct 
1815, 1824, 72 L.Ed.2d 114 (1982); South-
ern Pac Transp. Co. v. Campbell Soup 
Co^ 455 F.2d 1219,1222 (8th Cir.1972). An 
estoppel defense, however, is not available 
in a suit for undercharges when carriers 
simply misquote the rates. Seaboard Sys. 
R.R v. United States, 794 F.2d 635, 637-38 
(11th Cir.1986). Rather, the consignee 
must have paid the full applicable rate to 
the consignor in order for the carrier to be 
807F.2d-5 
estopped from collecting from the consign-
ee. Campbell Soup, 455 F.2d at 1222. 
[8] In the present case, it is clear that 
no one has yet paid the full freight charges 
to either carrier. Because Honeywell in-
cluded a nonrecourse provision in its bills 
of lading, Olin is liable for the underchar-
ges. O'Boyle Tank Lines v. Beckham, 616 
F.2d 207, 209 (5th Cir.1980). Olin has not 
paid the full freight charges and by paying 
it, it will not be subjected to the inequity of 
double payment 
E. Prejudgment Interest 
[9] In its cross-appeal, Inman claims 
that the district court erred when it failed 
to award prejudgment interest We note 
that prejudgment interest is normally 
awarded in claims for undercharges. 
Southern Pac Transp. Co. v. San Anto-
nio, 748 F.2d 266, 274 (5th Cir.1984); Loui-
siana & Ark. Ry. v. Export Drum Co., 359 
F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir.1966). Because the 
district court did not address prejudgment 
interest, we direct the district court to ex-
amine Inman's claim on remand 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, so much of 
the judgment as covers undercharges for 
shipments carried by Inman from Septem-
ber 4,1980 through November 14,1980 and 
from April 1,1981 through June 22,1981 is 
affirmed. As to the inclusion of under-
charges between November 14, 1980 and 
April 1, 1980, however, the trial court 
erred. 
We affirm in part and remand for a 
recalculation and modification of the judg-
ment in accordance with this opinion. Ap-
pellant is entitled to fifty percent of its 
costs and disbursements on this appeal. 
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